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This report provides an overview of Australia’s
containerised grain export supply chains. We
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their improvement. Rather the report outlines the
main broad ways in which Australia’s containerised
grain supply chains can be improved by
investment, policy or regulatory change
and education.
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>70%

Over 70 per cent
of Australia’s grain
packing businesses are
in eastern Australia.
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Recommendations
Market access
• Develop and support new or existing
market opportunities for Australian grain
and fodder and identify opportunities that
fit the capabilities of Australia’s
supply chains.

Supply chain investment
• Support investments that create or
maintain least-cost, low emission grain
paths for containerised grain and fodder.

– Support infrastructure investments
that complement the Inland Rail to
facilitate cost-effective movement of
containerised grain and fodder, and
empty containers.
– Invest in transport modes and
pathways that increase mass limits.
– Invest in infrastructure to fix
inefficiencies in the supply chain
caused by larger ships, inadequate
rail access to some container ports,
and a shortage of space in some
empty container parks.
– Invest in protection and maintenance
of buffer zones of container
transport corridors.

Grower education
• Educate growers and other prospective
participants about execution risks
associated with containerised grain.
• Educate these same participants about how
to soundly manage these risks when
exporting containerised grain and fodder.

Oversight and regulation
• More effectively monitor bulk and container
supply chains to support evidence-based
policy-making and beneficial investment.

– More effectively regulate container
ports to boost their efficiency and
avoid anti-competitive behaviour.
– Ensure container port developments
by governments and industry
achieve enduring economic and ESG
(environmental, social, governance)
outcomes rather than sole short-term
budgetary relief or commercial
advantage to incumbents.
– Review and appropriately regulate
domestic and international
container shipping.
– Enhance coordination and provision
of data hubs to facilitate management
and investment in containerised grain
supply chains.
– Protect and maintain buffer zones of
least-cost, low emission containerised
grain pathways.
• Frequently revise biosecurity protocols and
processes underpinning containerised grain
exports to improve their cost-effectiveness.
Continuously improve the training of
authorised officers.
• Investigate policies and regulations to
cost-effectively reduce export execution
risks in containerised grain supply chains.
• Where appropriate, further align transport
regulations to form national standards to
support least cost corridor networks.
• Help devise cost-effective responses to the
structural challenge of gradual reduced
availability of 20ft food grade containers.

Recommendations
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Key findings

Australia regularly exports over
3mmt of grain in containers
There are over 100 grain container packing
businesses in Australia and over 70 per cent
are located in NSW, Vic or Qld. In these three
states the export of containerised grain is
especially important. Over the period 2014–15
to 2020–21 containerised grain exports
accounted for 36, 28 and 34 per cent of all
grain exports in Vic, NSW and Qld respectively.
Nationally, over the same period, containerised
grain exports annually averaged 3.24mmt.

Australia regularly exports
around 1mmt of fodder in
containers
Complementing containerised grain exports are
exports of fodder. Often unappreciated is how
much fodder is exported via containers from
Australian ports. Over several decades
Australia has developed some key markets for
export hay, with often around 1mmt of fodder
being exported via containers from Australia.

Relative to the bulk export of
grain, containerisation offers
several advantages but also
some disadvantages
This report outlines the advantages and
disadvantages of exporting grain and fodder in
containers and compares the nature and
costliness of typical containerised grain supply
chains against those of bulk export supply
chains. The many advantages of
containerisation ensure it will remain an
important part of the supply of Australian grain
to overseas customers.
The per tonne costs of containerised grain
supply chains, prior to ocean freight charges,
are not greatly different from the costs of
Australia’s bulk grain supply chains. However,
by far the main cost component of
containerised grain supply chains is sea
freight. Its cost exploded during 2020 and 2021
with rates quadrupling or being even higher,
leading to massive increases in profits for
container shipping lines. The divergence in
price trends between bulk grain and
containerised grain sea freight rates in 2020
through to 2022, however, greatly eroded the
profitability of containerised grain and fodder
exports from Australia. This divergence of sea
freight rates was mostly due to COVID impacts.
A review of bulk supply chain costs reveals WA
growers receive a larger income per tonne for
the same crop grade compared to growers in
eastern states and SA. For similar situations
(i.e. same grade, quality and distance from
port), WA growers in 2020–21 likely received up
to $22/tonne at a receival site more than
growers in SA and likely received up to
$18/tonne more in 2021–22. These differences
affect the profitability of grain production
on farms.
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The ramifications of COVID have
greatly affected the profitability
of containerised grain exports
Since 2020 the spread of COVID greatly affected
the profitability of export of containerised grain
and fodder. COVID impacts altered household
demand for various consumer products and
reduced the reliability and availability of
shipping containers and container shipper
services. Unfortunately, the export of
containerised grain and fodder from Australia
was one casualty of these COVID impacts. The
ease and profitability of exporting grain and
fodder in containers greatly deteriorated during
2020 and these difficulties have extended into
2022. This report outlines reasons for these
problems and useful responses by
governments and industry.
This report finds that the main difficulties in
exporting containerised grain and fodder from
Australia are unfortunately largely beyond the
control of Australian governments and the
Australian grains industry. Some of these
difficulties, however, are not permanent.
Structural adjustment in shipping services and
shipping container availability eventually will
remedy the situation experienced mostly in
2020 and into 2022. Nonetheless, due to the
depth and longevity of the period of
adjustment, many Australian businesses
greatly exposed to the problems in exporting
containerised grain and fodder have suffered
substantial losses or reductions in profit from
2020 into 2022, despite the volumes of exports
of containerised grain being maintained.
Growers directly involved in containerised grain
exports have in some cases altered their
planting intentions due to erosion in profit
margins of some crops.

Government and industry
actions can generate enduring
value for the Australian
containerised grain and fodder
export industry
These actions are not simply band aid
remedies but are immediately and strategically
worthwhile actions. Some actions are relatively
easy to implement quickly. Others are liable to
prove more challenging to introduce. Yet both
sets of actions can create and protect enduring
value for Australia’s export of grain and fodder
in containers.
Beneficial actions exist in four areas: market
access; supply chain investment, oversight and
regulation; and grower education.

Market access
Collaboration between Australian governments
and the Australian grains industry can ensure
new or existing market opportunities for
Australian containerised grain and fodder are
maintained, further developed, or freshly
developed. This is a traditional yet worthwhile
ongoing focus of engagement between
governments, state and federal, and grains
industry stakeholders.
Growing populations and per capita wealth in
East Asia, South East Asia and South Asia
underpin increasing market opportunities for
Australian containerised grain and fodder,
especially where end users have a preference
or sole ability to receive containerised
products.

Key findings
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Supply chain investment
Opportunities for new investments in supply
chain infrastructure can create or maintain
least-cost, low emission grain paths for
containerised grain and fodder. Such least-cost,
low emission grain pathways are essential if
Australia’s international competitiveness is to
be protected and road congestion around ports
is to be reduced. In eastern Australia are
opportunities for investments to complement
the Inland Rail and thereby facilitate the
cost-effective, low emission movement of
containerised grain and fodder. Some of these
investments are already underway or are being
planned within the framework of the National
Freight and Supply Chain Strategy. Such
investments will help drought-proof eastern
Australia and help lessen the cost of food
items dependent on feed grains and fodder.
Greater use of the Inland Rail will allow more
empty containers to be moved more quickly, at
lesser cost, to export positions where they are
most needed. This would require, however,
greater coordination between track owners,
shipping lines, stevedores, rail operators,
freight forwarders and grain packers.
Additional investments in infrastructure can fix
some inefficiencies in the containerised grain
export supply chain caused by larger ships,
inadequate rail access to container ports and a
shortage of space in some empty
container parks.
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Although rail is considered as the most
reliable, low emission and efficient land
transport for large volumes of grain, especially
over long distances, nonetheless, over the last
decade, on average, only around 10 to
12 per cent of containers have been
transported by rail to container ports in
Melbourne and Sydney. For example, in
2020–21 only 2, 6 and 16 per cent of containers
arrived by rail at the container ports in
Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney. If this split of
market share of rail and trucks continues into
2030, noting firstly that grain is only one of the
many commodities transported in containers
and secondly, further growth in containerbased trade is forecast, a doubling in the
number of trucks conveying containers may be
required, leading to road congestion at and
around ports.
To lessen future road traffic congestion, greater
investment in intermodal hubs and rail access
to ports is necessary. Increasing volumes of
containers also will increase the demand for
space to house empty containers at or near
ports. Provision of land and infrastructure for
empty container parks and rail services to
ports is a major investment challenge due to
the expense and scarcity of land at and around
ports. The National Freight and Supply Chain
Strategy makes plain the economic desirability
of forming and protecting least cost freight
networks and corridors and the NSW State
Infrastructure Strategy 2022–2042 indicates
these investments are an immediate priority.

City populations continue to grow in size and
wealth, as does housing density. These trends
increase the value and use of waterfront land
and cause access to ports to often become
congested. Urban encroachment can erode
buffer zones of freight corridors and lessen the
ease of access to port facilities. Traffic
congestion and traffic noise become
increasingly important issues. Yet ports are
often geographically rare locations with unique
characteristics that need to be preserved if the
full value of their stream of economic trade
benefits is to be extracted. As locations, often
with natural endowments, ports and their
access corridors require strategic oversight,
on-going investment, protection
and management.

Oversight and regulation
Australian governments can aid the costeffective, low emission flow of containerised
grain and fodder via their oversight and
regulatory roles. More specifically, the ACCC
should be provided with statutory powers to
gather the required information from industry
players to closely examine margins throughout
the containerised grain supply chain, including
domestic and international shipping, to ensure
no excessive use of market power is occurring
and that information flows are sufficient to
encourage the discipline of competition.
In reviewing vulnerable supply chains in
Australia, the Productivity Commission (2021)
stated that “Supply chains can be long,
complex, and opaque, and data can be difficult
to obtain.” (p. 7). The Productivity Commission
identified that governments should aid the
management of risks in supply chains through
provision of information and expertise in risk
identification. Prevailing opaqueness in supply
chains fuels their inefficiency. Already the ACCC
has a role as a regulator of some port
operations and in that role collects critical
information, which when appropriately shared,
can help identify risks and issues in that key
part of grain supply chains.

The value to the government and users of
grain supply chains of accurate datasets is that
they can be indicators of efficiency and
emissions intensity and can help de-risk
investments or inform policy to improve those
supply chains. The National Freight and Supply
Chain Strategy identifies the need to better
measure freight and supply chain performance
in Australia as a priority action and the deputy
chair of the ACCC has indicated that a close
analysis of margins through the grain supply
chain would be useful, but only if the ACCC
had the statutory powers to gather the
required information from industry players.
Enhanced coordination and provision of open
data hubs can facilitate management and
investment in containerised grain supply
chains. Rolling out across Australia open data
freight hubs, as is already in place in NSW,
potentially ensures greater access to timely
data to facilitate management, coordination
and investment in containerised grain and
fodder supply chains.
Bulk grain and container supply chain services,
including domestic shipping and intermodal
terminals, should be effectively monitored to
support evidence-based policy-making and
beneficial investment in those supply chains.
Australian bulk and container grain terminals,
including intermodal terminals, should be
more effectively regulated to avoid spatial
monopolist behaviour and greater efficiencies
and better coordination should be encouraged.
An assessment of the economic and
environmental benefits of a consistent national
approach to modal pricing of transport
services, especially road versus rail, is
overdue. In addition, port developments by
governments and industry require greater
scrutiny to ensure they achieve enduring
economic and ESG (environmental, social, and
governance) outcomes rather than sole
short-term budgetary relief or commercial
advantage to incumbents.

Key findings
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Inflexible work practices and rigidities in
employment conditions unhelpfully add to the
inefficiency of operations at many Australian
ports and need remedy by government and
industry action. Some enterprise agreements,
for example, contain restrictive conditions
beyond what would be considered reasonable
in any industry. In consequence, Australian
ports operate sub-optimally by international
comparison (see ACCC, 2021) and remedial
action by governments, state and federal, is
required. Four of the five main container ports
in Australia are identified by the ACCC (2021)
to be in the worst-performing 15 per cent of
ports globally. The poorly ranked container
ports are Melbourne, Sydney, Adelaide and
Fremantle. These poor rankings infer that
many of Australia’s key grain export
competitors benefit from their superior, more
efficient and effective port operations. Given
that port logistics costs are a key component
of the overall cost of landed containerised
grain and fodder, it follows that inefficiencies
and inadequate service competition at
Australian container ports reduces the market
share for Australian containerised grain
and fodder.
Owners and operators of containerised grain
and fodder businesses were surveyed and
revealed that they considered government
regulation as the most effective mechanism to
achieve beneficial reform. Yet a body like the
ACCC that could best inform and evince
regulatory and monitoring power in fact lacks
all the necessary legislative teeth to gather the
required information across the containerised
grain supply chain. Especially challenging for
regulators is their need to monitor and assess
the behaviour of international shipping.
Australian collaboration with relevant
international or regional reviews of
international shipping may be a useful
initial foray.
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Governments need to do more than just
commission reports that outline issues and
opportunities affecting container supply
chains. Governments need to ensure that grain
supply chain businesses and service providers,
including domestic and international shipping,
are subject to monitoring, scrutiny and
regulation, where required, to ensure that the
wider Australian economy and not just a
handful of entities within those supply chains
are beneficiaries of the operations of those
supply chains. There is ample evidence of
governments failing to facilitate productivity
improvement, but rather unwittingly
supporting economic and environmental harm
to the wider economy.
Government action is an increasing pressing
need. Governments of Australia’s key grain
export competitors, Canada and the USA, are
already taking action to create greater
efficiencies in their containerised grain
export industries.
Another area of required government action is
to ensure that biosecurity protocols and
processes are frequently revised to improve
their cost-effectiveness. Regular detailed
reviews of containerised grain or fodder export
processes can lessen their regulatory burden
through efficient re-design of these processes
to include incentive and punitive measures. In
addition, the training of authorised officers
should be regularly appraised to ensure it
remains fit-for-purpose in form and content.
Buffer zones for least-cost, low emission grain
pathways should not only be formed but
should also be actively protected and
maintained by state and local governments.
Lastly, wherever cost-efficiencies are not
eroded, transport regulations should form
national standards to support least cost
corridor networks.

Opportunities for education
Case studies of containerised grain operations
in different states revealed a wide array of
execution risks when exporting containerised
grain or fodder. These case study participants
shared their lessons learned and revealed a
fundamental need to educate prospective
participants concerning the export of
containerised grain or fodder. For example,
providing required documentation to the range
of entities associated with the export of
containerised grain and fodder is essential yet
is often more time-consuming and exacting
than many prospective participants anticipate.
Other oversights and reasons for business
failure or under-performance include
inadequate planning, a failure to budget, the
absence of sound governance and insufficient
communication within the business.
Educating prospective participants, keen to
export grain or fodder in containers, about
these issues is essential. In addition, educating
prospective and current participants about how
to best manage these execution risks is also
essential. Otherwise, the outcome is likely to
be reduced profits and reputational damage to
these businesses and possibly to the broader
export fraternity.
Industry and government can collaborate to
collate information to lessen the opaqueness
of containerised grain supply chains and then
also invest in education or training for
prospective participants in containerised grain
export. There is no export manual outlining all
the steps and hazards involved in
containerised grain or fodder exporting.
Although various organisations offer basic
training and education for potential exporters,
the many tasks and difficulties faced by
exporting business are rarely addressed in
sufficient detail.

Key findings
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5,360

There are currently
globally around 5,360
container ships with a
carrying capacity of
25 million TEUs.
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Summary
There are currently globally around 5,360 container
ships with a carrying capacity of 25 million TEUs.
The grains industry globally has benefitted from
containerisation by being able to sell smaller
parcels of grains, oilseeds, seeds and fodder.
Containerisation also has facilitated access to a
wider array of end users and often has been a
means of market development, as a pathway to
eventual supply of bulk grain.
Containerisation of grain has also benefited from
institutional change, as noted by the Productivity
Commission’s inquiry into wheat export marketing
in Australia back in 2010. Until 2008 Australia’s
main crop, wheat, was subject to statutory
marketing that focused on large customers and
bulk shipping. Following the demise of the
Australian Wheat Board, however, Australian wheat
exports in containers gradually grew from 0.5mmt
in 2007 to 2.7mmt by 2012; and by 2020–21
4.2mmt of grain was exported from Australia in
containers. Nationally around 12 per cent of all
grain exports are via containerisation.
Despite the dominant role of bulk shipping and
bulk grain supply chains in Australia,
containerised grain exports continue to play an
important role for certain grain and fodder exports
from Australia. Containerisation is especially
important for specialty grains such as pulses and
is especially important in Australia’s eastern
states. By illustration, on average over the period
2014–15 to 2020–21, the proportion of grain exports
that came from containerisation in Vic, NSW and
Qld was 36, 28 and 34 per cent respectively.

SA displays the most even mix of containerised
grain exports, featuring lentils, faba beans, wheat,
field peas and malt. Similarly, WA exports a
diverse range of grain exports, but mostly wheat,
malt and processed oats. Each grain type,
however, tends to be sent to a narrow range of
destination countries. Pulses predominately are
sent to South Asian and Middle East countries.
Malt is exported to only a handful of countries.
Sorghum is mostly sent to Japan and wheat is
principally sent to China, Taiwan and a subset of
South East Asian countries.
What is not always appreciated is how much
fodder is exported via containers from Australian
ports. Over several decades Australia has
developed some key markets for its export of hay,
especially Japan and China, such that often around
1mmt of fodder is exported via containers
from Australia.
However, since 2020 the spread and management
of COVID has disrupted supply chains, particularly
containerised supply chains and the consequences
of that disruption have been substantial and have
extended into 2022. Many importers and exporters
have struggled with the consequences of a raft of
supply-chain issues. Higher transport and handling
costs, and unreliability and uncertainty costs have
squeezed or devastated profit margins and placed
upward pressure on end user prices, to the extent
that the higher costs within supply chains have
been able to be passed on.

The mix of crops exported via containerisation
does differ between Australian states. Wheat,
lentils and faba beans dominate containerised
grain exports from Vic, whereas wheat and
chickpeas dominate exports from NSW and Qld.

Summary

11

Why export containerised grain?
In general, container packing or shipment of grain
or fodder via containers is commercially feasible,
relative to bulk shipping, when there is:
i.

A viable shipping option for small cargoes
that can be reliant on:
• sufficiently high margins on small
volumes (e.g. niche qualities or grades),
perhaps also supported by closed loop
arrangements.
• credit, transport or storage constraints at
destination. Some customers can only
receive containerised grain, rather than
bulk shipments. Pulse Australia (2020),
for example, acknowledges the
contribution of containerised supply
chains to Australia’s comparative
advantage as an exporter of pulse crops.
Australia’s containerised supply chains
contribute to the reliability, flexibility
and timeliness of Australia’s pulse
exports, facilitating serving smaller
customers and higher value
niche markets.
• food processor trials of new varieties
or grades.

ii. Opportunities within the bulk supply chain
such as where:
• a farmer’s grain is produced near a
container packer but distant from their
nearest bulk terminal or upcountry
receival point for the type of grain
they grow.
• the farmer produces grain with
specialised traits sought by a particular
niche market or individual buyer.
• grain buyers want a verifiable
provenance of grain production and
traceability.
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• the bulk handler is perceived by the
farmer to be unduly profiteering from
their dominant or monopoly position as
a service provider of bulk storage,
handling and marketing services.
• farm production is of sufficient size and
complexity that containerisation of some
of the farm’s grain production can be a
value-adding or market risk
diversification strategy for the business.
• packing grain into containers allows
more efficient and profitable use of
existing farm storage, labour and
equipment; and for some large multicommodity trading businesses, a more
profitable use of their transport
(e.g. trucking or rail) assets.
• the bulk supply chain is at full capacity
or is facing bulk shipping bottlenecks. In
this situation, containerised grain supply
chains offer a supplementation option.
iii. Complementarity to a bulk grain supply
chain
• Linked to a previously mentioned
observation is a related observation that
creation and use of containerised grain
supply chains enables Australia’s grain
export industry to better serve a broader
range of customers and grain buyers.
Containerisation of grain can thus
complement bulk supply chains, whilst
usefully injecting some competitive
pressure on both supply chains (i.e. bulk
and container supply chains).

iv. An opportunity to extract value from
atypical or differentiated varieties or to
unlock value from crop breeders’ stranded
crop lines
• A logical and expected outcome of a
bulk handling network system, when
combined with the nature of grain
classification systems in Australia and
the end point royalty financing of
Australian crop breeding, is the frequent
dominance of a single variety (or
handful of varieties). Because crop
breeding is funded by end point
royalties, crop breeders mostly are
encouraged in a bulk system to only
generate high-yielding varieties that just
meet grade specifications. Hence, farmer
adoption of functionally novel varieties
within the bulk grade system is
disincentivised due to blending and
co-mingling of many grain parcels. In
some situations, a variety becomes so
dominant that the parent grade becomes
little more than a proxy for that variety.
The grains industry then becomes
characterised by the widespread
dominance of a few varieties rather than
the provision of a diverse portfolio of
varieties with a range of functionalities
for different end uses or products.

Containerisation and/or closed loop
arrangements can increase the biological
diversity of a region’s grain production
and increase the diversity of market
opportunities for grain producers and
crop breeders.
v.

Reward for protecting grain quality from
reduced handling
• One main difference between bulk
handling and containerisation of grain is
the frequency of handling and mingling.
In a bulk handling system, grain more
frequently risks being damaged and
co-mingled as it moves through the
supply chain from farm to bulkhead,
from bulkhead to train or truck, then
into port storage before being exported
via large conveyors. To minimise the risk
of damage most bulk handlers have
invested in handling equipment that is
less damaging (e.g. use of conveyor
belts rather than augers; and instituting
maximum drop heights). Nonetheless, in
general, containerisation involves less
co-mingling and damage to the grain
from repeated handling. Some pulses,
for example, are fairly easily damaged
so containerisation is one option to
avoid price penalties or downgrades
attributable to physical damage.

Yet, the intense search by crop breeders
for the next dominant variety means
their breeding programs likely contain
some advanced lines with some unique
or superior functionalities, but there is
no path to market in a bulk system for
these lines. However, containerisation
and/or closed loop marketing
arrangements offer a means to extract
value from these unique advanced lines,
so they need not be stranded or become
biological assets invariably discarded or
under-utilised.
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vi. A perceived need for greater diversity in
grain supply chains
• In some regions, grain producers opt for
selling some of their grain through
containerisation to lessen their
dependence on the services of the
dominant or sole bulk grain handler
or marketer.
vii. Better able to manage some
comingling risks
• Containerisation can limit financial
losses that arise from phytosanitary
events or quality disputes. In the case of
containers unless the contamination is
distributed throughout the entire
prospective cargo, the initial volume
knocked out of loading is often just the
one or two affected containers. Hence,
the downside commercial risk associated
with phytosanitary events or quality
disputes is often less in container
supply chains compared to bulk grain
supply chains.
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However, a grower who exports
containerised grain or fodder must
manage the biosecurity risk by having
their own Biosecurity — Authorised
Premises and fumigation contract and
biosecurity export documents specific to
their shipment, whereas the grower who
delivers into a bulk system entrusts the
processes and management of the
bulk handler.
viii. Access to food grade empty containers
• When there is a consistent ease of
access to food grade containers this
facilitates grain containerisation.

However, several disadvantages apply to grain
containerisation, including:
i.

Costliness of container supply chains
relative to bulk supply chains
• During 2020 and extending into 2022 the
main factors affecting the relative
commercial attractiveness of the
containerisation of grain and fodder, by
far, has been the execution risk and
supply chain costs associated with
containerisation. The per tonne costs of
the container supply chain versus its
bulk grain alternative, in many cases
have reduced profits from grain
containerisation.

ii. Need for proper business planning,
documentation and access to expertise
• As an additional business venture,
farmers are rarely cognizant of all the
commercial risks associated with the
export of containerised grain and fodder.
Lack of education about the entire
export process, poor planning,
inadequate budgeting, insufficient
governance, a failure to seek expert
help, improper documentation, and a
failure to communicate effectively across
the business jeopardizes or lessens the
profitability of the operation in many
cases. The fact that there are only
around 100 container packing businesses
across Australia is one indicator that this
is not a business venture that should be
embraced without proper care, skill, and
due diligence.

iii. Need to avoid over-capitalisation
• The profitability of exporting grain and
fodder can be subject to much
uncertainty and volatility. Accordingly, to
prevent under-utilisation of assets and
to ensure a sufficiently attractive return
on capital, it is vital to avoid overcapitalisation. Being able to cease or
scale back container trade operations in
response to market realities is crucial to
the viability of many businesses. Having
a capital structure appropriate to the
vagaries and volatility of the container
trade is a pre-requisite for
business success.
iv. Need to monitor Minimum Residue Limits
(MRLs)
• In markets with tight chemical residue
tolerances, the co-mingling of grain that
occurs in a bulk system provides a
dilution factor that ensures MRLs are
rarely breeched. By contrast, in
container supply chains with some grain
being supplied directly ex-farm, with no
access to dilution, the risk of breech is
greater. Even in a farm silo or bulkhead
that on average tests below MRL
thresholds, there may be pockets that
when packed into a container result in
subsequent detection and rejection; and
the associated reputational damage.
Even more serious are the flow-on
reputation loss impacts on the entire
grain export industry of Australia.
An increasing number of countries have
MRL protocols. It is difficult at any
container grain packing site to segregate
product until MRL testing is complete;
adding to the cost and delaying
grain containerisation. Moreover, grain
export inspection and MRL testing apply
to each container whereas in a bulk
system its per hatch.
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Relative costs of container and bulk grain supply chains
Supply chain costs impact the competitiveness of
the Australian grain industry. Data describing
Australia’s bulk grain export supply chains for the
2020–21 and 2021–22 harvests were collated and
compared. Overall bulk grain supply chain costs in
SA and Australia’s eastern states were similar in
both years. By contrast, bulk grain supply chain
costs in WA substantially increased in 2021–22.
However, across Australia, bulk grain supply
chains costs in WA still currently remain the
lowest, and since 2014–15, bulk grain supply chain
costs in WA have decreased by the greatest in real
terms. In 2021–22 the bulk grain supply chain
costs in WA were between $17.5 to $26 per tonne
cheaper than in other states for an equivalent
distance to port. Each main component of bulk
grain supply chain costs (i.e., freight, port fees,
and warehouse storage and handling) is less
costly in WA. Across all grain-growing regions of
Australia, the number of upcountry receival sites
is still decreasing, but primary sites are getting
more efficient and larger, causing total available
storage to be stable or growing, especially when
complemented with farmers’ on-farm storage.
International shipping bulk freight costs have
increased greatly in 2021–22, but this is making
Australian grain relatively more attractive to
buyers in nearby South East Asian markets.
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Although a variety of containerised grain supply
chains exist across Australia, often a key
difference in those chains is whether packing
occurs on the farm or at a distant packing facility
located either at a regional intermodal centre or at
port. An examination of the current typical costs
of different containerised grain supply chains
reveals that packing on-farm is rarely the more
profitable avenue for engaging in the
containerised export of grain. Ideally use of
packing facilities either at or near port or at
regional packing facilities with direct access to
cost-effective rail services is preferable.
A comparison of container versus bulk supply
chains for grain export reveals that by far the
major cost difference between these supply chains
is sea freight. The marked escalation in sea freight
rates for container services, relative to bulk freight
rates, has hugely eroded the preference to receive
containerised grain. In some previous years the
per tonne cost of sea freight for containerised
grain was competitive against bulk rates. However,
since mid-2020 the escalation in container sea
freight rates and the unreliability of container
shipping services has disincentivised the export of
containerised grain and fodder.

COVID impacts
When the first lockdowns hit in March 2020,
demand for containerised shipping initially sharply
declined as hesitant households curtailed their
expenditure and bunkered down. Simultaneously,
tighter IMO diesel fuel emission regulations in
early 2020 encouraged some shipping lines to
retire early some of their older container vessels.
However, under lockdown, demand for a range of
household goods, mostly manufactured in China,
then sharply increased, stimulating and
underpinning a demand for containers. Later, as
the Chinese and American economies began
reopening and government stimulus payments
began flowing, consumer demand for goods
trafficked in containers escalated further. By the
third quarter of 2021, world trade in goods hit a
record $5.6 trillion.
Contemporaneously, demand for bulk freight
vessels greatly increased in 2021, placing upward
pressure on bulk freight rates. Many major global
economies in 2021 announced stimulus packages
with emphases on infrastructure projects that
increased demand for iron ore and coal and
resulted in a lift in demand for bulk sea freight.
When combined with the regular demand for bulk
agricultural exports, the overall increase in bulk
sea freight demand led to a lift in dry bulk sea
freight earnings from mid-2020 and then
throughout 2021.

Despite the growth in ship revenues, however, the
estimated growth in the size of the dry bulk fleet
is lessening. The restricted growth is pushing up
prices of second-hand bulk vessels as is the
higher cost of new vessel construction, principally
due to higher prices of steel and the cost of more
fuel-efficient engines and associated technologies.
The ramification of these trends is that bulk sea
freight rates are poised to remain high over the
next few years, but this does generate a freight
advantage for Australian bulk grain shipped to
nearby South East Asian markets, relative to bulk
grain shipped to these same markets by distant
competitors such as Argentina or the Black
Sea region.
Relative to bulk freight rates, container freight
rates rose much more quickly and to higher levels
under COVID, generating a massive increase in
profits for container shipping. This, in turn,
sparked a marked increase in newbuilds of
container ships. These new, larger ships will
become available from 2023 onwards and will
likely drive down container sea freight rates,
narrowing the gap between container and bulk
rates. Eventually over the next handful of years
the export of containerised grain and fodder will
once again become more commercially attractive.
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The need to scrutinise and regulate parts of grain supply chains
The rapid increase in the cost of shipping
containers or bulk, and the increased profits
generated by these services, has heightened the
scrutiny of shipping services. The issue of concern
is whether undue market power or at worst,
anti-competitive behaviour, underpins the increase
in the pricing of shipping services. Unevenness in
market power across a supply chain is not a
phenomenon unique to Australia. To facilitate
greater scrutiny of their shipping services the
Federal Maritime Commission, a key regulator in
the USA, observed that, regarding international
shipping, few private parties have filed complaints
seeking reparations. The Commission has
commented that “shipper (and trucker) concerns
about retaliation, litigation costs (both in time and
money), and attorney fee liability are important
disincentives” (FMC, 2021). To combat retaliatory
behaviour the Commission has recommended
broadening anti-retaliation provisions to better
protect complainants. Fines for unlawful behaviour
have been potentially doubled and a greater range
of informational and financial support measures
introduced to encourage affected parties to lodge
formal complaints.
Similarly, in 2021 a diverse group of agricultural
groups across Canada joined forces to force
government action over container availability and
cost escalation in container shipping. The group
advocated for:
• Greater transparency and clarity into how
the Canadian container supply chain was
functioning within the context of a global
container shortage;
• Identification of domestic legislative or
competition law remedies and law changes
that would correct shipping line behaviour;
• Engagement with global partners and
authorities to develop appropriate
regulation of shipping lines.
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In Australia, a Productivity Commission inquiry
into Australia’s maritime logistics system is
underway and is due to report in August 2022. In
addition, the ACCC (2021) in its statutorily required
monitoring report on container stevedoring
observed that “Shipment delays have been
mounting as shipping lines are increasingly
omitting ports, rolling over cargo and cancelling
bookings. Cargo owners around the world are
scrambling to book scarce capacity on vessels,
bidding up freight rates to unprecedented levels.
Freight rates on key global trade routes are around
7 times higher than they were a little over a year
ago.” (p. ix). Specifically, regarding the shipping
lines, the ACCC (2021) state: “It is also time to
repeal Part X of the Competition and Consumer
Act 2010. Part X permits shipping lines to
collaborate on prices, capacity and schedules,
among other things, which would otherwise be
considered as anti-competitive conduct. There
does not appear to be evidence of shipping lines
charging excessive freight rates before the
pandemic. However, the shipping industry has
become more concentrated over the past decade,
so there is a growing risk that shipping lines could
use Part X to artificially elevate freight rates in the
future. Several other countries have already scaled
back or removed equivalent exemptions.” (p. xi).
Widening the review of shipping to consider the
nature and efficiency of domestic shipping is also
likely to reveal further opportunities for reform
from which domestic consumers and the wider
Australian economy will benefit. Reliance on
cost-effective interstate shipping of grain and
fodder is especially important during prolonged
periods of regional drought when large volumes of
grain and fodder need to be transported from
regions of surplus to regions of deficit.

An earlier monitoring report (ACCC, 2019) stated
that although the ACCC viewed increases in
infrastructure charges to be of concern and worthy
of consideration by policy makers, it reckoned it
did not have the power to determine stevedores’
charges and that the key issues regarding their
pricing actions were beyond the scope of the
ACCC’s monitoring mandate at key container
terminals. To the extent that this is true, then it is
essential that the ACCC or its regulatory equivalent
be given the powers to collect information which
when subject to analysis reveals the need for
regulation and reform of the export supply chain
for bulk and containerised goods from which the
entire economy will benefit.
The National Freight and Supply Chain Strategy
identifies the need to better measure freight and
supply chain performance in Australia as a priority
action and the deputy chair of the ACCC has
indicated that a close analysis of margins through
the grain supply chain would be useful, but only if
the ACCC had statutory powers to gather the
required information from industry players.
Enhanced coordination and provision of open data
hubs can facilitate management and investment in
containerised grain supply chains. Rolling out
across Australia open data freight hubs, as is
already in place in NSW, potentially ensures
greater access to timely data to facilitate
management, coordination and investment in
containerised grain and fodder supply chains.
It is not just greater scrutiny of stevedores’
charges or international shipping that requires
more scrutiny. There also needs to be greater
regulation of privatised ports. The outgoing chair
of the ACCC, Rod Sims, publicly commented in
early 2022 that Australia’s supply and logistics
challenges, were worsened by industry
concentration and infrastructure bottlenecks. His
remedy was to apply competition law to prevent
anti-competitive abuses of market power and
through general infrastructure reform. In reference
to Australian privatised ports, he stated: “We seem
to focus on how much we can sell infrastructure
assets for in Australia rather than having our
infrastructure benefit the wider economy.”

The same sentiment was expressed by the ACCC
(2021) who indicated that although privatisation of
the four major container ports in Australia had
improved their dynamism, nonetheless they were
under-regulated. In at least one case the port
owner had exercised undue market power in
charging land rents to port operators.
Australian bulk and container grain terminals,
including intermodal terminals, should be more
effectively regulated to avoid spatial monopolist
behaviour. The experience of greater regulation at
the Port of Botany (NSW Transport, 2018) reveals
the possible extent of improved efficiency that
is possible.
An assessment of the economic and
environmental benefits of a consistent national
approach to modal pricing of transport services,
especially road versus rail, is overdue and would
outline further sources of gain in supply
chain efficiency.
Aside from the actions of shipping lines and the
setting of infrastructure fees, another notable area
for needed scrutiny and reform is the cost and
productivity of port labour. Inflexible work
practices and rigidities in conditions unhelpfully
add to the inefficiency of port operations and only
encourage and hasten the eventual investment
switch into robotic technologies.
The ACCC (2021) found in enterprise agreements
restrictive conditions that were “outside the realm
of what would be considered reasonable terms
and conditions in any industry.” (p. 67). The ACCC
(2021) also concluded that “Overall, these
provisions constrain workplace performance,
reduce and distort incentives to improve
productivity, reduce timeliness and reliability, and
increase labour costs for a given level of activity.”
(p. 66). These are serious criticisms that point to
governments failing to facilitate
productivity improvement.
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A difficulty seemingly universally facing
containerised grain supply chains is their
opaqueness. In reviewing vulnerable supply chains
in Australia, the Productivity Commission (2021)
stated that “Supply chains can be long, complex,
and opaque, and data can be difficult to obtain.”
(p. 7). Although the ACCC has a role as a regulator
of some port operations and in that role collects
critical information, which if appropriately shared,
can help identify risks and issues in that key part
of grain supply chains; even the ACCC is aware
that some of its datasets are inadequate. Yet the
value to governments and users of grain supply
chains of accurate datasets is that they can be
indicators of efficiency and emissions intensity
and can help de-risk investments that draw on or
seek to improve those supply chains.

The same issue of opaqueness in containerised
grain supply chains applies in Canada, despite its
bulk grain supply train being subject, under
statute, to regular monitoring. A bulk grain
monitoring program is commercially managed by
Quorum Corporation and supply chain participants
are legally required to provide data that reveals
the nature and efficiency of their services.
However, the same legislative oversight of
Canada’s containerised grain supply chains does
not exist. It is already reported that entities in that
supply chain are not keen to reveal their data for
fear it may reveal how well or poorly their
businesses may be performing, yet key
stakeholders in the Canadian grains industry are
advocating for greater regulation and oversight of
the containerised grain trade.

In the USA the Federal Maritime Commission has
used its powers to force shipping companies that
carry containers to provide a range of specific
information related to vessel calls they have made
to the United States since June 2021, including the
number of loaded and empty containers carried
on a ship’s return journey to Asia. Ocean carriers
are now required to share information about the
export services they offer American shippers.
The Federal Maritime Commission has instituted a
Maritime Transportation Data Initiative that
commenced with industry meetings in December
2021 and will culminate in June 2022 with an
industry-wide Data Summit. The data initiative has
three key objectives:

Australia lacks the legislative framework to ensure
adequate monitoring of its bulk and container
grain supply chains; and the opaqueness in the
costs and inadequacies of efficiency assessments
of supply chain services act as barriers to entry
and raise risk premia in transactions. Provision of
greater transparency would facilitate commercial
exchanges and more greatly reward training and
educational services needed by newcomers keen
to engage in the trade of bulk or
containerised grain.

• Catalogue the status quo in maritime data
elements, metrics, transmission and access;
• Identify key gaps in data definitions/
classification; and
• Develop recommendations for common
data standards and access policies/
protocols.
Collation of data sets and identification of data
gaps will allow the Commission to have greater
oversight and will provide clarity and
understanding about what is underway in the
shipping trade, including the containerised
goods trade.
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As an illustration of how regulation can affect
supply chain operations, there are approximately
11 different regulated safeworking systems for rail
in Australia. Train crews are required to be
competent in safeworking systems before they can
operate in each relevant sector. Therefore, any
train crew wishing to operate Australia-wide is
required to be aware of, and comply with, each of
the 11 systems. By contrast, there is only one set
of safeworking rules that applies to the road
freight industry, which means, for example, that a
road transport driver with a NSW truck licence,
and a NSW licenced truck, may drive anywhere in
Australia if they comply with standard rules.
Standardisation of rail operating rules and systems
should be a priority to facilitate the efficient use
of rail freight and ensure greater use of least cost
grain paths.

As part of this study a survey of owners and
operators of containerised grain and fodder
businesses revealed what they viewed to be the
most effective reform actions. Overall, they
considered government regulation as the most
effective mechanism to achieve beneficial reform;
yet a body like the ACCC that could best inform
and evince that regulatory and monitoring power
lacks the legislative teeth to gather the required
information across the containerised grain
supply chain.
This report finds that governments need to do
more than just commission reports that outline
issues and opportunities affecting container
supply chains. Governments need to ensure that
grain supply chain businesses and service
providers are subject to monitoring, scrutiny and
regulation (where required) to ensure that the
wider Australian economy and not just a handful
of entities within those supply chains are
beneficiaries of the operations of those supply
chains. There is ample evidence of governments
failing to facilitate productivity improvement, but
rather supporting economic and environmental
harm to the wider economy.

Another facet of the need for oversight of export
grain supply chains concerns the need to protect
buffer zones around least-cost, low emission grain
paths. This need has been previously identified by
the National Freight and Supply Chain Strategy.
Many Australian capital city ports are becoming
more boxed in, with urban encroachment and
erosion of buffer zones lessening the ease of
access to port facilities. Traffic congestion and
traffic noise often become increasingly important
issues for urban communities whose complaining
actions then can lead to erosion of the ease of
access to port facilities. Maintenance of buffer
zones can also become a casualty of development
forces energised by the increasing worth of coastal
and city real estate. Hence, a crucial role for all
tiers of government, but especially for state
governments is a strong oversight of buffer zones
to protect and maintain least-cost, low emission
grain paths.

Government action is an increasingly pressing
need. Governments of Australia’s key grain export
competitors, Canada and the USA, are already
taking action to create greater efficiencies in their
containerised grain export industries.
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Other opportunities for government and industry action
Collaboration between Australian governments and
the Australian grains industry can ensure new or
existing market opportunities for Australian
containerised grain and fodder are maintained,
further developed, or freshly developed. This is a
traditional yet worthwhile ongoing focus of
engagement between governments, state and
federal, and grains industry stakeholders.
Growing populations and per capita wealth in East
Asia, South East Asia and South Asia underpin
increasing market opportunities for Australian
containerised grain and fodder, mostly where end
users have a preference or sole ability to receive
containerised products.
Another area of required government action is to
ensure that biosecurity protocols and processes
are frequently revised to improve their costeffectiveness and that the training of authorised
officers, particularly the form and content of that
training, remains fit-for-purpose. For authorised
officers employed by packers a central part of
their training needs to raise or heighten their
awareness of their conflict of interest, as despite
being paid by the packer, their legal duty is to
manage compliance with Commonwealth law
rather than being compliant to their employer’s
immediate needs. Having stated the need to
ensure authorised officers remain well-trained, it
also needs to be highlighted that the work of
authorised officers in recent years has been
stressful due to the impacts of COVID that have
reduced their staff availability and increased
individuals’ workloads.
An additional opportunity to pursue, to the extent
that existing cost-efficiencies are not eroded, is to
further align state-based heavy vehicle regulations
to form a single national standard and to
especially support least cost corridor networks.
Regulatory improvement is in-play. A National
Heavy Vehicle Regulator (NHVR) was established in
2013 as a statutory authority to administer the
Heavy Vehicle National Law, which applies in all
Australia’s states and territories except the NT and
WA. In August 2022 NSW will transfer its heavy
vehicle regulation oversight to the NHVR.
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Industry and government can provide educational
services for prospective participants in
containerised grain exports. Case studies of
containerised grain operations in different states,
undertaken prior to this report, revealed a wide
array of execution risks that accompany the export
of containerised grain. Case study participants
shared their lessons learned and revealed a
fundamental need to educate prospective
participants about the export of containerised
grain or fodder. For example, providing required
documentation to the range of entities associated
with the export of containerised grain and fodder
is essential yet is often more time-consuming and
exacting than many prospective participants
anticipate. Other oversights and reasons for
business failure or under-performance include
inadequate planning, a failure to budget, the
absence of sound governance and insufficient
communication within the business.
Educating prospective participants, keen to export
grain or fodder in containers, about these issues
is essential if execution risks are to be properly
managed and if reputational damage to their
business and the broader export fraternity is to be
avoided. There is an opportunity for industry and
government collaboration to collate information to
lessen the opaqueness of containerised grain
supply chains and then also invest in education or
training for prospective participants in
containerised grain export.
Such education is likely to be strategically
increasingly important as farm business owners
look to other means besides farm expansion to
grow their business wealth. Using containerisation
as a means to extract value from traceability,
provenance or minor crop production may form
part of farm business development in future
years, rather than the traditional action of buying
out a neighbour.
To its credit, Grain Trade Australia (2018) did
release a technical guideline document that
provides guidelines for container packing.

Supply chain investment
There is an on-going need for governments and
industry to support investments that create or
maintain least-cost, low emission grain paths for
containerised grain and fodder. There are planned
investments in intermodal terminals and
associated rail and road access and infrastructure
that will complement the Inland Rail to facilitate
cost-effective movement of containerised grain
and fodder. These investments, their maintenance
and upgrade will need to be an on-going feature
of the containerised grain and fodder and empty
container supply chain network in
eastern Australia.
As a general requirement, there is a need to
maintain government and industry investment in
transport modes and pathways that increase mass
limits as these limits constrain the cost-effective
movement of containerised grains.
Rail access to key container ports is typically
problematic, requiring further investment to
secure access corridors, increase rail capacity and
improve the efficiency of rail movements. Reliance
on double-stacking and shuttle trains is likely to
be increasingly the norm. Although rail is
considered to be the most reliable, efficient and
low emission land transport for large volumes of
grain, especially over long distances, nonetheless,
over the last decade, on average, only around 10
to 12 per cent of containers have been transported
by rail to the container ports in Melbourne and
Sydney. For example, in 2020–21 only 2.1, 6.1 and
15.5 per cent of containers arrived by rail at the
container ports in Brisbane, Melbourne and
Sydney. If the split of market share of rail and
trucks continues into 2030, this may double the
number of trucks required, leading to road
congestion on road networks servicing the ports.
Currently, stevedores and port owners are not
supportive of rail, as shipping lines pay the
majority of the handling charges in the terminals
that relate to road services but rail terminals must
be funded by rail operators and so are required to
be directly funded by exporters and importers.

The trend toward ever larger container ships and
increasing volumes of imported containers will
only heighten the need for rail access and
exacerbate the shortage of space in many empty
container parks. How to cost-effectively deliver the
increased space requirements of empty container
parks at some key container terminals and ports
will become a pressing investment challenge in
coming years.
City populations continue to grow in size and
wealth, and population housing density is
increasing. Port land adjacent to cities is becoming
increasingly valuable, yet greater population
density often makes access to ports more
congested and subject to urban encroachment.
Traffic congestion and traffic noise are becoming
increasingly important issues for urban
communities, yet maintenance of buffer zones can
become a casualty of development forces
energised by the increasing worth of coastal and
city real estate. The NSW State Infrastructure
Strategy 2022–2042 indicates that investments to
protect freight buffer zones is an
immediate priority.
Ports are often geographically rare locations with
unique characteristics that need to be preserved if
the full value of their temporal stream of
economic benefits is to be extracted. As locations,
often with natural endowments, they and their
access corridors require prioritised strategic
oversight, on-going investment, protection and
management. DITCRD (2019), for example,
identified potential savings worth $10.8 billion
from the protection and early acquisition of seven
corridors in a 2016 infrastructure priority list.
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Future supply of container ships
One of the reasons for the high cost of shipping
via containers in recent years has been the
inadequate investment in new ship building.
However, the high profits being generated by
shippers has triggered a surge in new container
ship building. As of early September 2021, 619
container ships were on order for future delivery.
Of those, 381 were ordered in 2021 alone. In early
September 2021 the container ship order book
held 5.3 million TEU of shipping capacity
scheduled to be added to the fleet from 2023
onwards. Never has such a large volume of TEU
been ordered in such a short time span, creating
eventual downward pressure on sea freight rates
for containers. A lowering of those sea freight
rates will enhance profits from the export of
containerised grain and fodder.
However, the boost to container ship construction
has meant that ship-building capacity for bulk
vessels is now highly constrained, suggesting
sustained pressure on bulk sea freight rates will
continue over the next few years and the current
differential between bulk versus container
shipping rates could narrow, helping restore or
enhance commercial interest in exporting grain
and fodder in containers.
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The magnitude of new orders for container ships
might suggest overcapacity could be a future risk,
but future supply requirements are clouded by
new environment regulations that become law at
the start of 2023. These environmental laws will
likely limit ship speeds to lessen or cap emissions
from sea transport, and so effective shipping
capacity may not be as apparent as newbuild
orders might suggest. However, it is not just
container ships that are affected by new
environmental laws. Some analysts estimate that
less than 25 per cent of bulkers and tankers will
attain the required level of emissions reduction
required under new regulations, placing further
upward pressure on bulk freight rates as these
older vessels are de-commissioned. How rapidly
the international shipping fleet will transition into
reliance on less polluting fuels is
currently uncertain.
The future increased supply of container vessels
and the trend towards larger ships should mean
that major destination ports of Melbourne, Sydney
and Brisbane should eventually benefit from eased
access to more containers, with grain and fodder
once again becoming attractive back freight
opportunities. Smaller ports in Adelaide and
Fremantle are less likely to benefit to the same
degree due to their lesser growth in containerised
freight trade.

Availability of food grade 20 foot containers
The proportion of 20ft containers within the stock
of all containers handled in Australia is gradually
declining. Shippers of non-grain commodities
prefer to use 40ft containers as their profit margins
per shipping slot are greater with 40ft containers.
If the proportion of 20ft containers eventually falls
to sufficiently low levels, then 20ft containers will
become less available, and the cost to convert
more of those containers to a food grade level will
become an additional expense for exporting. Profit
margins for grain export will then become further
constrained. However, it should be stressed that
just because 20ft containers are becoming a lower
proportion of the global stock of containers, does
not necessarily imply a problematic availability of
20ft containers, as long as the overall stock of
containers imported into Australia continues to
grow at a greater rate than containerised export
volumes. For example, Australian ports now handle
over 8 million containers every year; five times
more than 20 years ago. However, Australian grain
exports in containers have grown from under
1mmt in 2007 to 4.2mmt in 2020–21. That is over a
four-fold increase in containerised grain exports in
only 14 years, so the availability of 20ft food grade
containers unfortunately is likely to be an
increasingly pressing issue despite the greater
volume of containers being handled.

There needs to be industry and government
monitoring of the availability of 20ft food grade
containers and discussion about the most costeffective responses to the potential structural
challenge of gradual reduced availability of 20ft
food grade containers. Investing in transport
modes and pathways that increase mass limits
would appear one obvious component of a
solution. Having a jointly owned service business
at each main export port to solely provide
low-cost refurbishment of 20ft containers to a food
grade standard is another option. Encouraging a
joint South East Asian and Australian investment
in ownership of 20ft containers is another
possibility, as many end users in South East Asia
are better able to receive and transport
20ft containers.

An added difficulty for containerised grain
exporters, especially pulse exporters, is that one
common response by shippers to the disruption
caused by the COVID pandemic has been to lessen
the frequency of their sailing dates, particularly to
the sub-continent and the Middle East. These
regions are frequent purchasers of
containerised pulses.
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Glossary
Berth

A ship’s allotted space in a stevedore’s container terminal.

Cargo owner

Importers and exporters, also known as shippers.

Crane intensity	Total number of allocated crane hours divided by the elapsed time from
labour first boarding the ship to labour last leaving the ship. Crane
intensity is an input to calculating ‘net crane rate’ and ‘ship rate’.
Crane rate	An indicator of capital productivity and reflects the intensity to which
quayside cranes are worked. It is measured by dividing the total number
of containers (TEUs) handled by the crane by the ‘elapsed crane time’.
DP World	DP World Australia Ltd operates container terminals in Brisbane,
Fremantle, Sydney and Melbourne.
Empty container park	Companies whose business is to store empty containers. They may also
provide ancillary services such as container cleaning, repairs and
repositioning.
Flinders Adelaide	Flinders Adelaide Container Terminal Pty Ltd, fully-owned by the South
Australian port operator, is the sole container stevedore at Port Adelaide.
Hutchison	Hutchison Ports Australia, a member of Hutchison Ports Holdings Group.
Hutchison operates terminals in Brisbane and Sydney.
Infrastructure access charge

Now referred to as ‘terminal access charge’ (see below).

Land transport operators	Truck or rail operators under contract with cargo owners to transport
container goods from the stevedores’ container terminals to the cargo
owner and vice versa.
Landside activities	Activities facilitating the exchange of containers between land transport
operators and container stevedores.
Lifts

A ‘lift’ refers to the lifting of a single unit of container.

Monitored port	Ports under Part VIIA of the CCA subject to monitoring by the ACCC; the
international container ports of Adelaide, Brisbane, Burnie, Fremantle,
Melbourne, and Sydney.
NSW
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New South Wales
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NT

Northern Territory

Patrick	
Patrick Terminals operates container terminals in Brisbane, Fremantle,
Melbourne and Sydney.
Quayside activities

The lifting of containers on and off container ships at berth.

Qld

Queensland

SA

South Australia

Shipping lines	These companies facilitate the ocean-borne transport of containerised
cargo from one port to another. Shipping lines may be directly under
contract from cargo owners or through intermediary logistics companies.
Shipping lines are the primary customers of stevedores.
Stevedores	Firms under contract with shipping lines and port authorities to operate
specialist equipment that lift containerised cargo on and off ships in
Australia’s monitored container ports.
Terminal access charge (TAC)	
Previously known as Infrastructure access charge. Charges collected by
stevedores on land transport operators when collecting or delivering laden
(i.e. not empty) containers.
TEU 20 foot equivalent unit	TEU is the standard unit of measurement for shipping containers. One TEU
is equivalent to one 20ft shipping container. One 40ft shipping container is
equivalent to two TEUs. It is known as an FEU.
VBS	
The ‘Vehicle Booking System’. The VBS is an online software tool that
enables truck operators to book a time to pick up or drop off a container
at the terminal.
Vic

Victoria

VICT	
Victorian International Container Terminal Ltd, wholly owned by
International Container Terminal Services Inc. VICT operates a container
terminal in Melbourne.
WA

Western Australia

Glossary
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6mmt

In 2021–22 6mmt of
grain was exported
from Australia in
containers.
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Introduction
Australia’s grains industry has benefited significantly from growth in
global trade. Trade growth has been facilitated by trade agreements and
improvements in the efficiency of shipping, material handling and landbased supply chains and greater efficiency in farm production of grain.
The creation of shipping containers, to replace
more traditional break-bulk shipping, dramatically
lowered the cost of transporting many goods
(especially non-bulk goods) internationally, by
reducing time and labour costs when loading and
unloading ships, with additional benefits from
reduced theft, lower insurance costs, reduced
warehousing costs and lower costs of
interconnection with other transport modes.
Over recent decades, huge investments in new
container ships, container ports, intermodal hubs
and construction of millions of containers have
fuelled an international trade based on
containerisation. An increasing array of
containerised goods are now traded globally. There
are currently globally around 5,360 container ships
with a carrying capacity of 25 million TEUs.
The grains industry globally has benefitted from
containerisation by being able to sell smaller
parcels of grains, oilseeds, seeds and fodder.
Containerisation also has facilitated access to a
wider array of end users and often has been a
means of market development to be a pathway to
eventual supply of bulk grain.
Containerisation of grain has also benefited from
institutional change. For example, in Canada and
Australia, their main crop, wheat, was subject to
statutory marketing by the Canadian Wheat Board
and the Australian Wheat Board up until 2012 and
2008 respectively. Both boards focused on large
customers and bulk shipping. The Canadian Wheat
Board which operated when grain containerisation
was gaining popularity in the 2010s would deliver
in containers on a customer’s request, but it was
not a marketing practice that was actively

promoted. In the case of Australia, following the
demise of the Australian Wheat Board, Australian
wheat exports in containers gradually grew from
0.5mmt in 2007 to 2.7mmt by 2012. In 2020–21
4.2mmt of grain was exported from Australia in
containers. This equates to 11.2 per cent of all
grain exported from Australia.
By comparison Canada currently exports around
4mmt of grain in containers, or about 8.8 per cent
of its annual grain exports. Like Australia, a
gradual structural shift in the mix of mode of grain
export has occurred in Canada whereby
containerised sales of grain have become
increasingly important, especially for sales of
minor crops and pulses.
However, since 2020 COVID has disrupted supply
chains, particularly containerised supply chains
and the consequences of that disruption have
been substantial (see Appendix 11) and have
extended into 2022. Many importers and exporters
have struggled with the consequences of a raft of
supply chain issues. Higher transport and handling
costs, and unreliability and uncertainty costs have
squeezed or devastated profit margins and placed
upward pressure on prices to end users, to the
extent that the higher costs paid by supply chain
users have been able to be passed on. Container
shipping costs on some routes during 2021
reached peaks quadruple average prices in
previous years.
The economic costs of these issues have greatly
affected the containerised export of grain and
fodder from Australia, leading to the
next question.
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Why bother with grain
containerisation?
To answer this question requires providing some
context for Australia’s containerised grain exports.

majority export share of Australia’s annual crop
(Table 1). Nonetheless despite the dominant role
of bulk shipping, containerised grain exports
continue to play an important, albeit lesser role
concerning grain and fodder exports from Australia
(Table 2). In addition, as in Canada,

Firstly, considering inherent economies of scale
and the widespread distribution of large, efficient
bulk grain terminals across all grain production
regions of Australia, bulk shipping shoulders the
Table 1.

National grain production and usage, 2014–15 to 2020–21
mt
2014–15

2015–16

2016–17

2017–18

2018–19

2019–20

2020–21

Production

41.93

39.90

58.13

40.06

33.24

30.68

57.59

Containers

3.44

3.13

4.25

3.08

2.20

2.42

4.19

21.69

20.99

31.53

20.17

13.42

13.30

33.34

Bulk exports
Coastal shipments

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.92

3.49

2.50

0.00

Bulk shipments

21.69

20.99

31.53

21.08

16.91

15.80

33.34

Domestic

12.39

12.77

13.36

13.95

14.65

14.32

15.33

Total

37.51

36.90

49.14

38.12

33.76

32.55

52.87

Source: PTSP loading statements; ACF Shipping stem and market share report; ACF Export report; and ACF Supply and Demand
report; ABARES, State data underpinning: Australia Crop Report: September 2021 No. 199.

Table 2.

Proportion of bulk and containerised shipments by state, 2014–15 to 2020–21
%

2014–15

Bulk
Containers

2015–16

Bulk
Containers

2016–17

Bulk
Containers

2017–18

Bulk
Containers

2018–19

Bulk
Containers

2019–20

Bulk
Containers

2020–21

Bulk
Containers

Average

Bulk
Containers

WA

SA

Vic

NSW

Qld

Total

97

97

55

57

67

86

3

3

45

43

33

14

98

98

49

65

66

87

2

2

51

35

34

13

98

96

70

79

67

88

2

4

30

21

33

12

97

94

62

49

56

87

3

6

38

51

44

13

94

84

28

27

26

88

6

16

72

73

74

12

96

86

55

32

39

87

4

14

45

68

61

13

98

92

75

83

76

89

2

8

25

17

24

11

97

94

64

72

66

88

3

6

36

28

34

12

Source: PTSP loading statements; ACF Shipping stem and market share report; and ACF Export report.
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containerisation remains an important outlet for
specialty grains such as pulses and is especially
important in Australia’s eastern states (see Table 2
and Table 3). For each state of Australia, a more
detailed description of their exports of
containerised grain is shown in Figure 1 to
Figure 5.
Table 3.

Containerised exports of grain by state, 2014–15 to 2020–21
mmt
2014–15

2015–16

2016–17

2017–18

2018–19

2019–20

2020–21

2021–22

Average

New South Wales

0.87

0.91

1.03

0.54

0.25

0.17

1.21

1.54

0.82

Queensland

0.42

0.43

0.60

0.26

0.18

0.17

0.44

0.8

0.41

South Australia

0.20

0.11

0.37

0.35

0.48

0.55

0.56

1.11

0.47

Victoria

1.29

1.20

1.67

1.46

0.43

1.05

1.63

1.85

1.32

Western Australia

0.37

0.24

0.25

0.36

0.83

0.44

0.35

0.68

0.44

National

3.44

3.13

4.25

3.08

2.20

2.42

4.19

6.05

3.60

Source: ACF export report.
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Uptake of the export of containerised wheat
accelerated in the few years after the federal
government took action against the Australian
Wheat Board (AWB) in July 2008 by repealing the
Wheat Marketing Act 1989 that ended the
monopoly bulk export powers of the AWB. The
AWB seemingly gave little priority to the sale of
Australian wheat via containerisation. The loss of
the AWB monopoly powers enabled many smaller
grain traders to participate in wheat marketing via
containerisation. The uplift in containerised
exports of wheat additionally seems to have
stimulated the containerised exports of other
minor crops, especially lentils out of Vic and SA;
chick peas from NSW and Qld, and to a lesser
extent malt from NSW and WA. The Productivity
Commission’s inquiry into Wheat Export Marketing
in 2010 noted the uplift in non-bulk wheat exports
following deregulation of the AWB.
The marked volatility in grain production in Qld
and NSW is evident in the volatility of
containerised grain exports from these states. The
impact of widespread drought in Qld and NSW in
2017–18 and 2018–19 is evident in the decline in
their containerised exports in 2018–19 and
2019–20.
By far the main states that are sources of
containerised grain exports are Vic and NSW,
although the main focus of their grain exports
remains bulk export rather than containerised
exports. These two states regularly export between
1mmt and 1.3mmt of containerised grain each
year. Of next importance is Qld which is subject to
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much greater volatility in its exports of
containerised grain, often exporting between
0.5mmt and 1mmt. SA and WA annually export
lesser volumes, 0.8mmt and 0.6mmt on average
respectively, yet their pattern of export is subject
to far less volatility.
Interestingly the commodity mix of containerised
grain exports from each state differs. Wheat,
lentils, faba beans and canola dominate
containerised grain exports from Vic. Wheat and
chick peas dominate exports from NSW and Qld,
although in some years containerised exports of
sorghum from Qld can feature. Malt exports also
can also feature in some years for NSW.
SA displays the most even mix of containerised
grain exports, including wheat, lentils, faba beans,
field peas and malt. WA similarly exports a diverse
range of grain exports, but mostly wheat, malt
and processed oats.
Figure 6 to Figure 10 display the destinations of
containerised grain exports from each Australian
state. The top 20 destination countries are shown
along with the mix of containerised grains they
import from Australia. The portfolio of grains
principally exported from each state determines
the composition of key markets, so there are
some marked differences between the states.
Pulses principally go to the subcontinent, Egypt
and some Middle East countries; sorghum to
Japan; malt principally to Korea, Vietnam and
Thailand; and wheat and processed to China and a
handful of South East Asian countries.

2,000,000

VIC

1,800,000
1,600,000

Tonnes

1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
Pakistan

South Korea

United States

Fiji

Nepal

United Arab
Emirates

New Zealand

Saudi Arabia

Papua New
Guinea

Field peas
Grain sorghum

Cambodia

Canola oil
Oats

Philippines

Bangladesh

Sri Lanka

India

Egypt

Thailand

Myanmar

Indonesia

Faba beans
Processed oats

New Caledonia

Figure 6.

Lentils
Maize

Singapore

Wheat
Chick peas

China

Taiwan

Malaysia

Vietnam

0

Malt

Containerised grain exports from Victoria 2011–12 to 2021–22 to the top 20 countries

2,000,000

NSW

1,800,000
1,600,000

Tonnes

1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000

Wheat
Canola oil

Figure 7.

Chick peas
Field peas

Malt
Lentils

Faba beans
Oats

Grain sorghum
Processed oats

Japan

United Arab
Emirates

Philippines

Egypt

New Zealand

Bangladesh

South Korea

Myanmar

Indonesia

Malaysia

Pakistan

Thailand

India

China

Taiwan

Vietnam

0

Maize

Containerised grain exports from New South Wales 2011–12 to 2021–22 to the top 20 countries

Why bother with grain containerisation?

35

QLD

2,000,000
1,800,000
1,600,000
1,400,000

Tonnes

1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
Canada

Cambodia
Japan

Nepal

Philippines

Indonesia

South Korea

New Zealand

Maize
Malt

Papua New
Guinea

Faba beans
Canola oil

Malaysia

Thailand

Myanmar

Egypt

United Arab
Emirates

Taiwan

Vietnam

China

Grain sorghum
Processed oats

United
Kingdom

Figure 8.

Wheat
Oats

Taiwan

Chick peas
Field peas

Pakistan

Japan

Bangladesh

India

0

Lentils

Containerised grain exports from Queensland 2011–12 to 2021–22 to the top 20 countries

2,000,000

SA

1,800,000
1,600,000

Tonnes

1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000

Lentils
Processed oats

Figure 9.

36

Faba beans
Oats

Wheat
Grain sorghum

Malt
Maize

Field peas

Fiji

Singapore

Cambodia

China

Turkey

Saudi Arabia

Myanmar

Pakistan

Indonesia

Malaysia

United Arab
Emirates

Sri Lanka

Thailand

Vietnam

India

Bangladesh

Egypt

0

Chick peas

Containerised grain exports from South Australia 2011–12 to 2021–22 to the top 20 countries

Improving Australia’s containerised grain exports

2,000,000

WA

1,800,000
1,600,000
1,400,000
Tonnes

1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000

Wheat
Faba beans

Malt
Lentils

Processed oats
Chick peas

Field peas
Canola oil

Maize
Grain sorghum

New Zealand

Bangladesh

Kuwait

Brazil

United Arab
Emirates

Cambodia

Sri Lanka

Egypt

Singapore

Indonesia

India

Japan

Taiwan

Thailand

Malaysia

Myanmar

China

South Korea

Philippines

Vietnam

0

Oats

Figure 10. Containerised grain exports from Western Australia 2011–12 to 2021–22 to the top 20 countries

Although, as discussed later in this report,
logistical challenges and execution risks have
plagued the export of containerised grain in the
COVID era, nonetheless the export sector has
increased the flow of containerised grain exports.
Export data show that in 2021–22 Australia
exported 6.05mmt compared to 4.19mmt in
2020–21.
Containerisation of grain generates value for grain
growers and end-users insofar as it supports the
supply of specialised or niche grains (e.g. pulses,
oats, high protein wheat, food grade sorghum) or
small parcels of grain or fodder. Containerised
trade also serves small or niche markets and can

act as a bridgehead activity from which a bulk
trade may then eventuate.
What is not always appreciated is how much
fodder is exported via containers from Australian
ports. Over several decades Australia has
developed some key markets for its export of hay,
especially Japan and China, such that often around
1mmt of fodder is exported via containers from
Australia (Figure 11). As an illustration, in the
early 1980s Japan imported virtually no baled hay,
whereas now Japan regularly imports around
2mmt of baled hay via containers. Of that quantity
around 0.4mmt is oaten hay from Australia
(Figure 12).
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Figure 11. Australian hay and chaff exports
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Figure 12. Japan’s hay imports by type and source
Source: ITC calculations based on Japanese Ministry of Finance statistics (HS Code: 121490090).
Hay imports by type: Plant Protection Station, MAFF.

In the long-term Japan’s baled hay imports,
however, are likely to decline gradually due to the
slow decline and ageing of its population.
However, other markets especially China, have
increased their absolute and relative importance
(Figure 11) and remain as strategically valuable
outlets for Australian fodder, although in early
2021 the Chinese government opted not to renew
25 of 28 Australian export licences for hay. This
export hay trade with China is usually worth about
$160 million a year and represents a third of
Australian oaten hay exports.
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In contrast to the export of grains and fodder in
containers, bulk handlers, as their name implies,
focus on trades of bulk grain. Their preference for
bulk handling of grain lessens their need to create
and manage additional segregations of specialty
grades or types of grain at many of their receival
sites. Too many segregations involving small
amounts of different grains generate ‘loss-bydivision’ at storage sites and raise the unit cost of
grain storage and handling. Hence, diverting
specialty grains and small parcels of grain or
fodder into containerisation can serve as a useful
complement to bulk handling which most
cost-effectively focuses on the bulk flow of grain.

The advantages of grain
containerisation
In the context of Australian grain exports, efficient,
cost-competitive and spatially targeted container
packing infrastructure can unlock a diverse range
of commercial opportunities for growers and
customers. Broadly speaking, container packing or
shipment of grain or fodder via containers is
commercially feasible, relative to bulk shipping,
when there is:

A viable shipping option for small cargoes
Bulk freight is subject to minimum cargo
requirements — usually either a full vessel
(between 25–55kt) or in some cases at least one
hatch (3–6kt). The upfront cost to load a bulk
vessel is such that only larger companies can
participate. Port costs have to be paid upfront,
ocean freight is payable within a few days of
sailing and the grain cargo needs to be purchased
in advance of loading. For moderate-sized vessels
loaded with grain, millions of dollars of outlay is
required; restricting entry to mostly
large-sized businesses.
By contrast, containers allow shipping of grain
parcels as small as 1 (20ft) FCL1. A container
carries between 17–30 tonnes (depending on the
nature of the grain or fodder cargo). This ability to
securely and safely transport small volumes is
economically attractive in cases where there are:
i.

sufficiently high margins on these small
volumes (e.g. niche qualities or grades or
minor grains), perhaps also supported by
closed loop arrangements. Pulse Australia
(2020), for example, acknowledges the
contribution of containerised supply chains
to Australia’s comparative advantage as an
exporter of pulse crops. Australia’s
containerised supply chains contribute to
the reliability, flexibility and timeliness of
Australia’s pulse exports, facilitating serving
smaller customers and higher value
niche markets.

ii. credit, transport or storage constraints at
destination. Many end-users historically
have operated a ‘just in time’ approach to
sourcing grain due to their limited ability or
desire to store large volumes of grain at
their location. These users are prepared to
pay a premium for small parcels of grain in
order to avoid capital investments in land
and storage infrastructure at their
destination site. Some transport systems in
some receiving countries also are best
suited to the conveyance by truck of
individual containers rather than the bulk
movement of grain. Also, some buyers face
credit limits and so prefer small volume
purchases made possible via
containerisation. Some customers require
an even, year-round supply of grain or
fodder, best served through the regular
supply of containerised product. Finally,
some customers do not have access to a
deep-water port and so need to be serviced
by small ships that convey containerised
parcels of grain.
iii. food processor trials of new varieties or
grades. Assessing small loads of grain
allows food processors to determine the
suitability and functionality of new varieties
or grades of grain, without committing to
expensive large purchases of these
varieties or grades.
Further supporting the commercial attractiveness
of grain containerisation has been a structural
shift in the nature of containerised shipping. When
the containerization of grain was in its infancy
over 20 years ago, the largest container ships were
commonly in the 4500 TEU range. However, over
ensuing years larger vessels have been
commissioned. Vessels conveying over 8000 TEU
are now common, and ships carrying over
18,000 TEUs are entering service. The enlarged
carrying capacity of container ships has enabled
reductions in or containment of the real cost of
sea freight for containers.

1 In shipping jargon an FCL is a “Full Container Load”. This means the entire space of a container is solely allocated to a single
user (i.e. not shared with any other user).
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Inadequacies in the bulk grain supply chain
The rationale for a grower not delivering all their
grain into a bulk handling network, but rather
relying on some containerisation, is mostly due to
considerations of geography, differentiation, and
cost. Explaining further; containerisation is
increasingly attractive:
i.

where a farmer’s grain is produced near a
container packer but distant from their
nearest bulk terminal or upcountry receival
point for the type of grain they grow.
Container packing assets are relatively
inexpensive to build and set up and thus,
can be installed across these supply ‘hot
spots’ within a region.

ii. if the farmer produces grain with
specialised traits sought by a particular
niche market or individual buyer.
iii. where an end user requires a verifiable
provenance of grain production and
traceability.
iv. whenever the bulk handler is perceived by
the farmer to be unduly profiteering from
their dominant or monopoly position as a
service provider of bulk storage, handling
and marketing services. Containerisation is
one way a farmer can divert grain away
from the monopoly or dominant bulk grain
service provider.
v.

where farm production is of sufficient size
and complexity that containerisation of
some of the farm’s grain production can be
a value-adding or market risk
diversification strategy for the business.
Accessing small traders increases the price
pressure on the farmer’s grains by
supporting a larger pool of potential buyers.

vi. where packing grain into containers allows
more efficient and profitable use of existing
farm storage, labour and equipment; and
for some large multi-commodity trading
businesses, a more profitable use of their
transport (e.g. trucking or rail) assets. The
presence of either complementary
containerised goods (e.g. meat products) or
other products (e.g. timber, minerals) can
help ensure cost-efficiency of a region’s
transport services (e.g. rail routes to port)
that deliver commercial feasibility for
containerised exports.
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vii. whenever the bulk supply chain is at full
capacity or is facing bulk shipping
bottlenecks, containerised grain supply
chains offer a supplementation option.

Complementarity to a bulk grain supply chain
Linked to a previously mentioned observation that
successful containerisation requires a viable
shipping option for small cargoes, is a related
observation that creation and use of containerised
grain supply chains enables Australia’s grain
export industry to better serve a broader range of
customers and grain buyers. Containerisation of
grain can thus complement bulk supply chains,
whilst usefully injecting some competitive
pressure on both supply chains (i.e. bulk and
container supply chains).
The formation and maintenance of containerised
grain supply chains helps the Australian export
grains sector in its role as a supplier of grain and
fodder. Australia’s grains industry is not large like
the EU, USA or Russian grain sectors. Moreover,
Australia cannot easily increase its grain
production, as Australia lacks easy access to
additional arable land to support greater
production. Nonetheless, however, Australia has
sufficient large-scale logistics and port
infrastructure to receive post-panamax, panamax
and handymax-sized vessels and Australia’s small
population relative to its grain output frequently
allows Australia to be a source of exportable grain
surpluses; not withstanding occasional periods of
persistent drought. In addition, Australia has a
broadly distributed container freight footprint,
complemented by customer-centric marketing and
supported (up until the last few years) by
attractive back-haul freight rates for containers.
These facilities, a mindset for marketing and
usually attractive back-haul freight rates ensure
Australian businesses can frequently deliver a
range of grains, some with unique characteristics,
to meet the functionality requirements of endusers with significant flexibility. This ensures a
wide range of potential customers can be served;
those who buy several panamax loads of grain,
through to very small buyers, who need only one
container of a specialist grain.

An opportunity to extract value from atypical
or differentiated varieties or to unlock value
from crop breeders’ stranded crop lines
A logical and expected outcome of a bulk handling
network system, when combined with the nature
of grain classification systems in Australia and the
end point royalty financing of Australian crop
breeding, is the frequent dominance of a single
variety (or handful of varieties). In the case of
wheat, a grower will often sow the variety with
the highest yield or highest prospective gross
margin. As long as the variety and its load meet
receival specifications, its actual functionality to
an end user is not fully valued. For example, if a
grower produces a load of Australian Prime Hard
wheat that is exactly perfect for ramen production
and delivers it to their nearest APH receival point,
they will be paid the same price as some other
APH load that only just meets receival
specifications and may, in fact, be somewhat less
suited to ramen production.
In a bulk setting, this inability to fully reward
grain parcel functionality has a few consequences.
Firstly, farmer adoption of functionally novel
varieties within the bulk grade system is
inherently constrained due to blending and
co-mingling of many grain parcels. Secondly, in
some situations, a variety is so dominant that the
parent grade can become little more than a proxy
for the variety. Thirdly, and most importantly,
because crop breeding is funded by end point
royalties, crop breeders are encouraged in a bulk
system to generate new varieties that are highyielding whilst just meeting grade specifications.
The result is often the widespread dominance of a
single variety or a small group of varieties rather
than the provision of a portfolio of varieties with a
range of functionalities for different end uses
or products.

The intense search by crop breeders for the next
dominant variety means their breeding programs
likely contain some advanced lines with some
unique or superior functionalities but there is no
path to market in a bulk system for these lines.
However, containerisation and/or closed loop
marketing arrangements offer a means to extract
value from these unique advanced lines, so they
need not be stranded or be biological assets
invariably discarded or under-utilised.
Containerisation and/or closed loop arrangements
can increase the biological diversity of a region’s
grain production and increase the diversity of
market opportunities for grain producers and
crop breeders.

Reward for protecting grain quality from
reduced handling
One main difference between bulk handling and
containerisation of grain is the frequency of
handling and mingling. In a bulk handling system,
grain more frequently risks being damaged and
co-mingled as it moves through the supply chain
from farm to bulkhead, from bulkhead to train or
truck, then into port storage before being exported
via large conveyors. To minimise the risk of
damage most bulk handlers have invested in
handling equipment that is less damaging
(e.g. use of conveyor belts rather than augers; and
instituting maximum drop heights). Nonetheless,
in general, containerisation involves less
co-mingling and damage to the grain from
repeated handling. Some pulses, for example, are
fairly easily damaged so containerisation is one
option to avoid price penalties or downgrades
attributable to physical damage.
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A perceived need for greater diversity in grain
supply chains

Limiting the financial downside of quality or
phytosanitary events

One issue noted in the sub-section “Inadequacies
in the bulk grain supply chain” was that in some
regions, grain producers opt for selling some of
their grain through containerisation to lessen their
dependence on the services of the dominant or
sole bulk grain handler. In some situations,
farmers feel exposed to the risk of monopoly
behaviour by a sole or dominant bulk grain
handler or the monopsonistic behaviour of a
dominant bulk grain buyer. Provision of container
packing services by independent traders helps
expose grain producers to a different suite of
potential buyers and enlarges the competition for
farmers’ grain; thereby dissuading bulk grain
service providers and bulk grain buyers from
engaging in anti-competitive behaviour. Strategic
siting of container packing services by
independent traders can also allow some farmers
and related multi-commodity businesses to access
multicommodity freight services (e.g. rail freight
services) to their commercial advantage.

Containerisation can limit financial losses that
arise from phytosanitary events or quality
disputes. In the case of phytosanitary
contamination in a bulk shipment, this can be
particularly challenging if the issue is identified by
AQIS via examination of samples, which are taken
at regular, prescribed intervals during loading.

As a generalisation, any increase in the number of
buyers intensifies competition. A bulk shipment in
a panamax ship may be handled by several large
import buyers who then may split the cargo to
supply many smaller domestic buyers. By
contrast, supplying grain in containers potentially
serves the direct needs of a far greater number of
customers who help deliver competitive pressure
on the price of that grain and who help establish
niche markets and form new loyalties. It is this
wider array of customers that helps diversify
market opportunities whilst placing competitive
pressure on grain prices.
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For example, the identification of a single live
insect on the proscribed list triggers a cascade of
actions aimed at identifying the source and
examining the samples to establish whether the
issue is isolated or widespread. Regardless of the
nature of the contamination and who discovers it,
once identified, the silo, tank or stack in question
will almost certainly be removed for investigation,
with the shipper unable to load as planned and
then needing to quickly undertake a methyl
bromide application and swap to an alternate
supply. Depending on the contract terms in place
for the shipment in question and other factors
such as availability of replacement stocks and the
shipper’s ownership of additional stock within the
network, the issue could have minor or larger
financial consequences.
In the case of containers however, unless the
contamination is distributed throughout the cargo,
the initial volume knocked out of loading is often
limited to that container or its associated storage
no longer being accessed. Hence, the downside
commercial risk associated with phytosanitary
events or quality disputes is often less in
container supply chains compared to bulk grain
supply chains. A grower who exports containerised
grain or fodder manages the biosecurity risk by
having their own Biosecurity — Authorised
Premises and fumigation contract and biosecurity
export documents specific to their shipment,
whereas the grower who delivers into a bulk
system entrusts the processes and management
of the bulk handler.

Access to empty containers
Ease of access to containers facilitates
containerised grain exports.
Australia is a net importer of containerised goods.
This results in a surplus of empty containers
normally being readily available in main container
ports like Melbourne, Brisbane or Botany. Because
shipping companies normally try to avoid handling
empty containers, the prices of accessing empty
containers and their backhaul rates often
encourage grain and fodder containerisation.
In regions like Victoria and New South Wales with
their large populations and resultant large demand
for goods imported via containers, a surplus of
empty containers is usually constantly available.
This facilitates the export via containers of certain
pulse crops, seeds and fodder. Moreover, there is
a greater frequency of container ships arriving and
leaving the main ports of Melbourne and Botany
which enhances the potential speed and reliability
of serving containerised grain and fodder
customers out of these main ports. Due to the
volume of incoming containers into these main
ports there is often greater availability of 20ft
containers but only 25 per cent of 20ft containers
are typically food grade suited to containerised
grain exports.
Victoria, in particular, is well-placed to maintain a
potentially vibrant trade in containerised grain and
fodder (see Table 2). Another technical aspect that
favours the export of containerised grain in places
like Victoria where a surplus of empty containers
is commonplace is the weight-bearing capacity of
container ships. Explaining further and drawing on
Prentice and Hemmes (2015), a typical 5000 TEU
container vessel has a maximum gross carrying
capacity of approximately 49,000 tonnes, or
approximately 9.8–10.5 tonnes per TEU. This is a
function of the vessel’s buoyancy and
carrying capability.
Based on the dimensions of a standard 20ft
container, these ships can carry a maximum
per-cubic-foot loading of approximately
6.5 kilograms per cubic foot (kcf). The challenge
with loading bulk commodities into containers is
that their densities are greater than the average
lading threshold of 6.5 kcf. Accordingly, shippers
would say a container ship of grain would
“weighout” before it “cubed-out”.

Explaining further, a standard 20ft container
typically accommodates about 21 tonnes of grain,
often filling much of the available space in the
container. At the higher end of this range is wheat,
which normally weighs in at an average of
23 tonnes per 20ft container. If it is assumed that
a 5000-TEU container ship is available to load,
then the weight profile of these loaded containers
would only permit 2140 to be taken aboard; a load
factor of just under 43 per cent. In this case
having an ample supply of empty containers to
ship back to where those empty containers are
needed is a great advantage, because the ship’s
cargo can then comprise containers laden with
wheat plus a complementary cargo of empty
containers; thereby facilitating the export of the
containerised grain. Ultimately, 1.34 empty TEUs
would need to accompany every TEU loaded with
wheat in this case. This ratio of 1.34 is derived as
follows for a typical 5000-TEU vessel:
Vessel’s Net Tonnage: (NT) = 49,226 tonnes
Vessel’s Container TEU Capacity: (T) = 5000 TEUs
Standard lading per TEU: (SL) = 9.84 tonnes
Wheat lading per TEU: (WL) = 23 tonnes/TEU
The maximum number of loaded wheat
containers (MC) that could be carried are:
MC = (NT/WL) = (49,226 tonnes/23 tonnes) =
2140 loaded wheat containers.
The load factor (LF) per container ship is:
LF = (MC/T) = (2140/5000) = 0.428
The empty-to-loaded container ratio (ELR) is:
ELR = ((T – MC)/MC) = ((5000 – 2140)/2140) =
(2860/2140) = 1.34
To efficiently access empty containers requires
information-sharing and activity coordination
between track owners, shipping lines, stevedores,
rail operators, freight forwarders and grain
packers. The current status of containerised
supply chains in Australia suggests there is
inadequate information-sharing and coordination.
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The disadvantages of grain
containerisation
Having outlined the situations and motivations
where embracing grain containerisation is likely to
be commercially appealing, it is important to also
describe the challenges and pitfalls facing
businesses that engage or propose to engage in
the containerisation of grain and fodder.

Cost of container supply chains relative to
bulk supply chains
During 2020 and 2021 the main factors affecting
the relative commercial attractiveness of the
containerisation of grain and fodder, by far, has
been the execution risk and supply chain costs
associated with containerisation. The per tonne
costs of the container supply chain versus its bulk
grain alternative, in many cases has led to either
a cessation or reduction in use of containerised
grain supply chains over these years. Contraction
or expansion of this cost spread is a major
determinant of container demand for grain export.
That said, not all containerised freight is sensitive
to this spread, as below a certain total tonnage,
bulk freight cannot currently be a viable option.
Hence, certain very niche or specialty grain
markets remain the realm of containerisation,
albeit consumer resistance to paying high prices
eventually lessens the demand for these niche
products. Before reaching that price point of
consumer resistance, however, often the increased
freight and handling costs are passed back along
the supply chain but ultimately lower the
farm-gate price offered to farmers which lessens
the farmer’s incentive to then grow these
specialty crops.

Access to empty containers
As previously stated, ease of access to containers
can be either an advantage or disadvantage
depending on the magnitude and consistency of
that ease.
In less populous regions like Western Australia or
South Australia, container availability is less
assured, despite these regions regularly producing
large exportable surpluses of grain. Moreover,
container ships arrive and leave the main ports of
Fremantle and Adelaide less frequently compared
to Melbourne and Botany which reduces the
potential speed and reliability of serving
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containerised grain and fodder customers out of
these ports in WA and SA. In these ports access to
food grade 20ft containers for grain export is
especially important as often trucking capabilities
at receiving ports are better geared to handle 20ft
rather than 40ft containers. Also, even within
many parts of Australia, road transport regulations
limit the weight of grain that can be loaded into a
40ft container for subsequent road transport. This
weight restriction for 40ft containers, however, is
less an issue for fodder exports due to the lesser
density of fodder (see Appendix 1).
Access to food-grade 20ft containers is especially
important as some importing countries are not
able to easily handle 40ft containers and so have
a strong preference to receive 20ft containers.
Wherever regional availability of containers is less
and wherever frequency of access to container
ships is less, then the commercial attractiveness
and growth prospects for containerised exports is
constrained. Hence, states like WA and SA face a
more constrained future for containerised grain
and fodder exports than Victoria.
During the COVID pandemic, and even in its
aftermath, availability of 20ft food grade
containers at many of Australia’s container ports
has been problematic and so bookings cannot be
easily made. Moreover, even where containers
might be available, shipping lines may limit their
sailing dates or routes to key containerised grain
markets, such as the sub-continent or Middle East.

Need for proper business planning and access
to expertise
If a farmer seeks commercial involvement in grain
or fodder containerisation, then one of the main
messages from interviews with current farmer
participants in grain containerisation is the need
to conduct proper business planning and to
ensure appropriate expertise is available to the
business. In their rush to activity, often farmers
underinvest in business planning, due diligence,
and business governance. For example, if a farmer
opts to establish a container packing facility, then
often the resulting sales of containerised grain are
Delivered Container Terminal (DCT) contracts that
provide the farmer with no security for payment
given that the bills of lading are issued to the DCT
buyer (i.e. the firm that has booked the freight).
Once the containers are delivered to the terminal,
they are under the control of the DCT buyer, and

the seller has limited recourse in the event of
non-payment by which time the containers may
well have left the country. Hence, undertaking due
diligence assessment of potential DCT buyers is
essential. Often to lessen these sorts of risks,
many farmers instead directly deliver their grain
to a separate container packing business.
Proper business planning helps ensure that capital
purchase and labour-hiring decisions are properly
thought through to display commercial merit. Due
diligence in assessing third party risk and market
opportunities helps prevent bad or costly
decisions. Designing, communicating and
monitoring business and operational processes is
also essential to deliver organisational safety and
the required documentation to facilitate
commercial activity.
Often external experts or people with experience
in the marketing of containerised grain and fodder
are best brought into the business to avoid costly
mistakes or oversights. Entry into the trade of
containerised grain and fodder requires a farmer
to be exposed to many risks outside their control.
Exposure to third party risk is ever present.
Unfortunately, some businesses succumb to
money illusion where an enticing high price
causes the delivery of containerised product, only
then to find they are not paid for the product or
are not fully paid.
Farmers are also exposed to the actions of others
in their containerised grain supply chains
(e.g. shippers and stevedores). Farmers have
limited or no control over the actions of these
other service providers. Being aware of how
vulnerable their container trade business is to the
actions of others outside their control can help
contingency plans to be prepared and
implemented, when necessary.
In some grain-producing regions of Australia, such
as WA, where domestic market opportunities are
limited, and the bulk supply chain is relatively
cost-efficient, then many farmers opt mostly to
send grain into the bulk system. This simplifies
their grain management tasks and is attractive to
time-pressed crop producers. That said, there are
farmers in other regions that do not like being
solely reliant on a single commercial bulk grain
handler and so support grain containerisation to
inject some competitive pressure in
grain handling.

Although various organisations offer basic training
and education for potential exporters, the many
tasks and difficulties faced by containerised grain
exporting business are rarely addressed in
sufficient detail.
Grain Trade Australia (2018) produced a useful
technical guideline for container packing and will
run, if there is sufficient demand, 2-day courses
that cover the basics of packing operations.

Need to avoid over-capitalisation
Another main message from interviews with
current farmer participants in grain
containerisation is the need to avoid overcapitalisation. As shown in recent years, the
profitability of exporting grain and fodder can be
subject to much uncertainty and volatility.
Accordingly, to prevent under-utilisation of assets
and to ensure a sufficiently attractive return on
capital, it is vital to avoid over-capitalisation.
Being able to cease or scale back container trade
operations in response to market realities is
crucial to the viability of many businesses. Having
a capital structure appropriate to the vagaries and
volatility of the container trade is a pre-requisite
for business success.

Need for Minimum Residue Limit (MRL)
monitoring
In markets with tight chemical residue tolerances
the co-mingling of grain that occurs in a bulk
system provides a dilution factor that ensures
MRLs are rarely breeched. By contrast, in container
supply chains with some grain being supplied
directly ex-farm, with no access to dilution, the
risk of breech is greater. Even in a farm silo or
bulkhead that on average tests below MRL
thresholds there maybe pockets that when packed
into a container result in subsequent detection
and rejection; and the associated
reputational damage.
More countries are applying MRL protocols. Yet it
is extremely difficult at any container grain
packing site to segregate product until MRL testing
is complete. Thorough MRL testing adds to the
costs of containerisation and can delay the
process of containerisation.
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Grain containerisation versus
bulk grain
The nature and cost of bulk grain
supply chains
Introduction
White et al. (2018) divide bulk grain export supply
chains into three main types (Figure 14). In the
traditional supply chain, the grain is delivered by
the farmer to a nearby receival point where it is
stored and subsequently transported to port by
rail and road. At the port, grain is aggregated and
shipped. In a more direct supply chain, the grain
is delivered by the farmer to port from farm
storage for direct loading. In the third main type
of supply chain, the farmer stores grain on-farm
then sends it to domestic users. A recent analysis
of harvest logistics in Australia suggests that this
third type of supply chain may become
increasingly popular among farmers, especially
those in states outside of Western Australia (WA)
(Kingwell et al., 2020).
In all states, other than WA, farmers no longer
retain controlling shares in the ownership and
operation of their major bulk handling supply
chains. The organisations who own key
components such as up-country receival sites are
reducing the number of those sites and
consolidating their operations into larger more
efficient facilities that, whilst adding to some
farmers’ transport costs, are generating improved
turn-around times to assist in harvest velocity.
Economies of scale and excessive maintenance
costs, as facilities age and no longer meet safety
standards, are some of the factors driving
rationalisation of receival sites. Moreover, farmers
have invested in larger harvesting equipment,
headers and trucks, to increase the speed of
harvesting and reduce weather damage risk.
Combined with increasing crop yields, the
ramifications are that bulk handlers need facilities
to more rapidly receive and store grain, and then
outturn it more quickly. Farmers are also building
on-farm storage capacity to help match their
enlarged field harvest capacity.
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Wheat and barley deliveries to traditional bulk
handling companies on the east coast are typically
to access early cashflows at harvest and pay
suppliers of services. Some other crops like pulses
are delivered to container packing facilities
for export.
The costliness of Australia’s bulk grain supply
chains affects the international costcompetitiveness of Australian grain. Bulk grain
supply chain costs represent between 32 and
36 per cent of the FOB (Free on Board) price of
Australian wheat that is internationally traded.
Moreover, these bulk grain supply chain costs are
often more expensive than some of Australia’s
wheat export competitors like Ukraine and
Argentina (White et al., 2018). The challenge for
Australian grain exporters is that Australia’s
competitors continue to boost the efficiency of
their supply chains by investments in rail, road
and port infrastructure and, given less climate
variability, are often able to more reliably supply
customers year on year; although this advantage
is weakened by uncertain policy intervention by
the governments in some exporting countries and,
in the case of the Black Sea region, by recent
conflict and sanctioning actions. Significant
advances in milling technology also allow flour
mills to manage quality outcomes more effectively
across different wheat types in their blend so a
lesser quality of grain from some of Australia’s
competitors can be more easily and
frequently used.
One of Australia’s wheat export competitors is
Canada. It has invested in high throughput 150 rail
car upcountry sites and materially added to its
west coast port terminal capacity. New facilities
and upgrades to existing port facilities in the Port
of Vancouver have expanded its capacity from
29mmt to 40mmt/annum for an average 23–25mmt
export program. Improved upcountry rail loading
sites and introduction of high-performance trains
now allows Canadian unit trains to be up to
15,000 tonnes, an increase of 4400 tonnes per train
(White et al., 2018).

Argentina is renovating its rail system, investing
US$2.8b which will reduce its supply chain costs
(Kingwell & White, 2018). Ukraine has received a
US$560 million loan to upgrade or rehabilitate its
road network (Kingwell et al., 2016b) but war and
restoration in Ukraine will weaken its
cost-competitiveness in 2022 and 2023; and
perhaps even in subsequent years.
These above-mentioned investments contribute to
the grain export prowess of these countries and
ensure these countries will likely remain strategic
threats to Australian wheat exports
(Kingwell et al., 2016a; Kingwell et al., 2016b;
Kingwell & White, 2018). To keep pace with these
competitors, it is imperative that the supply
chains of Australia’s wheat industry are
increasingly cost-efficient.
In addition, the environmental sustainability of
grain supply chains is likely to become an issue of
increased importance (Kingwell, 2021). The cost of
being carbon neutral, for example, has not yet
been introduced in supply chain costs but could in
future years. It is known, for example, that the
principal provider of grain supply chain services in
WA, Cooperative Bulk Handling (CBH), monitors
greenhouse gas emissions across its supply
chains, and all bulk handlers are by law required
to report their greenhouse gas emissions.

The owners and operators of much of the bulk
export supply chain infrastructure, post-farm gate,
are also dominant grain traders. Owning and
operating supply chain infrastructure helps these
businesses to execute grain sales and gives them
spatial intelligence about the quantities and
qualities of grain available for purchase. Perhaps it
is therefore unsurprising that two of Australia’s
principal grain handlers, Cooperative Bulk
Handling (CBH) and GrainCorp over the last decade
have increased their combined share of Australia’s
bulk export of grain from 30 per cent a decade ago
to around 50 per cent (Figure 13) in recent years.
However, if the example of CBH is typical of
Australia’s other main grain handling and grain
marketing entities (i.e. Viterra and GrainCorp) then
a main portion of their business profits stems
from the grain handling and storage arms of their
businesses rather than grain marketing (Table 4).
The inference from data in Table 4 is that grain
trading in Australia is highly contested and that
for main grain handlers like CBH their principal
source of net profit is from storage and handling.
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Figure 13. Company shares of bulk grain exports from Australia: 2011–12 to 2020–21

Grain containerisation versus bulk grain

47

Table 4.

Sources of net profit for the CBH Group: 2016–17 to 2020–21
2020–21

Tonnes received (mmt)

2019–20

15.1

9.8

2018–19

2017–18

2016–17

5-yr average

16.4

13.3

16.6

14.24

45

98

55.2

Net profit source ($m)
Grain storage and handling

44

-11

100

Marketing and trading

77

12

-119

3

10

-3.4

Grain processing

14

8

-15

-7

8

1.6

2

4

-7

-25

-6.5

Other
Net profit source ($/t received)

6.10

3.44

0.23

0.60

-0.02

-0.53

0.48

0.16

-1.51

-0.32

2.91

Marketing and trading

5.10

1.22

-7.26

Grain processing

0.93

0.82

-0.91

0

0.20

0.24

-0.53

Other

-1.12

5.90

Grain storage and handling

3.38

Source: Based on published data in the CBH Annual Report 2021 (CBH 2021d).

The ACCC produces and publishes annual bulk
grain monitoring reports (e.g. ACCC, 2021). These
reports detail the nature and concentration of
export activity and capacity allocation at
Australia’s bulk grain port terminals. Table 5
displays supplementary data from the ACCC
(2021). Since 2010–11, additional bulk grain export
facilities have been built, mostly in states other
than Western Australia. These new facilities have
increased the export options for grain traders and
grain producers but in years of low volumes of
grain production become under-utilised assets
that potentially raise the unit cost of grain export.

from 28 facilities across Australia. However, fewer
exporters are using each port, with an average in
2020–21 of below five exporters per port,
compared to eight in 2011–12: mostly reflecting a
consolidation in the number of grain exporters.
Worth highlighting is the marked reduction in the
number of exporters using GrainCorp facilities
since 2010–11. Also the number of exporters using
Viterra facilities since the early 2010s has
noticeably declined.

Since 2010–11 a few trends have emerged
regarding the use of facilities and market shares
among grain traders. There are more new and
smaller grain export port facilities. In 2020–21 grain
exporters shipped a record amount of bulk grain
Table 5.
2020–21

The next sub-section outlines the approach taken
to estimate the current public tariff rates of bulk
grain supply chains in Australia and to then
compare those tariff rates against those reported
in previous studies by Stretch et al. (2014) and
White et al. (2018).

Number of bulk grain export facilities and the number of grain exporters using PTSP# facilities: 2010–11 to
2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 2018–19 2019–20 2020–21

National average per
facility (all PTSPs)

7.94

8.29

7.35

7.78

5.57

5.92

5.04

3.38

3.19

4.50

CBH average

8.75

10.0

8.75

10.75

10.25

10.25

9.25

9.00

8.75

8.25

Viterra average

7.60

7.40

9.20

11.40

8.60

7.60

8.20

5.60

6.00

7.00

GrainCorp average

8.00

8.00

5.57

4.86

4.29

6.00

4.29

1.86

1.43

3.86

18

18

18

19

23

24

25

25

28

28

Number of facilities*

Notes:
#
PTSP = Port terminal service provider — the owner or operator of a port terminal facility that is used, or is to be used, to provide
a port terminal service. The averages are not weighted by the size of the facilities.
* Port Adelaide Viterra is counted as two facilities (Inner Harbour and one for Outer Harbor).
Source: ACCC (2021) Based on PTSP loading statements; ACF Shipping stem and market share reports.
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Methodology
The approach of White et al. (2018) is followed to
assess supply chain tariff rates2. This approach
allows a node-by-node comparison of grain supply
chains across Australia. Figure 14 shows an
overview, as mentioned previously, of the three
categories of bulk grain export supply chains:
Traditional, Direct and On-farm. On-farm storage is
not considered here.
All tariff rates from harvest 2020–21 (hereafter
2021) are compared with previous data. Where
data is available for harvest 2021–22 (hereafter
2022) those datasets are included. Historical
charges were expressed in 2021 constant value
terms using CPI values (ABS 2021) and charges in
2022 assume a cost inflation of 3 per cent.
Public tariff prices published by Australia’s main
grain handling and storage service providers are
used where available. Road and rail freight data
published by CBH for WA and Viterra for SA are
used and compared against previously published
data based on distances to port. Rates are
compared with previous years for sites where
historic datasets exist (see Appendix 2 and
Appendix 3).

These rates are close to the market rates for
execution given they are ‘guaranteed’ rates as
part of export efficiency agreements for delivered
port supply chain costs. However, for the eastern
states (Vic, NSW and Qld), the road/rail freights
used are similar to the location differentials
published by Grain Trade Australia (GTA) as a
freight cost approximation. This approach is the
same used by Stretch et al. (2014) and White et al.
(2018), making our findings comparable to those
found in these previous studies. GTA publishes
each year the location differentials for all states
(see Appendix 3). However, location differentials
are not charges but are an instrument to facilitate
transfer of grain between traders. When they were
first developed, location differentials reflected
actual freight costs, as most grain was moved by
rail, but over time the cost difference between
road and rail has widened due to advances in
high-performance trucks with net weights up to
70 tonnes per truck (White et al., 2018).

On farm
storage
On-farm

1

Direct

2

Traditional

3

Truck or rail
grain to port

Handle and
store grain
at port

Load grain
onto ship

Ship to
destination

Truck to
Handle and store
receival point grain at receival
point

Figure 14. Overview of the types of supply chains
Source: Adapted from White et al. (2018).

2 This section of the report outlines a study supervised by Professor Ross Kingwell and mostly undertaken by Mr d’Abbadie, a
Master of Agricultural Economics student at the University of Western Australia in 2021.
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Warehouse storage costs were obtained from
public tariff rates published by service providers
(see Appendix 3). The fees’ names and purposes
vary between service providers. Consequently, we
use the names and definitions given by White
et al. (2018). GTA has published the main major
providers’ receival sites across Australia, and
those same sites are used here following the
methodology of White et al. (2018).
Port loading charges were obtained from the
service providers’ port terminals and ports
services agreements (see Appendix 3). All these
reports are public reports published by the
handlers and port authorities. From the ports’
public information is obtained the wharf fees and
other miscellaneous port fees. Stevedoring charges
were obtained from the port terminal agreements
and port schedules. To be consistent and
comparable with previous studies, we use the
names for port charges as described by
White et al. (2018). However, after receiving expert
advice the miscellaneous port costs and wharf
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fees were separated from the stevedoring charges,
given they are paid to different service providers
or in the case of stevedoring can be an internal
cost to the bulk handling company.
Ship freight rates were derived from the Baltic
Exchange (2021) and were considered to be the
averages from January 2021 to June 2021. This is
the peak shipping period for grain exported from
most Australian ports. The relevant shipping
routes considered are detailed in Appendix 4.
The fuel cost was the IFO 380 global average
bunker price published by Ship and Bunker (Ship
and Bunker, 2021). In 2021 and 2022 shipping
costs have increased due to the ramifications of
COVID-19 pandemic, combined with an increased
demand for dry bulk shipping.

Results and discussion
Truck and rail freight
A comparison of freight costs versus distance, for
CBH and Viterra, is shown in Figure 15. This figure
shows all the published freight rates for 2021.
The freight rates in the Viterra network to port are
higher than the freight costs in the CBH network
for the same distance. This finding is consistent
with that of White et al. (2018). The variation in
Viterra’s freight rates also is higher than for CBH.
This difference in variation is similar to the
variation difference found by White et al. (2018).
In that report, they argued that this variation
could be caused by the geography of SA and the
road and rail mix between the different export
zones (e.g. Eyre Peninsula in SA is 100 per cent
road). Nevertheless, on average, growers from SA
pay between $5.40 to $6.30/tonne more than WA
growers for freight over equivalent distances. The
lower rate in WA could be due to the greater
economies of scale in WA, for example running
longer 60 wagon trains. Another reason for this
difference, especially for larger distances (i.e.:
larger than 200km) is that a larger proportion of
freight at this distance is by train in WA
(approximately 60 per cent). However, the
difference between CBH and Viterra’s freight
charges is surprisingly constant even at short
distances. In those short distances (i.e. lower than
200km), rail and truck transport rates are
relatively consistent. Additionally, the trucking

costs in WA and SA should be similar as the main
components of truck costs are labour and fuel,
which are similar in both states and truck
combinations are also similar given road
network capacity.
In recent years, Viterra has changed its freight
logistics on the Eyre Peninsula to 100 per cent by
road trucks, as rail lines have been closed due to
a lack of viability in upgrading. A larger size of
trucks is allowed on the roads — up to 55–70 tonne
net payload on road trains (at harvest) and AB
triple trucks (site to port delivery). The geography
of the peninsula supports relatively straight and
flat roads. Rail is more costly due to the rail
system not covering multiple commodities, unlike
the case in eastern SA. Plus, the rail system is an
old narrow-gauge 16-tonne axle load which limits
wagon sizes and weights. This all makes road
transport preferable. Viterra contracts road
transport operators for an overall volume from
each site for a defined period, as distinct from
what happens on the east coast of Australia where
road rates are negotiated more on a spot basis.
The Viterra contracts provide more consistency for
road freight operators which allows for lower road
rates on confirmed tonnes.
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Figure 15. Comparison of CBH and Viterra freight charges for 2021
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Figure 16 illustrates freight charges versus
distance for CBH and Viterra in 2022. CBH, on
average, has lower freight costs than Viterra but
the difference has lessened in 2022. However,
Viterra still displays a greater variation in its
charges around an underlying linear trend. The
difference in costs between CBH and Viterra is
$3.50/tonne for freight distances below 100km
from port, and $1.70/tonne for freight distances
beyond 300km from port.
Adjusting prices to 2021 equivalent prices, the
freight rates have reduced over time for Viterra
and CBH, as shown in Figure 17 and Figure 18. For
Viterra, its real freight charges have reduced
between 2013 to 2022, by 11.1 per cent for 100km
and by 23.9 per cent for 300km. In short, the
longer the distance, the greater the reduction in
real charges. This could imply that greater
efficiencies were derived from reducing fixed costs
than variable costs.
CBH’s freight charges have similarly decreased
greatly since 2011, although 2022 is a large
reversal to the charging trend. Charges have
increased from 2021 to 2022 by 19.0 per cent for
100km and by 10.1 per cent for 300km. The
reasons for this increase could be a mix of short
and long-term factors. The short-term factors
mainly arise from the COVID-19 situation that has
fuelled a labour shortage in WA, including a
shortage of higher qualified drivers for PBS
vehicles, and has increased the cost of labour.

Contemporaneously, the expected large grain
harvest in 2022 has increased the demand for
trucks and rail services. Finally, the increase in
fuel costs in 2021 has placed upward pressure on
freight costs. Over time, with growing crop sizes,
the road-rail mix has changed with more road
services being required to transport grain from
farms and fill the flexible export task. These
trends place upward pressure on freight rates.
Additionally in 2021 CBH entered into a new rail
contract with Aurizon with additional rail capacity
(2 new unit trains) and more reliability
requirements built into the supply contract.
A further business structure influence is that CBH,
as a cooperative, relies on retained earnings to
reinvest in its business, to fund acquisitions and
maintain increasingly tighter lender requirements
for a large cash trading book. Increasing service
charges within their network operations is one
mechanism to maintain a healthy balance sheet.
Viterra in the same period has still operated under
the same take or pay rail contracts for its eastern
region export shipping, whilst road transport is
solely used on the Eyre Peninsula for its grain
export task.
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Figure 16. Comparison of CBH and Viterra freight charges for 2022
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Warehouse Storage
The reduction in the number of receival sites is
shown in Table 6 for different states. The results
show a reduction in the number of receival sites
in 2022 of around 7.8 per cent compared to 2018.
In general terms, the trend of fewer receival sites,
and simultaneous investment in larger more
efficient “primary” sites, has continued for more
than 20 years. Most service providers flex the
number of sites open based on harvest size (i.e.
“flex” sites only operate in above-average years or
where specific segregations for barley and canola
are required for domestic consumers). Viterra has
more than halved its number of receival sites. In
the eastern states, major bulk handlers continue
to face greater competition from private storage
providers and on-farm storage due to the higher
proportion of grain going to the domestic market.
Table 6.

Most bulk handlers are now investing in larger,
more efficient receival sites that offer the
flexibility to receive all the different types and
grades of grain, so growers do not need to rely on
temporal, or even long-term, on-farm storage.
GrainCorp, for example, has unveiled plans to
build 2mmt tonnes of new storage capacity as part
of an upgrade of its grains receival network in
eastern Australia. This investment is on top of a
previously announced investment by GrainCorp in
2021 to commit to a 1.5mmt expansion of
additional storage.

Change in the numbera of major providers’ receival sites
Year

State

Grain Handler

1998

2010

2018

2021

2022

NSW

GrainCorp

265

173

91

110

120

Cargill GrainFlowc

ndd

10

11

8

6

Other

nd

nd

42

46

50

GrainCorp

257

73

44

43

44

Emerald Grain

nd

4

7

4

4

Cargill GrainFlow

nd

4

4

4

4

Other

nd

nd

17

20

20

GrainCorp

87

36

23

31

31

Cargill GrainFlow

nd

4

4

2

2

Other

nd

nd

5

8

8

Glencore/Viterra/ABB

116

114

103

53

53

Cargill GrainFlow

nd

4

4

4

4

Vic

Qld

SA

WA
Total

b

Other

nd

nd

1

5

8

CBH

200

197

178

158

137

Bunge

nd

nd

2

3

3

925

619

536

499

494

Notes:
(a) The number of sites open each year may be less than the total number of sites provided, depending on the size of
the harvest.
(b) The grain handler in bold font is the region’s principal grain handler.
(c) The first listed entity for each grain handler is the entity’s current owner.
(d) nd — no reliable data.
Source: See Appendix 3.
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The costs of handling and storage for the major
service providers are shown in Table 7 for 2021. In
general terms, the costs vary between providers
for each service. With the exception of WA, the
total charges vary between 21.22 to 24.07 $/tonne.
In WA, its lesser charge of $17.90/tonne might be
explained partly by its cooperative nature. A
co-operative does not seek to maximise profit for
shareholders. Rather its main objective is to
efficiently provide services for its farmer members.
CBH also operates a network primarily geared for
grain export, so grain flows mostly in one
direction, to coastal ports. CBH controls which
grain is delivered to port for export customers.

Being solely in charge of a large storage and
handling network, CBH controls the number of
sites open each day and therefore can manage
daily outturn costs and thereby help lessen its
fees. Also, new operators in the WA market like
Bunge are forced to compete against the CBH
model which helps keep overall prices down.
Growers located in areas where CBH and Bunge
compete claim that the returns from selling to CBH
or Bunge are similar. CBH’s lower upcountry
receival and storage fees are translated directly
into higher prices received by growers.

Table 7. Upcountry receival and storage fees for three months charged by the major providers of grain storage
services in 2021a
Cargill
Cargill
GrainFlow
GrainFlow NSW/Vic/
SA
Qld
GrainCorp

CBH

Bunge

Viterra

Receival at
upcountry-storage

$/tonne

9.15

10.80

13.17–14.68b

10.02

10.05

10.04

Emerald
12.50

Storage for three
monthsc

$/tonne

0.00

0.00

4.95

4.04

4.31

4.19

4.95

Shrinkage rate

%

0.50

0.50

0.60

0.60

0.70

0.70

0.70

Shrinkage & dust costd $/tonne

1.25

1.25

1.50

1.50

1.76

1.75

1.75

Outturn fee

$/tonne

7.50

0.00

3.35

7.03

5.10

8.09

3.00

e

Discount

$/tonne

0.00

0.00

0.60

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Total cost

$/tonne

17.90

12.05

22.37–23.88

22.59

21.22

24.07

22.20

Notes:
(a) Fees listed are for standard services provided by each provider. Specified standard services can vary between providers and
extra charges may apply for some services. The names and purpose of each type of fee vary between service providers. The
names we have used to identify the fees here may be different from the names used by the service provider.
(b) Receival fees for Viterra vary between major wheat ($13.17) and minor wheat ($14.68) sites.
(c) Up until season 2021 CBH did not charge for storage until 1 October after the harvest. However, in 2021–22 CBH introduced a
$2/t fee for grain held in its storage after August 1, 2022. For other providers of upcountry storage, the charges for three
months’ storage have been estimated based on an assumption of who owns the grain for those three months, given there are
different storage charges for growers and accumulators. The charges are calculated assuming that 45 per cent of grain
delivered by growers to warehouse storage is sold to accumulators after the first month, 70 per cent after the second and
80 per cent after the third.
(d) Based on a conservative grain price of $250/tonne.
(e) Viterra provides a discount of $0.6/tonne to the fee charged to users of its export select service. Rebates provided by CBH have
been excluded.
Source: See Appendix 3.
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Figure 19 lists the upcountry and receival tariff
rates in different years for the main bulk handling
service providers in Australia. In 2021, compared
to 2018, Viterra and GrainCorp increased their
costs by 2.1 per cent and 14.8 per cent
respectively. The main driver of GrainCorp’s cost
increase was the increases in their receival
upcountry fee and outturn fee by 35.7 per cent
and 21.5 per cent respectively, whilst the inflation
over this period was only 7.8 per cent. In the same
period, GrainFlow and Emerald recorded increases
in nominal prices of 5.9 per cent and 5.7 per cent,
respectively, but these increases were less than
inflation in the period. By contrast, CBH reduced
its public tariff rates during 2018 to 2021. The
reduction was due to a nominal fall in the receival
upcountry fee by 15 per cent to $9.15/tonne.
However, the receival upcountry fee for the
2021–22 harvest has increased by 12 per cent, up

to $10.25/tonne. Outturn fees for CBH have not
changed since 2017 and will continue to be
$7.5/tonne in 2021–22. In comparison, Viterra,
GrainCorp, and GrainFlow have increased their
upcountry and receival charges by 3.4 per cent,
3.8 per cent and 4.2 per cent, respectively. These
figures are higher than the expected inflation of
3 per cent in 2021–22.
In 2021–22 Emerald Grain changed the way in
which they separately charge for receival and
outturn services, bringing their outturn fees closer
in alignment to similar CBH and GrainCorp charges
but being more expensive than charges applied by
Cargill or Viterra. However, the overall upcountry
receival, storage and outturn fees of Emerald Grain
display an consistent upward trend in 2021 dollar
terms, since 2019–20.
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Receival at upcountry

GrainCorp
Three month storage

Cargill Grainflow
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Emerald Grain

Outturn fees

Figure 19. Upcountry and receival charges in 2013, 2017 (adjusted to 2021 equivalent prices based on changes in
the Australian CPI), 2021 and in 2022 (where available; adjusted to 2021 equivalent prices based on inflation of
3 per cent in 2022) of the major providers of grain storage services
Note: In SA, charges are based on major wheat sites and outturn by rail. The discounts provided by Viterra have been subtracted
from the receival upcountry charge. For CBH, the outturn fee is derived from the proportion of the export shipping fee allocated to
the storage and throughput fee when this charge was created in 2017. Cargill GrainFlow fees only relate to NSW, Vic, and Qld.
Three-month storage has been estimated using the method in Table 7.
Source: See Appendix 3.
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Port Loading
All bulk grain export terminals and mobile loaders
operating at a berth across Australia are required
to comply with the requirements of a port access
code (Port Terminal Access (Bulk Wheat) Code of
Conduct 2014 — henceforth the Code) and are
monitored by the Australian Competition and
Consumers Commission (ACCC). In their last
report, the ACCC notes the Code is still applicable
to all port operators either fully or on an exempt
basis and that this provides flexibility to the
service providers (ACCC, 2021).

Table 8.

Table 8 lists the 2021 export charges for the six
major grain ports. The port terminals operated by
Quattro and NAT during the period did have a fully
integrated supply chain from country to port, such
as for GrainCorp, Viterra or Emerald. Quattro and
NAT customers however buy and move grain
through the GrainCorp and Cargill networks as well
as independents like CHS Broadbent and ex-farm.
Their public tariff rates are set at a similar level to
the larger integrated networks; however, they
most likely provide incentives for tonnes of
throughput to certain customers. In other words,
the vertical integration of GrainCorp, Viterra or
Emerald, does not imply a difference in
fees charged.

Feea components of port charges at six major grain port terminals in 2021
CBH
Kwinana

GrainCorp
Port
Kembla

Viterra
Adelaide
Outer

Emerald
Grain
Melbourne

Quattro
Port
Kembla

NAT
Newcastle

In-take fee

$/tonne

0.00

2.07

4.00

6.00–8.00b

4.00

6.00

Vessel nomination

$/tonne

0.00

8.00

5.00

8.00

8.00

8.00

Vessel loading

$/tonne

10.55

9.97

14.55

7.50

7.60

8.00

Storage

$/tonne

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Inspection

$/tonne

0.35

0.33

0.26

0.25

0.25

0.50

Wharf fees

$/tonne

1.90

2.74

2.58

2.78

1.12

1.03

Stevedoring charges

$/tonne

0.60

0.38

0.00

0.00

0.32

0.50

Shrinkage and/or
dust factor

%

0.25

0.30

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Shrinkage and dust
costc

$/tonne

0.63

0.75

0.38

0.00

1.00

0.50

Total Cost

$/tonne

14.03

24.24

26.77

24.53–26.53

22.29

24.53

Notes:	
(a) Fees are listed for standard services by each service provider. Specified standard services vary with each provider and extra
charges may apply. The name and purpose of the fee varies between service providers. The names we have used to identify
the fees may be different from the name used by the service provider.
(b) Intake fee varies between rail (lower figure) and road (higher figure).
(c) Based on a conservative grain price of $250/tonne.
Source: See Appendix 3.
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To illustrate how charges have changed, Figure 20
presents the total fees in terms of constant 2021
dollars for the major service providers operating at
the most important grain export ports. Following
White et al. (2018), the dust and/or shrinkage
costs have not been included as their percentages
have not changed and their cost depends on the
price of the wheat. The charges listed are standard
fees. From the ports listed in Figure 20, only
Viterra’s port is fully regulated by the Code. From
this analysis, no conclusion can be drawn about
the imposition of the Code and any resultant
difference in charges (the Code does not prescribe
prices, only the need for fair and equal access).
This same finding was observed by
White et al. (2018).

From 2018, port tariff rates have changed
unequally across Australia. While CBH, GrainCorp
and Emerald have reduced their tariff rates, Viterra
has increased them. CBH port charges in Kwinana
have reduced 14.3 per cent from 2018 to 2021.
However, for 2022, there is an increase of
5.1 per cent for CBH. GrainCorp’s tariff rates have
remained constant between 2018 and 2021 but will
decrease by 1.5 per cent for the next harvest.
Emerald’s port tariff charges have decreased in
2021 dollar terms consistently since 2017–18.
Viterra increased its port charges by 5.5 per cent
between 2018 and 2021 and a further 2.0 per cent
increase applies for 2022. The main cause of this
increase is a higher port wharfage fee of
0.5$/tonne, which is not under the control
of Viterra.

30

Charges ($/t)

25
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15
10
5
0

2014 2018 2021 2022 2014 2018 2021 2022 2014 2018 2021 2022 2014 2018 2021
(equ) (equ)
(equ) (equ) (equ)
(equ) (equ) (equ)
(equ) (equ) (equ)
CBH
Kwinana
Intake

Vessel nomination

GrainCorp
Port Kempla
Loading/terminal shipping

Viterra
Outer Harbour
Port fees

2022

Emerald Grain
Melbourne

Inspection

Figure 20. Port tariff charges in 2013, 2017 (adjusted to 2021 equivalent prices based on changes in the Australian
CPI), 2021 and in 2022 (where available; adjusted to 2021 equivalent prices based on inflation of 3 per cent in 2022)
for major port service providers in Kwinana, Port Adelaide, Port Kembla, and Port Melbourne
Source: See Appendix 3.
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Ship freight
The main drivers of shipping costs are the cost of
hiring the ship, the cost of its fuel and the
distance travelled between ports. Figure 23
illustrates the estimated costs for shipping grain
from Australian ports, Vancouver, Canada, Odessa,
Ukraine, and Rosario, Argentina to Asian ports in
late 2021. The proximity of Kwinana port to
southeast Asian countries, and thus a shorter total
daily hire, provides a competitive advantage with
respect to exports to those destinations. The
difference is about 7–8 $/tonne compared to other
Australian grain export ports. However, all
Australian grain export ports still have a
competitive advantage by around $5/tonne
compared to the Canadian and Ukrainian
supplying ports. When the distance to the market
starts to equalize, any advantage of proximity
lessens. This is the case for destination north
Asian ports (Japan, China, South Korea) with the
origin ports being Vancouver, and the destination
south Asian port of Yangon, Myanmar, with the
origin port being Odessa.
On average the shipping rate per thousand
kilometres in 2021 is around $3.49/tonne.

White et al. (2018) indicated the cost was
$1.96/tonne per 1000km in 2021 equivalent
Australian dollars. Hence, current bulk shipping
rates have increased by 78 per cent. Although the
exchange rate has not varied materially from 2018,
the cost of fuel has increased significantly in that
period, fewer new vessels have been constructed
and vessels have been required to meet new
emissions standards by fitting scrubbers to their
vessels which have increased costs. The fuel price
follows crude oil prices, so it is difficult to find
efficiencies in this area. Due to the COVID-19
pandemic, ship hire costs also have increased
significantly across most routes.
Moreover, demand for bulk freight vessels has
greatly increased in 2021, placing upward pressure
on freight rates. Many major global economies in
2021 announced stimulus packages with
emphases on infrastructure projects that
stimulated demand for iron ore and coal and
resulted in a lift in demand for bulk sea freight.
When combined with the regular demand for bulk
agricultural exports, the overall increase in bulk
sea freight demand has led to a lift in dry bulk
sea freight earnings since mid-2020 and
throughout 2021 (Figure 21).

50,000
45,000
40,000
USD per day

35,000
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Capesize (180k)
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Mar
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2020

Supramax (58k)
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May

2021

Handysize (38k)

Figure 21. Dry bulk freight earnings: 2019 to 2021
Source: Sand (2021).
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principally due to higher prices of steel and the
cost of more fuel-efficient engines and associated
technologies. The ramification of these trends is
that bulk sea freight rates are poised to remain
high over the next few years.
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Despite the growth in ship revenues the estimated
growth in the size of the dry bulk fleet is
lessening (Figure 22). The restricted growth is
pushing up prices of second-hand bulk vessels as
is the higher cost of new vessel construction,

-1
2017a
Delivered

2018a
Demolition

2019a
To be delivered p.a.

2020a

2021f

2022e

2023e

-2

Growth rate

Figure 22. Dry bulk fleet growth: 2017 to 2023 (estimated)
Notes:
a = actual. f = forecast. e = estimate which will change if new orders are placed.
The supply growth for 2021–23 contains existing orders only and is estimated under the assumptions that the scheduled deliveries
fall short by 10 per cent due to various reasons and 30 per cent of the remaining vessels on order are delayed/postponed.
Source: Sand (2021).
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South East Asia
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Figure 23. Estimated sea freight rates to major Asian and Middle East ports in 2021
Source: See Appendix 2 and Appendix 3.
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Total supply chain costs
Figure 24 lists the total charges (freight,
warehouse storage and port loading) of the major
grain bulk handlers in Australia. The only service
provider who has reduced its real tariff rates is
CBH. Other bulk handlers have maintained or
increased their tariff rates. For GrainCorp and
Emerald, it is important to note that their freight
cost estimates do not represent the actual rail or
road rates used to calculate site-based cash prices
for growers. Although the location differentials and
freight charges for GrainCorp were similar for 2015,
location differentials were higher than the actual
freight rates for GrainCorp in 2018 (White et al.,
2018). As the freight rates for GrainCorp and
Emerald are not public, GTA location differentials
are used. Making public their charges would
increase competitiveness and help reduce the
whole charges of the supply chain.

The increase in tariff rates to customers may
increase the profits of bulk handlers. CBH, being a
co-operative, enables any decreases in its costs to
be passed on to its grower members. CBH’s costs
may have reduced because of greater volumes of
grain produced that allow unit costs of storage
and handling to be lowered in a predominantly
export-focused network. The question arises as to
why the other bulk handlers have not also
decreased their tariff rates. There is evidence that
lower fees are possible in some circumstances. In
the case of Viterra, it could be argued that the
recent increase in port competition with the use of
mobile ship loaders by competitors Cargill and
Semaphore in Adelaide Harbour and T-Ports at
Lucky Bay on the Eyre Peninsula have caused their
tariff rates to fall over the last decade. However,
the increase in charges in the rest of Viterra’s
supply chain may indicate that the bulk handler is
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Viterra

Warehouse storage

1
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2

GrainCorp

Emerald
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3

Figure 24. Freight, warehouse storage and port loading charges in 2013, 2017 (adjusted to 2021 equivalent prices
based on changes in the Australian CPI), 2021 and in 2022 (where available; adjusted to 2021 equivalent prices
based on inflation of 3 per cent in 2022) of major service providers
Notes:
(1) Freight is based on a distance of 200km. CBH and Viterra publish an average price for freight services. Costs for GrainCorp and
Emerald are estimated using the GTA location differentials for each year.
(2) Based on the published charges of each service provider.
(3) Based on the port loading charges for Kwinana — CBH, Outer Harbour — Viterra, Port Kembla — GrainCorp, and Melbourne —
Emerald.
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increasing differential pricing across its network to
fund competition strategies against new
competition whilst trying to maintain its profits. In
addition, in the eastern states, the increase in
tariff rates for GrainCorp, Cargill and Emerald may
be expected because drought in 2017–18 and
2018–19 caused low volumes of grain harvests so
no efficiencies from economies of size were
available. This was not the case for WA and SA.
Climate conditions affect the harvest size and thus
size economies for service providers. Notably,
fobbing costs for GrainCorp vary by up to $5/tonne
from Queensland to Victoria due in the main to a
lower average export task and higher production
variability. Their charges largely reflect the size of
the grain harvest. CBH have profited from larger
harvests in recent years. However, up until season
2021 eastern states and SA have not had the same
luck. The small size of some of their harvests
could be the reason for the higher costs in those
states. Another effect that could underpin the
reduction of costs of bulk handlers could be the
increased scale and efficiency of larger sites which
offer greater throughput, intake and
outturn efficiencies.
These differences in charges imply that growers in
WA receive a larger income per tonne for the same
crop grade compared to growers in eastern states
and SA. In general, grains are sold on free on
board (FOB) terms. Thus, the difference in the
cash price on any day for export grain should in
theory be the difference in ship freight between
the ports.
Differences in charges from the farm to the port
impact directly on the profit of the growers. For
similar situations (e.g. same grade and quality),
growers in WA may receive up to $22.19/tonne at a
receival site more than growers in SA in 2021 and
may receive up to $18.17/tonne more in 2022. This
has huge implications for the profitability of grain
production on farms.

Concluding remarks
Overall, since 2014–15, grain supply chain public
tariff rates across Australia mostly have slightly
increased or decreased in real terms, with the
service provider, CBH, displaying both the largest
decrease in its real costs and remaining
consistently the nation’s leader in providing the
least costly grain supply chains.
The lower the costliness of a grain supply chain,
the higher the farm-gate price that can be offered
to grain farmers. Not included in the analysis of
costs are rebates provided by CBH to its grower
cooperative members. A cautionary note, however,
concerning CBH is that they have increased their
charges substantially for the 2021–22 harvest to
help maintain their ability to invest in capital
upgrades to the network and to retain improved
transport reliability. Yet their supply chain costs
still place them in first position as the provider of
the nation’s cheapest export grain supply chains.
The difference in export supply chain charges
between the service providers in each region
affects the relative profitability of grain production
across Australia, especially where there is also a
lack of competition between traders for export
grain. This study has revealed the nature of the
differences in charges between these service
providers and offered explanations for the
observed differences.
To further lower the costliness of bulk grain
handling, storage, freight, and port services in
Australia requires a raft of investment, regulatory,
technology and competition enhancements which
could be the subject of further study.
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The nature and cost of
containerised grain supply chains
The flow of grain from farm to packers and then
on to ships for delivery to international customers
involves accessing a range of services as mapped
out by SEPWA (2011) (see Figure 25). Although the
key activities are simple to state; place the grain
or fodder into containers and deliver those
containers to international customers, the detail
embedded in those actions can be challenging for
any new entrant, and the various steps in the
supply chain have associated business risks.
Although the names of some agencies mentioned
in Figure 25 may have changed (e.g. AQIS) the key
actions featured in the schematic remain central
to the process of containerised grain export. An
updated information manual describing the
current processes for grain export via
containerisation is available from SAGIT (see
McKay, 2022). That manual was produced as part
of this review of containerised grain export
supply chains.
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The fact that more farmers or groups of farmers
do not engage in the sale, via containers, of their
farm products is one indicator that the activity is
both challenging and risky. Those containerised
grain or fodder traders who have persisted tend to
be those capable of best managing the array of
downside risks that can characterise the trade in
these commodities. Nonetheless, there are over
100 grain container packing businesses in
Australia (Table 9). Each has its particular set of
supply chains, each with a particular cost
structure. Hence, comparing the nature and costs
of the components of containerised grain supply
chains is difficult, especially as the container
packers are private businesses with no incentive
to reveal their cost profiles. By contrast there are
only a handful of bulk grain storage and handling
businesses across Australia and the prices of their
services are often more visible to their users.
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SALE CONTRACT

CLOSE DEAL

Ship sails

Generate Commercial
Invoices

Chamber of Commerce

Final Bills of Lading
provided by Shipping Co.

Check Draft Bill of Lading
with Letter of Credit

Phyto Certificate if required

Certificate of weight &
quality verifies tonnes &
$ for PL, CI, Bank drafts
and CI

Packing list

Commercial voice

Bank drafts

Certificate of Origin

Lock currency when Sale Contract is
signed and Letter of Credit arrives

Create Letter of Credit details,
sign contract and send to buyer

Fumigation Certificate or previous storage Statutory Declaration of fumigation

Containers to wharf
with complete EDN

EDN completed with cleared PIG No.
Phyto Certificate if required approved

AQIS approved = PIG cleared,
Independent surveyor sample & test

Lodged in AQIS system = PIG No.
AQIS Inspection booked for
packing samples

Lodge with Customs for EDN
(not complete until AQIS has PIG)

Source: SEPWA (2011) The grain container export process: Findings from a trial shipment conducted by PASE and SEPWA in 2011.

Figure 25. Key activities in the export of containerised grain or fodder

Fumigated in containers
if required

Final weights taken

Grain packed into containers
and sampled

Containers released by shipping
company and taken to packer

Nominate ocean freight vessel.
Complete forwarding instructions

Grain cleaned and trucked
to port

COMMENCE SHIPMENT

Letter of Credit is opened and advised by both banks via email or fax to the grain exporter

Research logistic costs
i.e. freight, packing

All documents
assembled by the
exporter

Documents couriered
to grain exporter’s
bank

Bank checks and
approves

Grain exporter’s bank
sends documents to
foreign bank —
approves

PAYMENT

Table 9.
in 2021
State

Distribution of grain packers across Australia
Number of grain packers

WA

12

SA

17

Qld

22

Vic

26

NSW

27

Total

104

Since de-regulation of grain marketing in the
2000s, farm businesses have become responsible
for the marketing of their grain. Although some
farm businesses do employ grain marketing
advisers or develop their own marketing plans,
many farmers still simply sell for cash at harvest.
For many farmers the challenge of successfully
growing an array of crops and managing the
logistics of seeding and harvest is sufficiently
stressful. Hence most farmers see no attraction in
enlarging their business activity into the venture
of selling their farm’s grain or fodder via
containerisation.
The SEPWA (2011) report tracked a new venture of
exporting grain in containers out of the port of
Esperance. The report, although a decade old,
remains informative about the steps and risks
involved in selling grain via containerisation
(Figure 25). For example, establishing a working
business relationship with a potential customer is
often crucial for long term trading success.
Conducting background checks and using trial
shipments is often essential to limit the exporter’s
business risk exposure. Knowing up-front the
likely logistics costs and trade terms is also
essential if profit margins are not to be
compromised. A more detailed description of the
required current steps for exporting containerised
grain is available from SAGIT (McKay, 2022).
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Regarding trading terms, in September 2019, the
International Chamber of Commerce released
Incoterms 2020, that describes the commonly
applied rules and standards that underpin many
grain marketing contracts. These contracts define
the obligations of the seller and the buyer. By
illustration, trading terms for containerised grain,
including their CFR price and ocean freight, are
commonly stated internationally in USD. Hence,
any exporter of Australian grain or fodder needs to
be aware of AUD:USD exchange rate relativities, as
well as supply chain costs and risks when
engaging in transactions.
Moving containers from up-country packing
locations down to port requires cost-efficient
transport. Some operators (e.g. Fletchers
International) rely on multi-commodity access to
rail services to achieve freight cost efficiencies.
Many other operations rely on road transport. For
example, a review of container operations
involving the Port of Melbourne (2021) revealed an
increased use of road freight at the expense of rail
freight. High Productivity Freight Vehicles (HPFVs),
truck combinations that exceed 26 metres or have
a mass greater than 68.5 tonnes, are increasingly
used in Victoria.

iii. moving of containers to and from empty
container parks and customers for the
packing of exports and return of unpacked
import containers. Often there are direct
movements of empty containers between
the port and empty container parks. In
some instances, the function of empty
container parks is captured by storage
areas in stevedore terminals whereby
empty containers are returned after
unpacking direct to the container terminal,
and similarly the reverse with empty
pickups for export packing.

The HPFV approved network was expanded to
better connect major freight routes to major ports
and create interstate links. Consequently, a rapid
uptake of HPFVs vehicles ensued due to their
ability to carry more containers, especially 40ft
containers. HPFVs, such as super B-doubles, carry
up to two 40ft containers. Use of super-B doubles
between stevedores, transport depots, and
importers/exporters consequently also has
increased. Indicative containerised grain supply
chains in Victoria and southern NSW, underpinned
by road services, are shown in Figure 26.
A key component of containerised grain supply
chains are logistic operations at the container
port, including:
i.

In the case of the Port of Melbourne the key
road-based logistic operations that underpin the
export of containerised grain are shown in
Figure 27 whilst Figure 28 shows components of
the road and rail logistic activities.

moving a container from an empty
container park, where it is hired, to an
exporter, where it is packed.

ii. transport of the packed container directly
or indirectly to the stevedore for export as
a full container.
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Figure 26. Indicative containerised grain supply chains involving the Port of Melbourne
Source: Port of Melbourne (2021).
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Figure 27. Containerised grain road-based logistic activities at the Port of Melbourne
Source: Port of Melbourne (2021).
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Figure 28. Containerised grain rail and road logistic activities at the Port of Melbourne
Source: Port of Melbourne (2021).
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In Australia there are essentially three main types
of containerised grain supply chains as displayed
in Figure 29. The main differences between the
supply chains are who packs the container and
where the container is packed. Packing can occur
on farm or at a regional packing centre or at port.
The farmer can be responsible for the packing or
can use the services of a contract packer or can
sell their grain or fodder and deliver it directly to a
commercial export packer with facilities upcountry
or at port.
There are also three main methods of physically
packing grain into a container, as described by
Shipping Australia (2012). The weight of grain
loaded into a container is a function of the size of
the container (20ft or 40ft), the maximum
allowable cargo weight of the container and the
bulk density of the grain. The precise formula is:
Maximum cargo weight (container rating
minus tare) = maximum bulk density of grain x
maximum volume of the container.
Hence, for example, a typical 20ft container with a
rating of 30 tonne and tare of 2.4 tonne with
volume of 33m3 (=330 hectolitres (hL)) can in
theory be fully loaded with any grain of a bulk
density up to 83.6 kg/hL. However, for safety and
spillage reasons, a bulkhead or liner with metal
bars needs to be placed in front of the container
door, so usually only 23 to 26 tonnes of grain are
loaded into a 20ft container.

Container packing
on farm

The main grains exported from Australia have bulk
densities less than 83 kg/hL. For example, the bulk
densities of oats, barley, wheat and lupins
respectively are 50, 65, 75 and 78 kg/hL. In
contrast to 20ft containers, 40ft containers cannot
be almost fully loaded with grains like wheat or
lupins, due to weight restrictions (usually around
a 29 tonne maximum), but can be fully laden with
fodder that has a much lower bulk density. Hence,
when container supply chain costs are converted
into per tonne costs, a range of costs is likely,
dependent on what grain is being moved through
the supply chain and which size of container, 20ft
or 40ft, is mainly used.
The main components of the supply chain costs
associated with a containerised grain supply chain
in Australia are listed in Table 10. Underpinning
the ranges of costs in Table 10 are key
assumptions that 20ft containers are used, the
grain has been stored on farm for 3 months, the
grain conveyed is packed to a limit of 24 tonnes in
each container, the distance the grain needs to
travel from farm eventually to port is 300
kilometres, 250 containers are packed each year
and the containers are shipped to a South East
Asian port.
The per tonne costs of containerised grain supply
chains, prior to ocean freight charges, are not
greatly different from the costs of Australia’s bulk
grain supply chains (see Figure 24). However, it
comes as no surprise to most export containerised

Transport
to port

1
Grain or fodder
production on
farm

2
3

Transport to
Transport
regional packer to port

Transport Container packing
to port
at port
Figure 29. Three main types of containerised grain supply chains
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Load grain
onto ship

Ship to
destination

Table 10. Indicative cost components of a containerised grain supply chain in Australia
Cost (AUD/t)
Activity

On-farm packing

On-farm storage for 3 months
Amortised cost of capital investment in packing planta
Site compliance

Intermodal regional
packing

4

4

20

–

3

–

17

–

Packing fees

–

30

DAWE fees

1

2

Linersb

3

4

a

Amortised cost of laboura
a

Fumigation
Transport to portc

8

6

46

30

Port fees

6

9

Sub-total

108

85

Ocean freight

241

241

Total delivered to destination port

349

326

Notes:
(a) The intermodal packing plant’s capital, site compliance and labour costs are main components of the packing fee.
(b) Approximately 50 per cent of all containers require fitting with liners.
(c) The difference in freight costs are due to mode choice (road versus rail) and mass limits on routes.

grain and fodder participants that by far the main
cost component of the containerised grain supply
chain is sea freight. Its cost exploded during 2020
and 2021 (Figure 30 and Figure 44) with some
rates more than quadrupling, leading to the
massive increases in profits being announced by
container shipping lines. The divergence in price
trends between bulk grain and containerised grain
sea freight rates in 2020 continued into 2022
greatly eroding the profitability of containerised
grain and fodder exports.

Yet the costs of containerised sea freight are
outside the control of Australian containerised
grain and fodder exporters and so ceasing or
curtailing of grain and fodder exports via
containerisation has been widely observed across
Australia since early 2020. The escalation in sea
freight rates has exposed how vulnerable is the
container trade to these rates; yet in previous
years it was the commercial attractiveness of low
sea freight rates for containers (Figure 30) that
attracted entrants into this export trade.
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Figure 30. Global shipping prices
Source: RBA (2021).
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Tips for success
In the process of preparing this report, discussions
were held with several businesses engaged in the
sale of containerised grain and fodder and a
handful of case study operations were examined.
The case study participants, when reflecting on
their lessons learned from their years of
experience in containerised trade, often
highlighted the following as ingredients
for success:
i.

sound corporate governance, planning,
budgeting, and communication.
Often farmers are ‘doers’. However, being
physically busy does not ensure
commercial success. Rather it is vital to
plan a venture, to prepare budgets, to
establish sound governance of any
investment and activity, and to daily
communicate across the business.

ii. proper documentation.
Providing required documentation to the
range of entities associated with the export
of containerised grain and fodder is
essential yet is often more time-consuming
and exacting than many farmers anticipate.
In large commercial operations it is often
worth hiring people with the requisite skill
and knowledge to provide this
documentation.
SEPWA (2011) also stressed the need for
proper documentation saying: “All
documents must be absolute letter perfect
to avoid discrepancies, delays and even
rejections.” (p. 7).
iii. self-education and out-sourcing.
Marketing grain and fodder via
containerisation often means learning a
new set of skills and acquiring new jargon.
At times it is more sensible for the farmer,
as an investor in this new venture, to bring
in expertise to facilitate and de-risk that
investment and its associated activity. On
other occasions it may be more sensible for
the farmer to acquire those skills, such as
training to become an Authorised Officer.
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iv. identifying better use of existing capital
(e.g. grain storage, rail and vehicle assets).
In farm or corporate businesses that are
already sufficiently large or complex, there
is often an efficiency gain and value-adding
opportunity that grain containerisation can
achieve. Containerisation can allow more
efficient use of grain storage facilities, or
better use of rail and road transport assets.
v.

the need for nimbleness.
The vagaries and costliness of containerised
grain and fodder operations often requires
its stakeholders to be commercially and
practically nimble in executing sales or
stepping out of the market when thirdparty or execution risks become too large
and/or margins too small. On-farm
container-packing operations are often best
based on a low capital footprint that
lessens the capital at risk when market
downturn or disruption occurs.

vi. know your comparative advantage.
Bluntly summarised by one case study
participant was this comment: “If you can’t
be better than the neighbour down the
road you can’t survive”. Each farm
business has a range of strengths and
weaknesses. Knowing what you are good
at, and by inference what you are less
good at, may uncover if grain
containerisation is a likely sound
commercial fit for any particular
farm business.

The above list of ingredients for success reveals
that commercially viable containerised grain and
fodder export operations are not simple operations
to establish and maintain. Although packing grain
or fodder into a container is not difficult, it is all
the other tasks of proper documentation, risk
assessment, planning and oversight that are
essential to support success. The realistic and
candid above-mentioned comment from one case
study participant is a useful summary of the
challenge facing farmers considering engaging in
container operations: “If you can’t be better than
the neighbour down the road you can’t survive”.

There is merit in this view as scores of new large
container ships are under construction to become
available in late 2023 but mostly in 2024 and
subsequent years. This enhanced supply of
shipping capacity should drive down sea freight
rates for containers and make the export of
containerised grain and fodder, that depends on
backhaul rates and a surfeit of empty containers,
to be once again commercially attractive to
Australian exporters.

Nonetheless, however, it is important to note that,
despite all the difficulties each case study
participant experienced during 2020 to 2022, they
all had very positive assessments that grain
containerisation would play an important strategic
role in the future of Australia’s grains industry and
in their particular business operations.
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containerised export of grain
Altered competitive power along
the supply chain
Amalgamations and agreements between various
shipping lines (Table 11) now mean that three
separate shipping alliances account for around
90 per cent of the global container trade. Four
companies (Maersk, MSC, COSCO-OOCL and the
CMA CGM group) account for two-thirds of global
TEU trade. As a result of their dominance, these
carriers have increased their bargaining power,
often at the expense of other players. Price
pressure from shipping lines has contributed to a
downward trend in quayside revenue across the
container industry in Australia (ACCC, 2020).

Table 11. Market shares of three main shipping
alliances in 2021
Alliance

Carriers

Global market
share (%)

2M

Maersk

19.6

MSC

19.1

Sub-total

38.7

COSCO-OOCL

14.1

CMA CGM

14.1

Ocean Alliance

THE Alliance

Evergreen

6.4

Sub-total

34.6

Hapag-Lloyd

8.4

ONE

7.4

Yang Ming

2.9

Sub-total

18.7

Total

92.0

Others
Source: Statistica (2021) and Chambers (2021).
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8.0

The spot rate for a 40ft container to the USA from
Asia topped USD20,000 in 2021, up from less than
$2,000 a few years earlier. The reduced availability
of container shipping capacity and port
congestion, however, has meant that longer-term
rates in contracts between carriers and shippers in
2021–22 are now an estimated 200 per cent higher
than in the previous financial year, signalling
elevated prices for the foreseeable future.
Economists warn that persistently high
transportation prices will stoke inflation and
impede economic recovery. Ocean-freight carriers
have generated estimated profits of $150 billion in
2021 — a nine-fold annual jump after a decade of
relatively low returns.
The jump in shipping profits and the greater
concentration of shipping ownership have
highlighted, especially in the USA, shipping lines’
immunity from antitrust laws. Current shipping
laws in the USA date back to 1916, an era when
goods were loaded on ships by net and crane.
At the time, the US government, seeking to
encourage a USA-owned nascent domestic
commercial flee, exempted carriers from antitrust
laws, but required them to report any pricing
agreements to regulators. While shipping laws in
the USA have been reformed over the years, the
last major update was in 1998, despite the US
Department of Justice consistently pushing to
remove the antitrust immunity, arguing that it was
no longer justified and undermined a free-market
economy at a time when the shipping industry
was undergoing a wave of consolidation with
American carriers being taken over by
foreign entities.

Regulators from the USA, EU and China met in
September 2021 and determined there was so far
no evidence of anti-competitive behaviour in
container shipping. Subsequently in November
2021, the White House voiced its concern at the
industry’s consolidation, saying “this lack of
competition leaves American businesses at the
mercy of just three alliances”. The White House
called on the Federal Maritime Commission to
“use all of the tools at its disposal to ensure free
and fair competition.” A bi-partisan bill came into
law in late 2021 that initiated reform of US
shipping laws. It gives the Federal Maritime
Commission greater authority, prohibits carriers
from discriminating against American cargo, and
gives businesses more power to challenge carrier
fees. But even that bill stops short of targeting
carriers’ antitrust immunity. In Europe, the
shipping companies’ exemption from anticompetitive rules is set to be reviewed again in
2024. The European Commission has commented
that it is “closely monitoring the container
shipping industry and is aware that there have
been large price increases.”
Associated with formation of shipping alliances
has been a decline in the number of carriers
serving the Australian-Asian trade (Figure 31).
Relative to other key international ports, the
number of carriers serving Australian ports is low
(Figure 32), lessening the range of choice of carrier
for Australian exporters, particularly at smaller
container ports such as Adelaide and Fremantle.
25
20
Shipping carriers

Shipping lines have stated to the ACCC (2019) that
container stevedoring prices in Australia are
among the highest in the world. Hence, the shift
in bargaining power towards the shipping alliances
has limited quayside pricing increases by
stevedores. However, as discussed later,
stevedores have simply reacted by imposing
greater landside charges on those with a weaker
bargaining position such as farmers who rely on
being able to export their grains and fodder from
their nearest container port. The higher landside
charges ultimately mean lower prices are offered
to farmers for their grain and fodder that is
intended for export in containers at these ports.

15
10
5
0
2014

2019

Figure 31. Numbers of shipping carriers serving
Australian-Asian trade in 2014 and 2019
Source: GTA (2022).
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In Melbourne, VICT’s highly automated system and
location at Webb Dock gives it better access to
larger container vessels. As a result, VICT has
increased its national market share at the expense
of DP World and Patrick. At most ports there are at
least two stevedore companies that service the
shipping alliances (Figure 35). These stevedore
companies have experienced a weakening in their
bargaining power in their interactions with
shipping lines, due to the amalgamations and
agreements between shipping lines.
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Contemporaneously, some stevedores at some
container terminals have experienced substantial
hikes in property-related costs in the lead-up to
and following port privatisations. Since 1998, 4 of
the 5 largest container ports in Australia have
been privatised. Port owners have imposed higher
rents whilst state governments and industry
associations have demanded infrastructure
upgrades to deliver greater efficiencies for
transport operators collecting and
receiving containers.

Australia

Figure 32. Number of shipping carriers serving
Shanghai, Singapore and Australia in 2020
Source: GTA (2022).

The shipping alliances listed in Table 11 maintain
fleets comprised of owned and chartered vessels
(Figure 33). These vessels berth at a range of
container terminals at key Australian ports.
Two-thirds of Australia’s container export trade
passes through container terminals in Sydney and
Melbourne (Figure 34).
Zim
Antong Holdings
Zhonggu Logistics
Wan Hai Lines
Evergreen Line
ONE
Hapag-Lloyd
COSCO Group
CMA CGM Group
Mediterranean Shipping
APM-Maersk
0
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Ships
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Figure 33. Leading container ship operators — owned and chartered ships in 2021
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Figure 34. Port shares of container handling volumes
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Figure 35. Container stevedores at Australian monitored ports
Source: ACCC (2020).

Container terminal operators have been required
by their landlords to invest in infrastructure to
improve the efficiency of cargo throughput on the
landside. The result of this investment is intended
to directly benefit truck and train service
providers, with more efficient loading/unloading,
less paperwork, and less waiting time. The
combination of efficiency gains in lift rates, greater
labour productivity, combined with some erosion
in their bargaining power with shipping lines, have
caused an erosion in stevedores’ quayside

revenues since the mid-2010s (Figure 36).
In response, stevedores have imposed on truck
and train operators unanticipated large increases
in terminal access fees (Figure 37). Formerly called
infrastructure charges, terminal access fees are
charges applied to trucks and trains for dropping
off or picking up laden or empty containers at
the terminal.
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Figure 36. Stevedores’ revenues across Australian monitored container ports (in real 2019–20 dollars)
Source: Abstracted from www.accc.gov.au/media-release/stevedores-revenues-grow-despite-largest-drop-in-container-volumes-in-adecade.

Stevedores significantly increased their terminal
access fees in 2019–20, 2020–21 (Figure 37), and
again in 2021–22, despite concern from both
industry stakeholders and some state
governments. For example, DP World announced
that from May 2021, at its Brisbane, Sydney and
Melbourne terminals, its charges per full container
would be as follows:
Export Containers: $89.50 at Brisbane, Sydney,
and Melbourne.
Import Containers: $124.00 at Brisbane;
$126.60 at Sydney; and $139.20 at Melbourne.
Terminal access fees were either non-existent or
just a few dollars in all ports other than Brisbane
prior to 2017 (see Figure 37). Stevedores at the
three largest ports of Melbourne, Sydney and
Brisbane now have charges in 2021 exceeding
$120 per TEU for imported goods in containers.
Figure 37 charts the large rapid increases in these
charges since 2018, a period of very low cost and
wage inflation in Australia.
From 2020 most stevedores began applying lesser
terminal access fees for containers bound for
export. This was in response to views that the
charges had a more notable impact on exporters,
especially primary producers exporting lower value
products such as containerised grain for a
world market.
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Currently, the only port at which stevedore
terminal access fees are noticeably less than in
other ports is Fremantle. In January 2021
Fremantle Ports concluded negotiations with
Patrick and DP World over new leases for the two
existing container terminals at the port. The
10-year leases included guaranteed investments
by Patrick and DP World to upgrade port facilities
and their equipment, an equalisation of berth
lengths between the two stevedores, incentives to
improve landside and quayside performance and
the reporting of performance KPIs. An agreed
structure on infrastructure charges also limited the
rate at which the two stevedores could increase
their terminal access charges.
Across the five main container ports in Australia,
stevedores collected $256 million in revenues from
terminal access fees in 2019–20, 51.9 per cent
higher than in the previous year. In 2020–21, due
to further increases in terminal access fees,
stevedores’ revenues increased even further.
The escalation of terminal access fees is causing
stevedores to earn a growing proportion of their
revenues from users of their services who have
limited responses to those charges. The outcome
is that importers and exporters are paying higher
charges to ship their goods and ultimately those
higher transactions costs weaken Australia’s
international export competitiveness and force
domestic consumers to pay more for
imported goods.
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Figure 37. Stevedores’ terminal access charges for container imports at key ports since 2017
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Although the ACCC (2019) accepted that increases
in infrastructure charges were of concern and
worthy of consideration by policy makers, The
ACCC reckoned it had no power to determine
stevedores’ charges and that the key issues were
beyond the scope of the ACCC’s monitoring
mandate at key container terminals.

Because shipping lines contract with a single
stevedore for cargo, and because there are few
stevedore companies at each port, there is little
competition in providing landside services. Such a
situation calls for price and service monitoring and
greater regulation, otherwise price gouging is
highly likely.

Stevedores have pointed to reasons for their
increases in terminal access fees, including:

It is not just terminal access fees that have been
subject to cost escalation. Stevedores charge for
other services (e.g. VBS administration fees,
registration fees) and they also impose a range of
penalties including, no show fees, late arrival fees,
reconnection fees, and chain of responsibility
overweight fees. These penalties may or not be
commensurate to the actual dislocation or
business costs generated. Listed tariff schedules
reveal that many penalties and fees, besides
terminal access charges, have steeply increased
over the last handful of years, suggesting these
fees may not be justifiably linked to business
losses actually incurred.

i.

falling prices being charged to shipping
lines because of both greater competition
between stevedores and a stronger
bargaining position of shipping lines
following industry consolidation.

ii. sustained and significant increases in their
property-related costs.
iii. their need to maintain adequate returns
required to recover past investments and
justify future investments in quayside and
landside terminal facilities.
Important to note is the ACCC’s (2020) finding that
stevedores’ revenues and profit margins increased
overall in 2019–20, despite the global pandemic
causing the largest contraction in container
volumes in a decade. Clearly, the higher charges
for terminal access were a key contributor to
those increased revenues and profits. The then
ACCC Chair Rod Sims has commented that:
“excessive terminal access charges will nullify the
benefits of greater competition between
stevedores in providing services to shipping lines.
However, any regulation of these charges is a
matter for state and territory governments.”
The State Government of Western Australia, via
Fremantle Ports, is one of the few state
governments that has acted to limit the large
escalation in terminal access fees charged by
stevedores. The statements in 2020 by the then
ACCC Chair Rod Sims infer government failure is
widespread in all states, other than WA,
concerning regulation of terminal access charges.
The ACCC (2021) observe that stevedores’ land
rents have grown rapidly following privatisation of
the largest container ports in Australia. It is worth
noting that at the Port of Fremantle which remains
under public ownership, stevedore terminal access
fees are noticeably less than in other ports
(Figure 37).
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More generally, it is worth noting that Canada, a
containerised grain competitor to Australia, has
introduced legislation to increase the transparency
and ease of regulating its grain supply chains. In
May 2018, Bill C-49, the Transportation
Modernization Act, became law, causing the
introduction of reciprocal penalties into Service
Level Agreements. It provided the Canadian
Transportation Agency with inquiry powers on
systemic or emerging rail freight issues under
guidance from the Minister of Transportation.
It defined adequate and suitable service and made
other changes to promote railway investment in
rolling stock.
A key outcome of Bill C-49 was the development
and monitoring of rail service performance
indicators. The Bill ensured that Canada’s grain
supply chains would be monitored transparently
and effectively and key players would be held
accountable for their performance.
Rod Sims, as the then outgoing chair of the ACCC
Chair, in an address to the National Press Club on
23 February, 2022 made several general and
specific comments about anti-competitive abuses
of market power in the Australian economy and
some comments are relevant to the export of
containerised grain. In general, he noted that
“Perceptions of unfairness and inequity will see
faith in a market economy eroded” and that

“The Australian economy suffers from high levels
of market concentration.”

Kembla Port Commitment Deeds, and it made the
development of a container terminal at
Newcastle uneconomic.

More specifically, Sims noted that: “Australia is
currently facing supply and logistics challenges.
I think these are made worse by the industry
concentration that we have and by our
infrastructure bottlenecks. We need to address
this through competition law to prevent anticompetitive abuses of market power and through
general infrastructure reform.” His comments
would seem supportive of inquiries into terminal
access fees and collaborative international
inquiries into ownership concentration of
container shipping and abuse of market power.
Mr Sims added that: “We seem to focus on how
much we can sell infrastructure assets for in
Australia rather than having our infrastructure
benefit the wider economy.” This last comment is
especially relevant to port privatisation in Australia
that has not been accompanied by relevant state
or federal government monitoring and oversight.
Again, this is a clear case of government failure
and commodity importers and exporters, including
many Australian grain producers, pay the price for
this government failure.
As an example of guarding against anticompetitive market power, Sims gave the example
of the case of the Port of Newcastle versus the
Port of Botany that, at the time of writing, is on
appeal before the full Federal Court of Australia.
The NSW Government privatised Port Botany and
Port Kembla in May 2013 and entered into
agreements, known as Port Commitment Deeds,
with the new port operators for a term of 50 years.
These deeds obliged the State of NSW to
compensate the operators of Port Botany and Port
Kembla if container traffic at the Port of Newcastle
was above a minimum specified cap. Accordingly,
the ACCC alleged that entering into these deeds
likely prevented or hindered the development of a
container terminal at the Port of Newcastle,
thereby substantially lessening competition.
Another 50-year deed was signed in May 2014
when the Port of Newcastle was privatised. This
deed required the Port of Newcastle to reimburse
the State of NSW for any compensation paid to
operators of Port Botany and Port Kembla under
the Botany and Kembla Port Commitment Deeds.
Again the ACCC alleged that the reimbursement
provision in the Port of Newcastle Deed was an
anti-competitive consequence of the Botany and

This sequence of events underpins Mr Sims’
comment that “We seem to focus on how much
we can sell infrastructure assets for in Australia
rather than having our infrastructure benefit the
wider economy.” Given how important export
industries are to the long term economic health
and diversity of Australia’s economy, it is a
lamentable sign of government failure that the
expediency and dictates of current budgetary
difficulties blinker government decision-making
regarding strategic long-lived assets. The cost of
such government failure is borne by grain
producers and the wider economy.
The unevenness in market powers across a supply
chain is not a phenomenon unique to Australia.
The Federal Maritime Commission, a key regulator
in the USA, observed that, regarding international
shipping, few private parties have filed complaints
seeking reparations. They comment that “shipper
(and trucker) concerns about retaliation, litigation
costs (both in time and money), and attorney fee
liability are important disincentives” (FMC, 2021).
To combat retaliatory behaviour the Commission
recommended broadening anti-retaliation
provisions to better protect complainants. Fines
for unlawful behaviour have been potentially
doubled and a greater range of informational and
financial support measures introduced to
encourage affected parties to lodge
formal complaints.
Similarly, in 2021 a diverse group of agricultural
groups across Canada joined to force government
action over container availability and cost
escalation in container shipping. The group
advocated for:
• Greater transparency and clarity into how
the Canadian container supply chain was
functioning within the context of a global
container shortage;
• Identification of domestic legislative or
competition law remedies and law changes
that would correct shipping line behaviour;
• Engagement with global partners and
authorities to develop appropriate
regulation of shipping lines
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The fact that greater regulation and scrutiny
powers of government agencies was seen as the
preferred and effective action to address issues of
cost escalation and disruption in both Canada and
the USA is perhaps a strong signal to Australia that
a similar solution is applicable in Australia.
Already in Australia, there is evidence that greater
regulation of container ports can cause efficiency
gains. For example, the Port Botany Landside
Improvement Strategy led to the establishment in
2014 of the Cargo Movement Coordination Centre
(CMCC). The CMCC has enhanced the coordination
of supply chain activities at Port of Botany and
Port Kembla. Truck turn-around times within the
Port of Botany precinct fell from up to five hours
to under 30 minutes, due to enforcement of
mandatory standards for road carriers and
stevedores. Those standards came into force in
2010 and were updated in September 2021 (i.e.
the Ports and Maritime Administration Regulation
2021). Further regulatory changes are mooted for
later in 2022. A proposed change is to switch from
booked slots starting on the hour to truck booking
slots starting every half hour, with the slots
continuing to be an hour in length but overlapping
with adjacent time zones. This proposed change
aims to spread out truck arrivals and reduce
queueing at the start of each time zone. The CMCC
is an illustration of the benefits of coordination
and targeted enforcement of regulation.

policy and regulatory changes in the aftermath of
the Productivity Commission’s report have
occurred (e.g. formation of the National Heavy
Vehicle Regulator in 2013), those changes have not
fully remedied the inequity in access charges, and
so cost differentials persist (Table 12). Accordingly,
further reform of transport regulations and policies
is required to form national standards and support
least cost corridor networks.
The National Heavy Vehicle Regulator (NHVR)
administers the Heavy Vehicle National Law, which
applies in all Australia’s states and territories
except the Northern Territory and Western
Australia. After July 2022, Transport for NSW is
transferring to the NHVR 340 staff plus the heavy
vehicle regulatory services formerly provided by
Transport for NSW. The intention is to facilitate the
national regulation of heavy vehicles and make
their use safer and more efficient. The focus of
further regulatory reform involving heavy vehicles
should be to improve and protect the nature of
least-cost grain paths and networks. This is a key
task as the heavy vehicle supply chain comprises
around 165,000 businesses that are responsible for
the movement of much of Australia’s annual
grain production.
Any review of service provision and the exercise of
market power along containerised or bulk supply
chains should include a review of not just of
international shipping but also domestic shipping.
The interstate flow of grain and fodder via
shipping services should be included in any
examination. Such flows are especially important
in periods of regional drought where grain is
exported from regions of surplus to regions of
deficit (ACCC, 2019; Kingwell, 2020). Being able to
cost-effectively transport grain and fodder across
large distances within Australia is obviously of
national economic importance during prolonged
periods of regional drought.

Another long-standing regulation and policy issue
affecting investments in least-cost grain paths is
the inherent inequalities in transport mode
pricing. The Productivity Commission’s 2006 report
into road and rail freight infrastructure pricing
(Productivity Commission 2006) revealed that road
freight operators were at a distinct cost advantage
compared to above rail operators. Road operators
did not pay an equivalent proportion of the costs
of constructing and maintaining the road network
compared to prices paid by above rail users for
access to below rail services. Although some

Table 12. Rail and road freight access charges from 2012–13 to 2020–21
Port

Compound average annual growth
(%)

Road user charges (B-double)

0.3

1.4

Rail access charges

2.2

22.3

Road freight index

2.2

21.7

Rail freight index

4.9

54.4

Source: Pacific National (2021).
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Disruptive flow-on effects of
COVID
When the COVID epidemic quickly unfolded in
early 2019 the volume of container imports,
supplied mostly from China, initially declined as
widespread fear or loss of employment curtailed
people’s expenditure. In 2019 was the largest
annual decrease in container volumes in over a
decade. By the end of March 2020, manufacturers
in China had resumed operations and imports
were returning to normal levels, although this was
met with a reduction in demand for some
containerised goods as the pandemic
reached Australia.
Some shippers reacted to the reduction in demand
by implementing ‘blank sailings’, which is where a
scheduled trip does not go ahead. Noting that
ordinarily the export of empty containers is the
main export item at Australian container ports,
these blank sailings contributed to congestion at
container parks in both Melbourne and Sydney
and forced some parks to close, adding to import
fees, and also causing delays for exporters. In
early 2020, Maersk announced a suspension of
their Asia-Australia YoYo service until the end of
the year due to poor market demand. By April
2020, international carriers operating in global
supply chains put a record 13 per cent of their
container ship fleet on idle due to the initial
impact of COVID on trade demand. Ships were
taken off key routes, anchored and effectively
shut down. In terms of capacity, this translated to
a reduction in the container freight availability of
around 3 million TEU.

TEU volumes handled by stevedores at the five
main container ports in Australia declined in
July–December 2019 and in January–June 2020, by
4.1 per cent and 4.3 per cent respectively, relative
to the same periods in 2018–19. In July–December
2019, Sydney showed the largest decrease
(9.3 per cent). In January–June 2020, disruptions
due to the COVID-19 pandemic were evident at all
ports, with Sydney and Melbourne experiencing
decreases in container handling of 8.8 per cent
and 7.8 per cent respectively. In July–December
2019, the number of container vessels handled by
stevedores declined in the five ports, by
4.7 per cent compared to July–December 2018. The
largest decreases occurred in Fremantle
(11.8 per cent) and Adelaide (7.7 per cent).
Some shipping lines imposed new congestion
charges of up to USD 350 per standard container
at Port Botany in Sydney and some shipping lines
delivered cargo to other ports such as Brisbane or
Melbourne and charged importers to have them
trucked to Sydney.
The initial fearful response to COVID greatly curbed
household expenditure. The commonly observed
response in developed economies to lockdowns
under COVID was that households spent less on
travel, recreation, entertainment, and away-fromhome eating but then subsequently increased their
expenditure on household items. In households
with secure incomes, savings increased, and many
families upgraded their homes and vehicles
(Figure 38). This altered pattern of consumption
increased consumer reliance on goods imported
from China, as China was the world’s principal
source of household goods and consumer items.
Most household goods are shipped in containers.
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Figure 38. Percentage change in US consumer spending in 2021 (1st qtr) versus 2019 (1st qtr)
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The upshot of the altered pattern of consumption
was an enhanced demand for shipping containers
stuffed with these consumer goods, then exported
from China.

handles around 13.5 million TEU a year or about
36,400 TEU a day, making it a key gateway port on
a global scale. As a result of the COVID-related
impacts at this port, port congestion ensued and
lowered the daily container shipping sailing
capacity (Figure 39). In partial response, container
lines globally blanked 298 sailings in the first half
of June in 2021 (i.e. over 3 million TEU), and the
number of blanked sailings remained elevated
during the rest of June.

However, the flow of containers from China to
other regions was disrupted by the COVID-induced
partial closure of some key ports in China
(e.g. Yantian, Shanghai). For example, the major
container port of Yantian in China had its western
terminal closed from May 21 to June 10 in 2021
due to a COVID outbreak, whilst its East terminal
only worked at half capacity. This port usually
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Figure 39. Daily container global shipping sailing capacity
Source: McKinsey DeepBlue (2022).
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The congestion at ports has meant container ships
face delays in loading and unloading, reducing the
effective sailing days of container ships
(Figure 39). This congestion slows the delivery of
goods from factories and farms to end consumers.
Those end users or consumers who want a timely
delivery of their goods pay more, as price-based
rationing of container services occurs. Low margin
operations such as the export of fodder usually
cannot afford to pay these elevated costs of
shipping and so this export trade reduces. The
reduced active sailing capacity of the global
container fleet has continued into mid-2022, at the
time of writing this report.
Congestion during 2020–21 drove container freight
rates to unprecedented levels. Drewry’s composite
World Container index increased to USD 8,399 per
FEU in July 2021. The Drewry rate for the Shanghai
to Rotterdam route increased to USD 12,203 per

700

FEU in July 2021 (567 per cent higher year-on-year)
whilst the backhaul on the Los Angeles — Shanghai
route increased to USD 1,284 per FEU. A source
from Freightos said full door-to-door shipping
prices in late 2021 were $26,000 now, up from
$8,000 at the beginning of the year. Door-to-door
shipping is when the item is picked up from the
vendor and delivered to the recipient’s door.
Congestion has not only affected container ships
but dry bulk shipping as well. Port congestion, so
problematic in 2021, has continued to be a serious
problem into 2022 (Figure 40). Congestion at ports
results in ships waiting at anchor and this incurs
an expense known as demurrage. As an
illustration of the increased importance of
demurrage costs, CBH (2021) reported demurrage
costs of $17.3 million in 2020–21 compared to
$1.5 million in 2019–20.
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Figure 40. Congestion at Chinese ports and ports in the rest of the world (RoW)
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In Australia, due mostly to the disruption costs
associated with COVID, the number of container
vessels visiting Australian ports has consistently
declined since 2018–19 (Figure 41), reducing the
availability of containers for re-export and causing
a reduction in container-based exports from key
Australian ports (Figure 42). The number of
container ships that visited key container ports in
Australia was almost 40 per cent less in 2020–21
compared to 2018–19.

The impacts of the decline in the number of
container vessels visiting Australia have been
lessened by the increase in size of container
ships, especially with an increase in the number
and share of container traffic visiting Australian
ports being ships of over 8,000 TEU (Figure 43).
The larger ships now visit all key container ports
in Australia.
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Figure 41. Number of container vessels at key Australian ports
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Figure 42. COVID impacts on container exports from key Australian ports
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As the sizes of container ships gradually increase
then it is vital that Australian ports have the
required infrastructure to readily accommodate
larger ships to expedite the loading and unloading
of their containers. To receive the larger ships,
ports and terminal operators need to have
sufficiently sized infrastructure such as cranes,
berths, quays, large and deep enough channels,
technology, rail access and sufficient labour. If port
investments across Australian ports are not
well-coordinated to accommodate larger ships
then the situation may arise where only a few
terminals will be able to service larger ships.
Perversely this may constrain competition and
make it commercially less attractive for a large
container ship to visit Australia. This suggests that
ports capable of supporting larger container ships
will need to additionally ensure they have
adequate rail access and ample facilities to
assemble packed and empty containers and store
empty containers.

Owners of container ships in recent years have
experienced spectacular increases in their profits
(Figure 21, Figure 30 & Figure 44) due to the
reduced sailing capacity of the container fleet
(Figure 39) caused in turn by port congestion
(Figure 40), the altered pattern of demand for
containerised goods and the reduced construction
of new container ships during the 2010s.
Dr Johannes Schlingmeier, CEO of Container
xChange has said, “2021 was an outstanding year
for the shipping industry. The staggering earnings
and profits for ocean freight companies have
surpassed the combined industry profits made
over the whole decade. It was also a year that
showed that shippers were “willing” to pay higher
prices for shipping”.
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Figure 44. Howe Robinson container index
Note: The Howe Robinson Container Index represents the container market for charter rates (rental price for a container ship
per day).
Source: Webinar on April 5, 2022 by Janina Lam, Howe Robinson Partners: Dry Bulk Market Overview.
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The magnitude of profits earned by container ship
owners has been underpinned by large increases
in the cost of many freight routes for shipping
containers, especially shipping containers out of
China. The historic levels of profit have allowed
many of the owners of container ships to place
orders for new ships that will become available
from late 2023 and early 2024 onwards (see a later
section titled “Container ship replacement”).
Eventually the supply of additional container ships
and the likelihood of a deceleration in economic
growth in North America, Europe and China in
2022 will eventually see the cost of many freight
routes for shipping containers decline
substantially from their peaks in 2021. How
quickly the rates charged for shipping containers
will decline is subject to much speculation
(Figure 45). The most likely scenarios point to

rates rapidly falling during 2023 to levels in 2024
similar to, or somewhat higher than those
observed in 2019. The red dot in Figure 45
indicates the indexed cost of containerised freight
in early August 2022, suggesting a more rapid
decline in the cost of sea freight is underway
in 2022.
The enhanced future supply of container ships
and the trend towards larger vessels should
especially benefit Australia’s main container ports
in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane. At these
ports, once again, containerised grain and fodder
should become attractive back freight
opportunities.
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Figure 45. Shanghai Containerised Freight Index: 2019 to 2024f
Note: SCFI=Shanghai Containerised Freight Index.
Source: McKinsey (2022).
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Disruption of labour supply
at port

over the same period. Congestion at Port Botany
has deteriorated to such an extent that shipping
lines are often skipping the port entirely.” (p. 14).

The ACCC (2021) noted that each time a stevedore’s
enterprise agreement expires, the Maritime Union of
Australia (MUA) and the stevedore then engage in
protracted EA negotiations that create delays and
congestion at Australian container ports. For
example, the expiry of a number of enterprise
agreements at the end of December 2020 elicited
industrial action at Port Botany from early
September 2020. Protest stoppages occurred at
Patrick, DP World and Hutchison’s Port Botany
terminals. Industrial action has been observed at
almost every major container port in Australia
during 2021. For example, since February 2020 until
the end of 2021 the Maritime Union of Australia
(MUA) launched more than 220 industrial actions
against Patrick Terminals. Sydney, Brisbane,
Melbourne and Fremantle terminals all experienced
delays for importers and exporters. Yet the MUA’s
assistant national secretary, Jamie Newlyn, still
boldly stated: “Despite a political campaign of
misinformation and interference by the ACCC, the
Productivity Commission and even Scott Morrison,
the Union has always sought to work cooperatively
with Patrick Terminals’ management on continuous
business improvement to ensure job security,
safety, and productivity at Patrick Terminals’ four
ports.” (7 Feb, 2022). The MUA actions at the Patrick
terminals worsened port congestion (e.g. Figure 46).

Note that the average cost of a day’s wait for a
shipper is typically around $35,000; so a 20 day
average wait time translates into a $700,000 cost.
In their container stevedoring monitoring report,
the ACCC (2021) note that “Market participants
across the supply chain have expressed concerns
to the ACCC that these industrial actions are also
causing damage to many Australian businesses
that are not parties to the industrial dispute. They
advised industrial actions have disrupted their
operations continuously over the past few years
with a consequential impact on the entire supply
chain.” (p. 67).

The ACCC (2021) stated “Average idle hours
increased in aggregate across all 5 Australian
container ports, from 9.1 hours in 2018–19 prior to
the pandemic, to 13.3 hours in 2020–21. The
increase in idle time at Port Botany was especially
pronounced, going from 11.9 hours to 21.2 hours

It is not just labour disruption at Australian ports
that affects the ease and cost of exporting grain
and fodder in containers from Australia. Also
creating ripple effects in Australia is the likelihood
of labour disruption at west coast port terminals
in the USA. Ending on July 1, 2022 is a 5-year
service contract between the Pacific Maritime
Association who are owners and operators of
29 USA west coast port terminals, and the
International Longshore and Warehouse Union. The
union has already rejected a one-year extension of
their existing contract, and despite previously
accepting the need for container port automation
and being financially compensated for that stance,
they are now strongly opposed to such
automation. The prospect is for labour disruption
at the key container ports on the USA’s west coast
towards mid-2022 until either intervention by the
USA federal government or finalisation of a new
agreement. Until that time there will be adverse
ripple effects for the container trade in Australia.
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Figure 46. Port congestion at Patrick terminals in Port Botany: July 2020 to October 2020
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Inadequate supply chain
investment
Wherever supply chain investments deliver
subsequent benefits from coopetition or
competition then such investments should be
encouraged. However, as outlined in a preceding
sub-section, at times useful container supply
chain investments appear to have been actively
and purposefully stymied. The example cited was
the behaviour of the NSW Government who
privatised Port Botany and Port Kembla then
provided these entities with protection against any
possible investments at Port of Newcastle. By
preventing or hindering the development of a
container terminal at the Port of Newcastle,
competition and a possible enlargement of service
provision was lessened.
An example of feasible investments supported by
coopetition is the construction of intermodal
terminals linked to the inland rail that are jointly
funded by multiple users and governments that
then, via competition for services, deliver regional
and industry economic growth. As an illustration
in the 2022–23 Budget, the national government
committed up to $3.1 billion for the $3.6 billion
Melbourne Intermodal Terminal Package that will
deliver two new intermodal terminals at Beveridge
and Truganina. The funding includes $1.62 billion
for the Beveridge Interstate Freight Terminal,
$280 million for its road connection upgrades,
$740 million for the Western Interstate Freight
Terminal at Truganina and $920 million for the
Outer Metropolitan Ring (OMR) South
Rail connection.
These two new terminals, being linked to the
Inland Rail, will ensure that Melbourne’s freight
infrastructure has the capability to accommodate
the double-stacked 1,800 metre trains that will
operate on the Inland Rail. Double-stacking
containers reduces the unit cost of grain and
fodder transport, and lengthens the geographical
market reach of these farm products.

These intermodal terminals plus others already
constructed or being planned (see www.inlandrail.
gov.au/for-business/understanding-the-freightsupply-chain/intermodal-terminals) mean that, in
times of drought, animal feeds can be moved
further and more cheaply to better protect farm
businesses and regional communities from the
vagaries and economic stress of drought.
Conversely, in periods of plenty, these farm
products can be more cost effectively moved into
export positions.
That said, a key issue affecting several container
ports is adequate rail access and the potential to
achieve greater efficiencies by better integrating
rail into supply chains. Although rail is considered
to be the most reliable and efficient land transport
for large volumes of grain, especially over long
distances, nonetheless, over the last decade, on
average, only around 10 to 12 per cent of
containers have been transported by rail to the
container ports in Melbourne and Sydney. For
example, in 2020–21 only 2.1, 6.1 and 15.5 per cent
of containers arrived by rail at the container ports
in Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney (ACCC, 2021).
Yet, in the particular case of the Port of Botany,
the NSW government supposedly planned to
increase the share of rail freight at Port Botany to
28 per cent by 2021 (NSW Transport, 2018). To-date
in 2022 the share of rail freight at Port Botany has
averaged only 13.6 per cent.
Upcountry investments in rail can sometimes
improve the efficiency of the entire supply chain.
For example, upgrading the limits on axle weight
capacity on short distances of track where train
speed is reduced, or enlarging inadequate siding
lengths, or constructing passing loops can
separately or in aggregate lift the handling
efficiency of the rail network.
Currently, stevedores and port owners are not
strongly supportive of rail, as shipping lines pay
(i.e. charge to the exporter in the Terminal
Handling Charge in the ocean rate) the majority of
the handling charges in road terminals (first lift off
and last lift on) whereas rail terminals must be
funded by rail operators (as they are the second
lift away) and so are directly funded by exporters
and importers.
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If the split of market share of rail and trucks
continues into 2030, this may double the number
of trucks required, leading to road congestion on
road networks servicing the ports, as well as
increased emissions from road transport. Marked
growth in the volume of containers passing
through Australian ports is projected towards 2030
(Table 13).
The outcome of this growth in the volume of
containers passing through Australian ports will be
political pressure on local and state governments
to lessen the congestion, accident risk and noise
issues associated with more frequent truck
movements. Greater investment in rail corridors,
tracks capable of double-stacking, rail loops and
shuttle trains are all possible required investments
that will lower unit transport costs and reduce the
emissions intensity of transport services (see later
Figure 55). Rail freight is known to impose fewer
costs on the community in terms of accidents,
congestion and emissions than road. These costs
are not factored into transport prices in Australia
(Deloitte 2017). Deloitte compared emissions from
road and rail freight and concluded that road
freight produced 16 times as much carbon
pollution as rail freight per tonne kilometre.
Indicative of the future, at the Port of Fremantle,
rail transport of containerised grain and fodder is
regularly around 20 per cent of the export volume
of grain and fodder containers from the port with
the rail freight being subsidised by the state
government to reduce road congestion and road
train noise in suburbs adjacent to the port.
Moreover, a major new container port is at a very
advanced stage of planning, to be positioned
south of the Port of Fremantle with a far greater
ease of rail and road access. However, investment

in this new port is being strongly opposed by the
Maritime Union of Australia who want the less
efficient Port of Fremantle to be the region’s sole
container port towards 2050.
The National Freight and Supply Chain Strategy
(DITCRD, 2019) outlines that Australia’s freight
volumes are projected to grow by over 35 per cent
between 2018 and 2040. Urban freight is forecast
to increase by nearly 60 per cent by 2040, along
with greater population density. Yet DITCRD (2019)
observe that Australia’s freight productivity and
costs have plateaued, with little change in real
freight costs since the 1990s. This impacts the
competitiveness of Australian exports, including
containerised grain exports. DITCRD (2019) also
comment that “Urban infrastructure is reaching
capacity due to road congestion (which will be
around $30 billion a year by 2030), greater noise
and environmental regulation, and corridor and
precinct encroachment.” (p. 10).
DITCRD (2019) also identify potential savings worth
$10.8 billion from the protection and early
acquisition of seven corridors in a 2016
Infrastructure Priority List, emphasising the
economic importance of investments in least cost
freight networks and corridors.
An additional pressure for rail investment is the
trend towards larger vessel sizes which increases
the need for speed and volume of loading and
unloading, and places greater demands on empty
container parks. The demand for empty container
park space will increase as the volume of imported
containers continues to grow, yet due to the cost
and availability of land around each port, more
cost-effective investment and management of
empty container parks will be required in the future.

Table 13. Containerised trade by Australian port
Annual average growth rate (%)
1998–99 to 2012–13

2012–13

Forecast 2032–33

Brisbane

8.1

6.2

1070

3563

Sydney

6.5

4.5

2126

5155

Melbourne

5.9

4.8

2512

6415

Adelaide

7.7

5.4

339

972

Fremantle

6.6

5.8

670

2055

Other ports

5.7

5.1

447

1218

All ports

6.5

5.1

7165

19,377

Port

Source: BITRE estimates.
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Labour practices at port

Biosecurity inspection

Ports are nationally important strategic assets.
Berths, container cranes and transport facilities
are expensive assets that need to be used
efficiently to generate sound returns. Limitations
on asset use that arise from curfews, restrictions
on access or antiquated labour practices need to
be remedied. Labour services at port should be
tailored to user needs, not vice versa.

In March 2021 new export legislation came into
effect in Australia: the Export Control Act 2020 and
the Export Control Rules 2021. The new legislation
was intended not to add regulatory burden or
change export business operations. Importantly,
fees and charges were not changed following
enactment of the new export legislation.

There are some inflexible work practices and
rigidities in conditions that unhelpfully add to the
inefficiency of port operations and only encourage
and hasten the eventual investment switch into
robotic technologies. Mismatches in opening hours
of port terminals, container parks, and delivery
schedules generates its own set of inefficiencies.
The ACCC (2021) describe in detail how the MUA
used industrial actions in 2020 and 2021 to
demand stevedores accept restrictive provisions.
The ACCC found in enterprise agreements
restrictive conditions that were “outside the realm
of what would be considered reasonable terms
and conditions in any industry.” (p. 67). The ACCC
also concluded that “Overall, these provisions
constrain workplace performance, reduce and
distort incentives to improve productivity, reduce
timeliness and reliability, and increase labour
costs for a given level of activity. This has
contributed to the sub-optimal performance of the
nation’s major ports and added to the pandemicinduced supply constraints.” (p. 66). These are
damning and serious criticisms that point to
governments failing to facilitate productivity
improvement, but rather supporting economic
harm to the wider economy.

Under the old and new legislation, an authorized
officer (i.e., a government authorised officer or
third-party authorised officer) inspects the
products’ packaging (e.g., bags) and container
unit to ensure they meet the appropriate
standards and that there is no pest contamination.
The officer inspects the grain or fodder to be
exported, and assesses its associated
documentation, and confirms that it:
• meets the importing country requirements
• complies with Australian export laws
• complies with all other requirements
outlined on the Plant Export Operations
Manual.
A phytosanitary certificate is issued that states:
“This is to certify that the plants, plant products
or other regulated articles described herein have
been inspected and/or tested according to
appropriate official procedures and are considered
to be free from the quarantine pests specified by
the importing contracting party and to conform
with the current phytosanitary requirements of the
importing contracting party, including those for
regulated non-quarantine pests.”
The officer must ensure that the grain or fodder is
referred to by its common name (e.g., barley,
sorghum, mung beans), with no quality
descriptors being allowed (e.g., milling wheat or
soft wheat). If the importing country requires the
product to be treated for pests, then treatment
details must also be provided by the exporter.
It needs to be emphasised that the sole focus on
pest identification only partially protects the
export reputation of Australian grain and fodder
exports. Grain or fodder quality is not assessed
and so these vital characteristics of the exported
products need either third-party verification, or
parties adversely affected by failure to honour
contract specifications need redress via GTA
dispute resolution processes.
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Availability of food grade 20ft
containers

The introduction of third-party authorised officers
has provided flexibility and greater assurance in
the availability of biosecurity inspection for the
export of containerised grain. However, to
maintain the quality of their service provision and
the quality of service provision by government
authorised officers regular upgrade and audit of
their performance is required.

Shippers prefer to use 40ft containers as their
profit margins per shipping slot are greater with
40ft containers. Currently, 20ft containers have
approximately a 36 per cent global market share of
all containers (Singh 2020). At Australia’s main
Port of Melbourne, relative to the global average, a
higher proportion of 20ft containers is imported
and exported (Table 14), at least for full
containers, and the port regularly annually exports
over 500,000 empty containers (Figure 47). This
equates to about 38 per cent of all this port’s
containers being exported empty, suggesting
availability of 20ft containers may not ordinarily
be a pressing issue at this main port. However,
most containerised grain exports from Australia
are in 20ft food grade containers that are a subset
of the stock of 20ft containers.

Having held discussions with various persons
engaged in the export of containerised grain and
fodder, we have formed a view that the training of
authorised officers needs regular review to ensure
the form and content of training remains
fit-for-purpose.
For authorised officers employed by packers their
training especially needs to highlight awareness
training regarding conflicts of interest, as despite
being paid by the packer, the legal duty of these
officers is to manage compliance with
Commonwealth law rather than being compliant to
their employer’s immediate needs. Having stated
opportunities to retain the quality of training for
authorised officers, it needs to be highlighted that
the work of authorised officers in recent years has
been stressful due to the impacts of COVID that
have reduced their staff availability and increased
individual workloads.

Table 14. Port of Melbourne import and export full
container size shares in 2009 and 2019
Direction

Size
(ft)

2009
(%)

2019
(%)

Imports

40

42

53

20

58

47

40

34

47

20

66

53

Exports

Source: Port of Melbourne (2021).
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Figure 47. Container trade through the Port of Melbourne: 2010 to 2020
Source: Port of Melbourne (2021).
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A food grade container requires the container to
be free of obnoxious odours, with no flaking paint
or rust, with no transferable stains and containing
no infectible material. Hence, the seeming ready
availability of 20ft containers overstates the actual
availability of food grade 20ft containers.
Moreover, gradually as 40ft containers become a
higher proportion of the global stock of containers,
it follows that also gradually, the availability of
20ft food grade containers will diminish.
The Maritime Waterline reports (Waterline 62 and
67 from the Department of Infrastructure,
Transport, Regional Development and
Communications) reveal a gradual decline in the
proportion of 20ft containers within the stock of
all containers handled in Australia (Figure 48).
If this proportion eventually falls to sufficiently low
levels, then 20ft containers will become less
available, and the cost to convert more of those
containers to a food grade level will become an
additional expense for exporting. Profit margins for
grain export will then become further constrained.
However, it should be stressed that just because
20ft containers will become a lower proportion of
the global stock of containers, does not
necessarily imply a problematic availability of 20ft
containers as long as the overall stock of
containers imported into Australia continues to
grow at a greater rate than growth in exports of
containerised grain. For example, Australian ports

now handle over 8 million containers every year;
five times more than 20 years ago, but the rate of
increase in exports of containerised grain is also
higher. Australian grain exports in containers have
grown from under 1mmt in 2007 to 4.2mmt in
2020–21. That is over a four-fold increase in only
14 years so the availability of 20ft food grade
containers is increasingly likely to be a
pressing issue.
Due to difference in growth rates of the volume of
containers imported into Australia and the volume
of grain exported in containers, there needs to be
industry and government monitoring of the
availability of 20ft food grade containers and
discussion about the most cost-effective responses
to the potential structural challenge of gradual
reduced availability of 20ft food grade containers.
Investing in transport modes and pathways that
increase mass limits to allow greater use of 40ft
containers would appear one component of a
solution. Road mass limits cause most grain
exporters to use 20ft containers as they can be
loaded with up to 24 tonnes of grain before
breaching road mass limits. However, even these
mass limits mean that 20ft containers are unable
to be filled completely with very dense grains. The
situation is far worse for a 40ft container that is
subject to equivalent mass limits.
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Figure 48. 20 foot containers as a percentage of all containers handled in Australia: 2015 to 2020
Source: GTA (2022).
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Aside from road infrastructure investments that
allow for carriage of heavier loads, another
response is to have a jointly owned service
business at each main export port to solely
provide low-cost refurbishment of 20ft containers
to a food grade standard for grain exporters.
Encouraging a joint South East Asian and
Australian investment in ownership of 20ft
containers is another possibility. This could be
jointly beneficial as many South East Asian nations
lack the landside infrastructure to accommodate
40ft containers, preferring reliance on
20ft containers.

To efficiently access empty containers requires
information-sharing and activity coordination
between track owners, shipping lines, stevedores,
rail operators, freight forwarders and grain
packers. The current status of containerised
supply chains in Australia suggests there is
inadequate information-sharing and coordination
between these industry groups and this causes
inefficient access to empty containers. Lack of
coordination between these operators also lessens
the effectiveness of the Inland Rail for the supply
of empty containers across the broader port/
interstate rail network.

Of some concern is the increased cost of 20ft
containers. Container manufacture that principally
occurs in China continues to produce huge
volumes of 20ft containers so there is little
likelihood of any rapid decline in the availability of
20ft containers. However, containers are now
much more expensive to manufacture. For
example, the cost of steel increased substantially
from 2,202 Yuan/MT in early July 2016 to
5,594 Yuan/MT by May 2021. This has increased
the manufacturing cost of shipping containers and
meant that purchasers or owners of these new
containers require higher lease prices to generate
the same rate of return to their investment in
these capital items.

During the COVID pandemic, and even in its
aftermath, availability of 20ft food grade
containers at many of Australia’s container ports
has been problematic, in turn making bookings
difficult. Moreover, even where containers might
be available, shipping lines have limited their
sailing dates or routes to key containerised grain
markets, such as the sub-continent or Middle
East. Hence, gaining access to some key markets
has proven to be a logistic difficulty.

The upshot is that there is unlikely to be a rapid
return to ‘cheap’ 20ft containers and so profitable
reliance on these containers will continue to be
constrained by their cost of access and use.
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Market access
By far the main container trade flows centre on
Asia. The transatlantic trade flows involving the
Americas and Europe fade into relative
insignificance when compared against the trade
flows between the Americas and Asia, and Europe
and Asia (Figure 49).
Australia has a small domestic manufacturing
sector and so is required to import a large range
and volume of manufactured goods, many of
which are transported in containers. As Australia’s
population and per capita income has grown, so
has Australia’s demand for imported goods, many
of which arrive in containers. Australian ports now
handle over 8 million containers every year; five
times more than 20 years ago.
Yet Australia’s major merchandise exports (iron
ore, coal, gas, grains) are bulk exports. A
consequence is that Australia annually receives
many more containers than it currently fills with
back-loaded exports. At many Australian container
ports, the export of empty containers remains a
major category of container exports (Figure 47).
Availability of empty containers, especially 40ft
containers for packing with oaten hay, is usually
not a constraint on export operations. However, as
discussed later, availability of food grade 20ft
containers is likely to become a structural
impediment to export of containerised grain.
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More important, and what most constrains the
export of grains and grain products are the supply
chain costs, including the shipping costs,
associated with the containerised export of these
commodities; the financial risks associated with
the container trade and the expense of the initial
purchase of some of these commodities.
Adding to the supply chain costs and financial risk
is the security of market access. Some large
markets like China or India can unexpectedly be
subject to restricted access. Already Australian
exports of barley and oaten hay have been subject
to unexpected actions by the Chinese government
that, by various means, have removed access to
the Chinese market for these commodities. Trading
margins are typically slim for the export of
containerised grain and grain products, so any
small changes in supply chain costs or
impediments to market access quickly erode profit
margins and add financial risk to
export operations.
Industry and government actions that enlarge
access to new or existing markets for
containerised grain and fodder is a sensible
strategy and spreads market risk. Often access to
a market is conditional on the industry and
government policies in that target market. Through
bilateral exchanges jointly involving respective
government agencies and industry representative
bodies it sometimes is possible to achieve trade
or regulatory reform which increases access to
those target markets. In the particular case of
containerised grain and fodder, target markets are
those with a strategic need to import grains and
fodder that Australia can regularly supply, a
capacity to pay for provenance and a proximity to
Australia that gives Australian suppliers a
freight advantage.
Growing populations and per capita wealth in East
Asia, South East Asia and South Asia underpin
increasing market opportunities for Australian
containerised grain and fodder, mostly where end
users have a preference or sole ability to receive
containerised products.

Figure 49. The volume of container trade based on
main routes

Issues and problems in the containerised export of grain

97

Container ship replacement

Overall, perhaps due to the commercial
uncertainties surrounding the global impacts of
COVID during 2019 and 2020, few shippers opted
to place new orders for ships in those years. The
restricted replenishment of shipping capacity in
2019 and 2020 has fuelled the escalation shipping
rates in 2020 and 2021 and high rates and high
profits from shipping are destined to continue into
2022. These high profits encouraged ocean carriers
to eventually double their orders for container
ships by the end of 2021 (see Figure 51).

The fleet of container ships is forecast to grow
4.4 per cent in 2021 and just 2.8 per cent in 2022,
significantly below demand growth projections,
although high levels of newbuild are contracted
for 2023. By mid-2021 there was marked variation
in shippers’ commitments to investments in
additional shipping capacity (Figure 50). Maersk,
for example, although responsible for about
20 per cent of the global TEU trade, in mid-2021
had only around one per cent of its TEU trade
placed as new ship orders. By contrast MSC, that
also is responsible for about 20 per cent of the
global TEU trade, in mid-2021 had 22 per cent of
its TEU trade placed as new ship orders.
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Figure 50. Variation among shippers in their investment in new ship orders
Note: The size of each bubble is the total TEUs in 2021 carried by that shipping company.
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Figure 51. Total vessel orders by sea freight type: 2006 to 2021
Source: Nugent (2021).
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As of early September 2021, 619 container ships
were on order for future delivery. Of those, 381 were
ordered in 2021 alone. In early September 2021 the
container ship order book held 5.3 million TEU of
shipping capacity scheduled to be added to the
fleet from 2023 onwards. Yet at the start of 2021
only 2.5 million TEU was on order. Never has such a
large volume of TEU been ordered in such a short
time span. The magnitude of the boost to container
ship construction has meant that ship-building
capacity for bulk vessels is highly constrained,
suggesting sustained pressure on bulk sea freight
rates will continue over the next few years.
The magnitude of new orders might suggest
overcapacity could be a future risk in the trade of
containerised goods, but future supply
requirements are clouded by new environment
regulations. The Energy Efficiency Design Index
(EEDI) for new ships promotes more energy
efficient (less polluting) equipment and engines.
The EEDI requires a minimum energy efficiency
level per capacity mile (e.g. tonne mile) for
different ship type and size segments. Since
1 January 2013, following an initial two-year phase
zero, new ship designs need to meet their relevant
reference level that is tightened incrementally
every five years. Implementation of the EEDI is
affecting the cost of ship construction and will
likely limit ship speeds in order to lessen or cap
emissions from sea transport (IMO, 2021). Hence,
and so effective shipping capacity may not be as
apparent as newbuild orders might suggest.
However, it is not just container ships that are
affected by new environmental laws. Some analysts
estimate that less than 25 per cent of bulkers and

tankers will attain the required level of emissions
reduction required under new regulations, placing
further upward pressure on bulk freight rates as
these older vessels are de-commissioned.
For new ships, the EEDI requires that energy
efficiency is improved in phases such that CO2
emissions are progressively reduced. During phase
one that ran from1 January 2015 to 31 December
2019, the EEDI required a 10 per cent reduction of
carbon intensity below the relevant reference line
for newly built ships. However, phase two runs
from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2024 and
requires up to a 20 per cent reduction of carbon
intensity. Phase three of the EEDI commences in
April 2022 and requires an additional 10 per cent
reduction, i.e., ships being built in 2025 will be
required to be 30 per cent more carbon efficient
than those built in between 2000 to 2010
(Standard Club, 2021).
In general, containerised sea freight is playing an
increasingly important role in the international
trade of goods (Figure 52). In over four decades,
containerised sea trade has grown from virtual
obscurity, being under 2 per cent of the global
shipping freight fleet to now consistently being
around 14 per cent of the global fleet. The carrying
capacity of today’s largest container vessels is
boggling, equivalent to a 71 kilometre-long freight
train solely carrying containers. Because a large
proportion of the global trade in sea freight now
relies on containerisation it means that any policy,
regulatory, technology or investment changes that
affect the cost and efficiency of containerisation
are also increasingly important.

Container ships as a proportion of the
world’s shipping freight fleet
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Figure 52. Container ships’ share of the world’s shipping freight fleet
Source: Compiled from UNCTAD data available at https://hbs.unctad.org/merchant-fleet/.
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An investment challenge wrought by the structural
shift to larger container ships is their requirement
for increased channel depth and often longer
berths. These smaller ship classes include coastal
ships, reefer ships, or geared ships. Larger ships
above 8,000 TEU have a more uniform design with
little draft variations (Figure 53). The New
Panamax standard was set in 2016 with the
expansion of the Panama Canal to accommodate
draughts around 15 metres, allowing ships with a
capacity of about 12,000 TEU. Even larger capacity
container ships generate their capacity by
lengthening rather than widening the ship, but
this requires longer berths. For instance, a
16,000 TEU ship of the Marco Polo class is about
25 per cent longer than a ship of about 9,000 TEU.
The gradual shift to larger, longer container ships,
although reducing the sea freight cost per
container does require complementary investment
at landing and loading ports to accommodate the
greater dimensions of these ships. This means

that at shallower Australian ports or at ports with
restricted sizes of berths, additional investments
in channel dredging or berth lengthening will be
required. In some cases, larger container vessels
have a draught less than 15 metres but are wider,
close to 60 metres. This substantially improves
their buoyancy but requires container cranes to be
larger, capable of reaching across the 23 containerwidth of the vessel. The main limitation for
draught is the Suez Canal that can only
accommodate vessels with a 17 metre draught.
Hence, in summary, to make more Australian ports
feasible and attractive destinations for larger
container ships will require additional
infrastructure investments and maintenance
expenditure on channel dredging. Gathering
environmental approval for dredging is not a
simple, nor inexpensive process as protection of
marine environments receives heightened interest
from a wider range of interest groups.
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Figure 53. The relationship between container ship size and draught
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Competitor performance

Integrated scheduling and real-time
communications between the shipping line, DP
World, and Canadian National Rail result in
unparalleled terminal velocity and efficient
transfer of containers between vessels and trains.
The Port of Prince Rupert serves as an outlet for
containerised grain produced in the Canadian
prairies. The Fairview Terminal expansion is due
for completion in 2022. About a third of all
container exports from the terminal are grains,
oilseeds, and pelletised feed. Another 30 per cent
are lumber exports.

Australian ports are not the only source of grain
and grain products for international customers.
Take the example of the Port of Prince Rupert on
north-west coast of Canada. This port housed
Canada’s first dedicated ship-to-rail container
terminal, Fairview Container Terminal (Figure 54).
It is a dedicated intermodal facility, purpose-built
to be a high-velocity gateway for transpacific
container trade. Operated by DP World, the
terminal provides shippers with a significant
advantage over alternative gateways. The port
handled 1.2 million TEU in 2019, and by 2022,
following an expansion in its facilities, the port
terminal will have an annual operational capacity
of 1.8 million TEU.
The terminal features two marine berths capable
of accommodating the largest container ships with
direct and unimpeded access to international
shipping lanes. On-dock rail adjacent to the berth
provides efficient intermodal operations to build
trains up to 3,660 metres.

Figure 54. Fairview container terminal at the Port of
Prince Rupert, Canada

A complementary investment is being undertaken
by the Prince Rupert Port Authority to install shore
power capacity at the terminal, so that docked
vessels use hydroelectric power while their cargo
is loaded and unloaded, reducing their carbon
emissions. This shore power project is part of the
Prince Rupert Port Authority’s carbon reduction
strategy to reduce the port’s greenhouse gas
intensity by 30 percent from 2018 levels by the
year 2030 and reach net-zero carbon emissions
by 2050.
Importantly, the World Bank and IHS Markit
compared in-port time performance of
351 container ports across the world and found
that 4 of the 5 Australian major container ports
were in the worst-performing 15 per cent of ports
(Table 15). The poorly ranked container ports were
Melbourne, Sydney, Adelaide and Fremantle. Only
Brisbane had a higher ranking than these four
poorly performing container ports, yet for Brisbane,
still around 70 per cent of all global ports outperformed it. The internationally poor rankings of
Australia’s key container ports indicates that many
of Australia’s key grain export competitors benefit
from their more efficient and effective port
operations. Given that port logistics costs are a key
component of the overall cost of landed
containerised grain and fodder, it follows that
inefficiencies and inadequate service competition
at container ports reduces the market share for
Australian containerised grain and fodder.

Issues and problems in the containerised export of grain

101

Table 15. Australian container ports’ international rankings (as percentages where 1% = worst; 100% = best)
Administrative comparison
(%)

Statistical comparison
(%)

Brisbane

33

30

Melbourne

11

14

Fremantle

9

7

Sydney

7

4

Adelaide

5

3

Port

Source: ACCC (2021).

Ports are long-lived spatial assets. Understandably
often cities develop adjacent to ports. Initially this
proximity delivers lower freight costs and the
convenience of ready access to imports and
infrastructure for exports. However, as city
populations grow in size and wealth, and as
population housing density increases then
waterfront land becomes increasingly valuable and
access to ports often becomes more congested
and subject to urban encroachment. Many
Australian capital city ports are becoming more
boxed in, with urban encroachment and erosion of
buffer zones lessening the ease of access to port
facilities. Traffic congestion and traffic noise
become increasingly important issues for urban
communities whose complaining actions often
lead to erosion of the ease of access to port
facilities. Maintenance of buffer zones becomes
the casualty of development forces energised by
the increasing worth of coastal and city
real estate.
The need to acquire and preserve separate rail
corridors for passenger and freight transport is an
increasing need as growth in urban populations
and density occurs in Australia’s major cities.
Failing to acquire and protect land for corridors
only adds to future costs and problems of
congestion and inefficiency. The NSW State
Infrastructure Strategy 2022–2042 (NSW
Infrastructure, 2022) indicates that investments to
create and protect freight buffer zones are an
immediate priority.
Yet ports are often geographically rare locations
with unique characteristics that need to be
preserved if the full value of their temporal stream
of economic benefits is to be extracted. As
locations, often with natural endowments, they
and their access corridors require strategic
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oversight and management. Who should own and
operate a port asset is an inadequate question.
Rather the more important concern is the
ownership and operation of port facilities and
their accompanying access corridors. Failure to
protect and provide the strategically important
freight corridors to ports only weakens and
jeopardizes the economic performance of
container ports.
Rail access to ports is especially important due to
the rail mode being a low emission (Deloitte, 2017;
IEA, 2019; Figure 55) and low cost service for
transporting large volumes of grain and fodder
over long distances. The NSW, WA and Vic
governments both subsidise rail access to their
respective container ports. Most recently, the Vic
government announced in its 2022–23 budget a rail
subsidy called the Mode Shift Incentive Scheme.
Emissions (tonnes of oil equivalents per
million tonne-kilometres)

Urban encroachment

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Medium trucks

Heavy trucks

Rail

Figure 55. Emissions from various land transport
modes
Source: Adapted from IEA (2019).

Opaqueness in supply chains

The data initiative has three key objectives:

In reviewing vulnerable supply chains in Australia,
the Productivity Commission (2021) stated that
“Supply chains can be long, complex, and opaque,
and data can be difficult to obtain.” (p. 7). The
Productivity Commissions identified one
potentially useful role of government in aiding the
management of risks in supply chains. That role
was the provision of information and expertise in
risk identification. Already the ACCC has a role as
a regulator of some port operations and in that
role collects critical information, which if
appropriately shared, can help identify risks and
issues in that key part of grain supply chains.
The value to the government and users of grain
supply chains of accurate datasets is that they can
be indicators of efficiency and can help de-risk
investments that draw on or improve those
supply chains.
The Productivity Commission also noted that
governments could reduce the costs that firms
might incur to understand their supply chain risks
and quoted the example of governments who
promoted the use of global data standards to
facilitate the exchange of supply chain data
between industry and governments. A key
component of the National Freight and Supply
Chain Strategy, as outlined by DITCRD (2019) was
the need to better measure freight and supply
chain performance to aid government and industry
to improve freight productivity and help evaluate
where infrastructure were required.
In the USA the Federal Maritime Commission has
used its powers to force shipping companies that
carry containers to provide a range of specific
information related to vessel calls they have made
to the United States since June 2021, including the
number of loaded and empty containers carried
on a ship’s return journey to Asia. Ocean carriers
are now required to share information about the
export services they offer American shippers.
The Federal Maritime Commission has instituted a
Maritime Transportation Data Initiative that
commenced with industry meetings in December
2021 and will culminate in June 2022 with an
industry-wide Data Summit.

• Catalogue the status quo in maritime data
elements, metrics, transmission and access;
• Identify key gaps in data definitions/
classification; and
• Develop recommendations for common
data standards and access policies/
protocols.
The Commission’s activity is seemingly
underpinned by the adage “you can’t manage
what you can’t measure”. Collation of data sets
and identification of data gaps allow the
Commission to have greater oversight and
provides clarity and understanding about what is
underway in the shipping trade, including the
containerised goods trade.
The same issue of opaqueness in containerised
grain supply chains applies in Canada, despite its
bulk grain supply train being subject, under
statute, to regular monitoring. A bulk grain
monitoring program is commercially managed by
Quorum Corporation and supply chain participants
are required to provide data that reveals the
nature and efficiency of their services. However,
although Canadian railways collegiately reveal
their inland containerised grain movements, the
rail companies do not always know the grain
cargoes, as shippers are only required to divulge
that information if it is a hazardous material.
Another reporting problem is that around
70 per cent of grain that ends up in containers
first arrives at Canadian ports in rail wagons.
At port that grain is packed into containers. Those
container packers however are not licensed by the
Canadian Grains Commission and so are not
required to report their grain handling data.
Moreover, these entities are not keen to reveal
their data to their competitors for fear it may
reveal how well or poorly their businesses may
be performing.
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Service level (%)

Opaqueness in containerised grain supply chains
can act as a barrier to entry and can raise risk
premia in transactions. Greater transparency can
facilitate commercial exchanges and more greatly
reward training and educational services needed
by newcomers keen to engage in the trade of bulk
or containerised grain. An initial review of the
processes and many entities that form
containerised grain supply chains (McKay, 2022)
reveals that exporting grain or fodder in containers
is not a simple task. The myriad of tasks, the
many risks, the many entities, special terms and
acronyms encountered when engaging in the
export of containerised grain, fodder or seeds
reveal that the venture is complicated. To be
successful and avoid the many potential pitfalls
associated with containerised exports requires due
diligence, competence, adherence to the detail of

processes and for newcomers, reliance on advice
and skills of those already engaged in and
proficient in the export of containerised grain.
Clearly, here is an opportunity for industry and
government collaboration to collate information to
lessen the opaqueness of containerised grain
supply chains and then also invest in education or
training for prospective participants in
containerised grain export.
Although various organisations offer basic training
and education for potential exporters, the many
tasks and difficulties faced by exporting business
are rarely addressed in sufficient detail. The view
of several stakeholders engaged in containerised
grain export was that there is no readily available
source of independent, experienced information to
assist prospective entrants to the export of
containerised grain, GTA (2018) being an exception.
The experience of various participants interviewed
during the preparation of this report revealed that
when exporting via containerisation “There’s many
a slip twixt the cup and the lips!”.
A more detailed review of the policies, regulations
and industry structures that underpin
containerised grain supply chains in Australia
would likely reveal many specific opportunities for
improvement. One overdue national investigation
is to assess the economic and environmental
benefits of a consistent national approach to
modal pricing of transport services, especially road
versus rail.
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Figure 56. Performance metrics for the Port of Botany: 2016 to 2022
Source: Based on data from the NSW Transport Open Data Hub.
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The NSW government acknowledged opaqueness
in supply chains and inadequacy of access to
data, and so created a freight data hub (see
https://opendata.transport.nsw.gov.au/dataset/
freight-data). Its purpose is to collate data from
multiple sources to support evidence-driven
decisions by key stakeholders. Access to the
datasets enables charts to be generated, such as
Figure 56 that reveals how over the period 2016 to
2022, both the container turnaround times and the
stevedore service level worsened until September
2020 and then have plateaued, showing
no improvement.

Market diversification
A role of government identified by the Productivity
Commission, regarding supply chains, is to help
enlarge Australia’s market diversification. Already
the Australian Government provides financial
support to firms through Export Market
Development Grants. The Export Market
Development Grants program reimburses eligible
Australian exporters for part of their costs of
promoting, developing and expanding their
presence in overseas markets. In addition, in
December 2020, the Australian Government
announced a $42.9 million Agribusiness
Expansion Initiative:
… to scale up support to over 2000 agri food
exporters each year through Austrade’s
existing services. Austrade will also work with
industry bodies to deliver targeted advice and
trade missions (where possible) to help
exporters expand and diversify in existing and
new markets. (Austrade, sub. 46, p. 3)

As noted by the Productivity Commission,
sometimes government regulation is a useful and
required intervention in order to support
competition. Regulation should be:
• outcomes focused and not unduly
prescriptive.
• integrated and consistent with other laws,
agreements, and international obligations.
• enforceable and embody the minimum
incentives needed for effective compliance.
A further role for government to enhance market
diversification through provision of precompetitive information and analysis. The public
good nature of information (non-rivalrous and
non-excludable) can mean it is best supplied
through government action, drawing on or
sometimes requiring industry collaboration. Such
information and analysis can facilitate investment
and risk management decisions by industry,
leading to market developments and greater
market diversification from which the entire
economy can benefit.

Containerisation is often the initial pathway for
market testing and market expansion.
A further role for government is to create a
regulatory and policy environment that avoids
unnecessary impediments to domestic and
international trade. Open trading environments
allow businesses to more effectively respond to
operating uncertainties or unanticipated risks in
their supply chains, and to adapt their production
or supply chains in response to a major disruption
at a lower cost. Actively supporting and advocating
for a rules-based global trading system is a key
role for government in a country like Australia that
is trade-exposed.
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Stakeholders’ views of container
supply chain issues and solutions
Background

Respondents

The previous section listed several issues affecting
trade in containerised products, including grain
and fodder. However, it is important to ascertain
which of these issues most affects that trade yet
are amenable to alteration by Australian action. To
aid that prioritisation task grain and fodder
container packing businesses were surveyed in
February and March 2022.

Via internet searches and industry contacts, a list
of grain and fodder container packing and export
businesses operating in Australia was compiled.
We used this list to contact 85 business operators
in early February 2022 and requested their
participation in the survey. In response to this
initial contact, 29 people either partially or wholly
completed the survey. To gain more respondents,
the survey was also sent to about 20 stakeholders
via Darren White from the Australian Fodder
Exporters Association in late February. As a result,
a further 3 people completed the survey, giving a
total of 32 people who partially or wholly
completed the survey by the time of the
completion deadline in mid-March.

The issues presented in the survey were identified
by the project team after consultation with
industry stakeholders as a short-list of possible
key issues. Survey respondents were asked to
rank the relative importance of these issues and
to rate the effectiveness of government regulation,
research reports and other mechanisms for
achieving reform of Australian supply chains. The
survey questions are detailed in Appendix 5.
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Most people responding to the survey indicated
that their business was exporting more than
500 TEU per annum with Cost and Freight (CFR)
contracts being used by half of them (Figure 57).
Direct to Container Terminal (DCT) contracts were
also used as the main selling method by about
25 per cent of the respondents (Figure 58).
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Figure 57. Three-year average container export volume
of businesses operated by the survey respondents

CFR

DCT

Other

n/a

Average annual capacity (TEU)

Figure 58. Main selling method used by businesses
operated by survey respondents
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Main issues facing businesses
exporting containerised grain

Three statements received a high level of
agreement (Figure 59). Issues relating to landside
port charges increasing at short notice received
the highest number of agreement responses (26 in
total). Only two people disagreed with this
statement. Issues relating to the poor availability
of 20ft containers and the limitations of ACCC
powers with respect to shipping lines received a
high level of agreement and some partial
agreement but no disagreement.

During the second half of 2021 our project team
convened 14 formal meetings with industry
stakeholders to identify the main issues affecting
the containerised grain industry. Farmers, owners
and operators of container packing businesses,
industry representatives, port operators and
government departments were consulted during
this process. The project team then summarised
the main issues into 15 statements — one
statement for each issue. Survey respondents
were asked whether they wholly agreed, partially
agreed or did not agree with each statement.
Appendix 2 lists the full statements as they
appeared in the survey. We have used an
abbreviated form of the statements when
presenting graphical results.

More people disagreed than agreed with only one
statement. This was relating to insufficient
investment to maintain international markets. For
all other statements more people agreed than
disagreed with each statement, however as shown
in Figure 60, eight of the 15 statements received
more people partially agreeing with the
statements than wholly agreeing.

Land side port charges increase at short notice
Inadequate availability of 20 foot containers
ACCC powers do not cover shipping lines
Insufficient investment to maintain international markets
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Number of responses
Wholly agree

Don’t agree

Figure 59. Statements about supply chain issues that received the highest level of agreement or disagreement from
survey respondents
Note: See Appendix 2 for the full statements of issues
Inadequate availability of 20 foot containers
ACCC powers do not cover shipping lines
Land side port charges increase at short notice
Insufficient numbers of truck and train drivers
Privately owned ports not well regulated
Inadequate change to lesson labour disputes
Transport regulations not aligned to one standard
Inequality in modal access pricing
Insufficient port investment for large ships
Insufficient complementary investment for inland rail
Buffer zones not protected
Publicly owned assets continued to be sold off
Data on supply chains not well monitored
Biosecurity protocols inefficient
Insufficient investment to maintain international markets
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Figure 60. Number of people wholly agreeing, partially agreeing, or disagreeing with statements on issues affecting
containerised grain supply chains
Note: See Appendix 2 for the full statements of issues
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Relative importance of supply
chain issues

However, the order in which the top five issues
appeared changed slightly. For example, the issue
relating to privately owned ports being poorly
regulated received the fifth highest overall
agreement score, but its level of importance to
businesses was rated as having the third most
important impact.

To gain an understanding of the likely impact of
each issue to the respondents’ businesses we
asked them to select the five issues of most
importance to their business. The five issues
selected were placed by the respondents in order
of importance and we calculated an index to
determine the relative importance of the issues to
all respondents (see Appendix 4 for details).

The greatest change in the order of agreement
with issues and their impact on businesses came
with those falling in the lower half of the
agreement range (see Figure 62). Issues relating to
insufficient investment to maintain international
markets received the lowest level of agreement
but were rated in the top half of the business
impact range.

The five issues that received the most agreement
by respondents (see Figure 60) were also the
issues that had the greatest impact on the
respondents’ businesses (Figure 61).

Inadequate availability of 20 foot containers
Land side port charges increase at short notice
Privately owned ports not well regulated
ACCC powers do not cover shipping lines
Insufficient numbers of truck and train drivers
Insufficient investment to maintain international markets
Transport regulations not aligned to one standard
Inadequate change to lesson labour disputes
Insufficient complementary investment for inland rail
Buffer zones not protected
Data on supply chains not well monitored
Biosecurity protocols inefficient
Inequality in modal access pricing
Insufficient port investment for large ships
Publicly owned assets continued to be sold off
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Figure 61. Relative importance of containerised grain to the respondent’s business
Note: See Appendix 2 for the full statements of issues
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Agreement rank
Inadequate availability of 20 foot containers
ACCC powers do not cover shipping lines

Business impact rank
Inadequate availability of 20 foot containers
Land side port charges increase at short notice

Land side port charges increase at short notice

Privately owned ports not well regulated

Insufficient numbers of truck and train drivers

ACCC powers do not cover shipping lines

Privately owned ports not well regulated
Inadequate change to lesson labour disputes
Transport regulations not aligned to one standard
Inequality in modal access pricing
Insufficient port investment for large ships
Insufficient complementary investment for inland rail
Buffer zones not protected
Publicly owned assets continued to be sold off
Data on supply chains not well monitored
Biosecurity protocols inefficient
Insufficient investment to maintain international markets

Insufficient numbers of truck and train drivers
Insufficient investment to maintain international markets
Transport regulations not aligned to one standard
Inadequate change to lesson labour disputes
Insufficient complementary investment for inland rail
Buffer zones not protected
Data on supply chains not well monitored
Biosecurity protocols inefficient
Inequality in modal access pricing
Insufficient port investment for large ships
Publicly owned assets continued to be sold off

Figure 62. The rankings of respondents’ agreements with issue statements compared with their rankings of the
business impacts of these issues
Note: See Appendix 2 for the full statements of issues

Effect of supply chain issues
on businesses
Issues affecting containerised supply chains
described above are likely to have a range of
impacts on businesses. To determine the relative
importance of these effects we asked respondents
to rank, in order of severity, how their business
was impacted for the top five issues they
identified. The following categories were provided:
• Increased costs mostly borne by the
business.
• Less flexibility to change the volume of
container shipments at short notice.
• Increased costs mostly passed on to
customers.
• Required switching to a different service
provider (e.g. shipping line or transport
operator) to manage costs.
• Reduced reliance on container shipments
within the business.
• No direct effect on costs.

110

Improving Australia’s containerised grain exports

A business effects index was calculated with
results expressed as a proportionate score for
each of the six categories (see Appendix 5 for
more details).
Unsurprisingly, of all the issues considered, the
option of increased costs mostly borne by the
business was rated consistently higher than other
options, while no direct effect on costs was rated
as a minor effect overall (see Figure 63).
The direct effect on costs however was not
dominant for all issues. Most issues had a range
of impacts (see Table 16). The issue of publicly
owned assets continuing to be sold off was rated
as having the least effect on costs. Interestingly
also, the two transport related issues were rated
as having the highest impact that required
switching to a different service provider.

Increased costs borne by the business
Less flexibility to change container shipments
Increased cost passed on to customers
Requires switching service providers service providers
Reduced container shipments
No effect on costs
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Business effects score for all issues

Figure 63. The relative impact of supply chain issues on businesses in six areas. Ratings are averaged across
all issues
Note: See Appendix 6 for details

Table 16. The main areas where supply chain issues tend to impact respondents’ businesses
Dominant effect on cost
Issues where “Increased costs borne • Inequality in modal access pricing.
by the business” received an impact • Biosecurity protocols inefficient.
score more than 8 points higher
• Inadequate change to lesson labour disputes.
than the next highest impact.
• Land side port charges increase at short notice.
• ACCC powers do not cover shipping lines.
• Insufficient numbers of truck and train drivers.
Least effect on cost
• Publicly owned assets continued to be sold off.
Issues where “No direct effect on
cost” received a higher impact score
than “Increased costs borne by
the business”.
Highest effect on switching service providers
Issues where “Requires switching
service providers service providers”
received the highest impact score.

• Transport regulations not aligned to one standard.
• Insufficient complementary investment for inland rail.

Broad effect on businesses
Issues where the impact score was
reasonably well distributed across
all impact areas.

• Insufficient port investment for large ships.
• Data on supply chains not well monitored.
• Buffer zones not protected.
• Insufficient investment to maintain international markets.
• Privately owned ports not well regulated.
• Inadequate availability of 20ft containers.

Note: See Appendix 2 for the full statements of issues
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Mechanisms to achieve change

Government regulation was rated by most people
(9 out of 25, or 36 per cent) as the most effective
mechanism to achieve reform. Monitoring was the
next most frequently rated option (5 respondents
or 35 per cent). Self-regulation and ad-hoc enquiry
were the most frequently rated options
(20 per cent each) perceived as being not at all
effective. Slightly more than half of all
respondents considered reports, lobbying and
ad-hoc enquiries as only having some effect in
achieving reform. When converted to an
effectiveness index, government regulation was
the most effective mechanism to achieve reform
while reports were considered the least effective.

Respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness
of six potential mechanisms for obtaining
meaningful reform in containerised supply chains
(Figure 64). The six options (see Appendix 6 for
more detail) presented to respondents were:
• Reports — Research reports describing
issues and recommending actions
• Lobbying — Representative organisations
prioritising issues and lobbying for change
• Self-regulation — Industry developing
self-regulation and standards
• Government Regulation — Government
imposing new laws and regulation

When asked to rate the effectiveness of the
different mechanisms for achieving reform for
issues of most importance to their business,
respondents continued to consider government
regulation as the most effective mechanism. For
only three issues was government regulation not
rated the most effective. These issues were:

• Monitoring — Regular monitoring of prices
and logistics to inform government and
industry (e.g. by the ACCC)
• Ad-hoc government enquiry
(e.g. Productivity Commission enquiry)

• Data on supply chains being not well
monitored. Respondents considered reports
and monitoring to be equally effective as
government regulation.

Twenty-five people responded to this question
about six potential mechanisms for obtaining
meaningful reform in containerised supply chains
and were asked if the mechanism:

• Inadequate change to lesson labour
disputes. Respondents regarded
self-regulation, monitoring and ad-hoc
enquiry as being equally effective as
government regulation.

• was not at all effective;
• had some effect;
• had a reasonable effect;
• was most effective.

• Inequality in modal access pricing.
Respondents regarded reports and lobbying
as being equally effective as
government regulation.
Government regulation
Monitoring
Lobbying
Self-regulation
Ad-hoc enquiry
Reports
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Figure 64. Relative effectiveness of a range of mechanisms aimed at achieving reform in containerised
supply chains
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Correlation between project and
industry assessment

Agreement between the project team’s
recommendations and that obtained in the survey
was relatively poor. Most of the project team’s
prioritised issues (issues falling above the line in
Figure 65) were in the mid-range of issues as
assessed by survey respondents (Table 17). Four
out of the top five issues as assessed by the
survey respondents fell below the frontier of
prioritised recommendations as determined by the
project team.
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Prior to conducting the survey, the project team
independently assessed the 15 issues in terms of
their impact on the industry and the feasibility of
implementing reforms. From this assessment the
team formed a group of prioritised
recommendations consisting of issues that, in
their assessment, had both a high impact and
high feasibility of achieving reform (see Figure 65)
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Figure 65. Issues rated by the project team as having
an impact on containerised supply chains and the
feasibility of achieving reform of the issues
Note: Issues they rated to have a high impact and high
feasibility are displayed above the line. The numbers relate to
the impact ranking determined by survey respondents with the
top five issues coloured in green

Table 17. Issues subject to prioritised recommendations by the project team. Issues are listed in order of business
impact (highest impact at the top) as rated by survey respondents
Included within project
teams prioritised issue

Ranking

Issue

1

Inadequate availability of 20ft containers

2

Land side port charges increase at short notice

3

Privately owned ports not well regulated

4

ACCC powers do not cover shipping lines

5

Insufficient numbers of truck and train drivers

6

Insufficient investment to maintain international markets

yes

7

Transport regulations not aligned to one standard

yes

8

Inadequate change to lesson labour disputes

9

Insufficient complementary investment for Inland Rail

yes

10

Buffer zones not protected

yes

11

Data on supply chains not well monitored

yes

12

Biosecurity protocols inefficient

yes

13

Inequality in modal access pricing

14

Insufficient port investment for large ships

15

Publicly owned assets continued to be sold off

yes
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Part of the explanation for the observed
differences in ratings is that the survey only
targeted people involved in container packing who
most likely focused on the impacts to their
individual business when responding to questions,
rather than the industry as a whole. The project
team jointly focused on whole-of-industry impacts
and the feasibility of achieving reform through the
project’s recommendations.
Two issues were rated very differently by
respondents versus the project team. Firstly, the
lack of 20ft containers was the top issue according
to survey respondents and this was also assessed
as having a high impact by the project team (issue
number 1 in Figure 65). However, this issue did not
make the project team’s list of priorities because
the feasibility of the project’s activities having an
impact on this issue was considered to be very low.
In effect, availability of 20ft containers was assessed
by the project team to be a global structural issue
unlikely to be cost-effectively solved by any of the
project team’s recommendations
In contrast, the issue of publicly owned assets
continuing to be sold off (issue number 15 in
Figure 65 and Table 17) was rated as the least
impactful issue by survey respondents, but, was
included within the project team’s list of
prioritised issues. Survey respondents may or may
not have considered this issue as important for
the industry, yet interestingly considered it to
have a low impact on their business.
These differences in perception of issues, while,
understandable and explainable, are important
considerations when framing overall
recommendations. Additionally important are
respondents’ views regarding the perceived
effectiveness of achieving reform through industry
reports. Survey respondents considered that such
reports, which are one of the main outputs from
this project, are the least effective mechanism for
achieving reform of issues of most importance to
their business.
The survey results reveal that owners and
operators of containerised grain and fodder
businesses rate government regulation as the
most effective mechanism to achieve beneficial
reform. Of next importance is monitoring of the
container supply chains. By contrast,
self-regulation and ad-hoc enquires are rated to
be the least effective mechanisms for beneficial
reform of container supply chains.
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Relatedly, in 2022 key grain grower organisations
(e.g. Grain Producers Australia) have voiced
concerns that there needs to be independent,
expert analysis of grain supply chains and
competition in the grain market (Heard, 2022).
The call has been for an ACCC inquiry into the
structure of the grains industry. In response, the
deputy chair of the ACCC, Mick Keogh, has
indicated that such an industry inquiry would be
useful, allowing a close analysis of margins
through the supply chain. However, he has also
added that without statutory powers to gather the
required information from industry players, such a
review would not be particularly useful.
So here is a potential example of government
failure where in the grains industry in general, but
also in the particular case of the export of
containerised grain and fodder, the owners and
operators of containerised grain and fodder
businesses consider government regulation as the
most effective mechanism to achieve beneficial
reform; yet a body like the ACCC that could best
inform and evince that regulatory and monitoring
power lacks the legislative teeth to gather the
required information.
As stated by at the start of this report by Joseph
Stiglitz (2021), a Nobel laureate in economics
— “We must work to correct market failures and
government failures. It is a never-ending struggle
to create good institutions.” In short, governments
need to do more than just commission reports
that outline issues and opportunities affecting
container supply chains. Governments need to
ensure that grain supply chain businesses and
service providers are subject to monitoring,
scrutiny and regulation (where required) to ensure
that the wider Australian economy and not just a
handful of entities within those supply chains are
beneficiaries of the operations of those
supply chains.
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Appendices
Appendix 1.

How much grain or hay can be packed in a container?

How much grain or hay that can be packed in a
container is an important economic consideration
as it affects the per tonne costs of handling and
transport of that containerised product. The
amount of grain or hay loaded into a container
depends on a few factors such as the type of
container (20ft or 40ft), the bulk density of the
product and road transport load weight limitations.
The typical bulk densities of various grains and
hay are listed in Table A1.
Table A1. Bulk densities of different grains
Grain type

Bulk density
(kg/hl)

Lupins

78

Lucerne seed

76

Wheat

75

Mung beans

75

Chickpeas

74

Canola

67

Barley

65

Oats

50

Sunflower

40

Oaten hay

15

A typical 20ft container with a rating of 30 tonne,
tare of 2.4 tonne and volume of 33m3
(330 hectolitres) will be able to be fully loaded
with any of the grains listed in Table A1. However,
a 40ft container is often only packed up to road
transport load limits. For example, to load a 40ft
container to a gross weight of 30 tonnes with a
grain of bulk density 75 kg/hl (600kg/m3), given
that the tare of the container is 4 tonnes and the
internal floor area is 27.8 m2, the height to fill
inside the container is 1.25 metres. Note, the
internal height of a 40ft container is 2.39 metres
so in this example the container would be around
half full.
The exact formula for determining the packing of
the 40ft container is:
Height of grain inside the container = [Grain
weight (gross allowable weight of the
container-its tare weight) (tonnes)] divided by
[Floor area of container (m2) x Grain bulk
density (kg/m3)]
Applying this formula reveals that the lighter
(i.e., the less dense) is a grain, the greater the
volume of the 40ft container that can be packed.
Oaten hay and grains like oats or sunflower can
be more easily be fully packed into a 40ft
container than dense grains like lupins or wheat.
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Appendix 2. Bulk Handlers’ delivery routes
Table A2. Routes used to compare Viterra’s freight charges across available years
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Origin

Destination

Origin

Destination

Arno Bay

Port Lincoln

Lock

Port Lincoln

Booleroo Centre

Wallaroo

Loxton

Outer Harbor

Bordertown

Outer Harbor

Pinnaroo

Outer Harbor

Buckleboo

Port Lincoln

Poochera

Thevenard

Darke Peak

Port Lincoln

Rudall

Port Lincoln

Elliston

Port Lincoln

Streaky Bay

Thevenard

Gladstone

Outer Harbor

Tailem Bend

Outer Harbor

Kapinnie

Port Lincoln

Warramboo

Port Lincoln

Keith

Outer Harbor

Wirrulla

Thevenard

Kimba

Port Lincoln

Witera

Thevenard

Lameroo

Outer Harbor

Wudinna

Port Lincoln

Improving Australia’s containerised grain exports

Table A3. Routes used to compare CBH freight charges across available years
Origin

Destination

Origin

Destination

Origin

Destination

Ainsworth

Kwinana

Gnowangerup

Albany

Mullewa

Geraldton

Aldersyde

Kwinana

Goodlands

Kwinana

Munglinup

Esperance

Ardath

Kwinana

Goomalling

Kwinana

Narembeen

Kwinana

Arrino

Geraldton

Hyden

Albany

Narrogin

Kwinana

Avon

Kwinana

Jacup

Albany

Nembudding

Kwinana

Ballidu

Kwinana

Jennacubbine

Kwinana

Newdegate

Albany

Beacon

Kwinana

Jerramungup

Albany

Nomans Lake

Kwinana

Beaumont

Esperance

Jubuk

Kwinana

Nungarin

Kwinana

Bencubbin

Kwinana

Kalannie

Kwinana

Nyabing

Albany

Bokal

Albany

Karlgarin

Albany

Ongerup

Albany

Bolgart

Kwinana

Katanning

Albany

Perenjori

Geraldton

Borden

Albany

Kellerberrin

Kwinana

Piawaning

Kwinana

Boyup Brook

Albany

Kirwan

Kwinana

Pingrup

Albany

Brookton

Kwinana

Kodj Kodjin

Kwinana

Pithara

Kwinana

Broomehill

Albany

Kojonup

Albany

Quairading

Kwinana

Bruce Rock

Kwinana

Kondinin

Kwinana

Ravensthorpe

Esperance

Bullaring

Kwinana

Konnongorring

Kwinana

Regans Ford

Kwinana

Bulyee

Kwinana

Koorda

Kwinana

Salmon Gums

Esperance

Bunjil

Geraldton

Korbelka

Kwinana

Shackleton

Kwinana

Cadoux

Kwinana

Kukerin

Albany

Three Springs

Geraldton

Calingiri

Kwinana

Kulin

Kwinana

Trayning

Kwinana

Canna

Geraldton

Lake Grace

Albany

Wagin

Albany

Carnamah

Geraldton

Lake King

Esperance

Watercarrin

Kwinana

Cascades

Esperance

Lake Varley

Esperance

Watheroo

Kwinana

Cleary

Kwinana

Latham

Geraldton

Wellstead

Albany

Coorow

Geraldton

Manmanning

Kwinana

West River

Esperance

Corrigin

Kwinana

Marchagee

Geraldton

Wickepin

Kwinana

Cunderdin

Kwinana

Mawson

Kwinana

Wilgoyne

Kwinana

Dale

Kwinana

Mclevie

Kwinana

Woodanilling

Albany

Darkan

Albany

Meckering

Kwinana

Wubin

Kwinana

Doodlakine

Kwinana

Merredin

Kwinana

Wyalkatchem

Kwinana

Dowerin

Kwinana

Miling

Kwinana

Yarding

Kwinana

Dudinin

Kwinana

Mindarabin

Albany

Yealering

Kwinana

Dumbleyung

Albany

Mingenew

Geraldton

Yerecoin

Kwinana

Ejanding

Kwinana

Mogumber

Kwinana

York

Kwinana

Gabbin

Kwinana

Moora

Kwinana

Yorkrakine

Kwinana

Gairdner

Albany

Morawa

Geraldton
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Appendix 3. Information sources for the bulk supply chain
analysis
Table A4. References to data sets and documents considered in the supply chain analysis
Supply chain
segment

Historical Data

Data for 2021

Data for 2022

Freight

Stretch et al. 2014

• CBH 2020c

• CBH 2021c

White et al., 2018

• Viterra 2020b

• Viterra 2021b

• Viterra 2020c
• Viterra 2020d
• Viterra 2020e

Receival sites

Warehouse
storage

White et al., 2018

• GTA 2020a

• GTA 2021a

• GTA 2020b

• GTA 2021b

• GTA 2020c

• GTA 2021c

• GTA 2020a

• GTA 2021a

• GTA 2020b

• GTA 2021b

• GTA 2020c

• GTA 2021c

• GTA 2020d

• GTA 2021d

• GTA 2020e

• GTA 2021e

Stretch et al. 2014

• CBH 2020a

• CBH 2021a

White et al., 2018

• Viterra 2020a

• Viterra 2021a

• GrainFlow 2020a

• GrainFlow 2021

• GrainFlow 2020b
• GrainCorp 2020a

• GrainCorp 2021a

• Emerald 2020
Port loading

Stretch et al. 2014

• CBH 2020b

• CBH 2021b

White et al., 2018

• Viterra 2020a

• Viterra 2021a

• Flinders Ports 2020

• Flinders Ports 2021

• Emerald 2020
• Port of Melbourne 2020
• GrainCorp 2020b

• GrainCorp 2021b

• Australian Amalgamated
Terminals 2020

• Australian Amalgamated
Terminals 2021

• Quattro 2020
• NAT 2020
• NSW Ports 2020
Shipping

White et al., 2018

• Baltic Exchange 2021
• Ship and Bunker 2021
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Appendix 4. Assumptions for estimating international sea freight
rates on various routes
The shipping freights consider a speed of 14 knots consuming 32t of fuel oil per day. The routes
considered were:
• P3A_82 (Panamax Japan-S Korea Transpacific round voyage)
• P4_82 (Panamax Japan-S Korea trip to Skaw Passero)
• P5_82 (Panamax South China, Indonesian round voyage (BEP Asia))
• P6_82 (Panamax Singapore round voyage via Atlantic)
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Appendix 5. Screen shots of questions used in the survey
What is your average (3 yr average) container export volume in TEU?
0–10

10–50

50–100

100–500

500+

n/a













Do you sell mainly CFR or DCT?





Q1:

CFR
DCT
Other (Specify)
n/a

Issues reducing the effectiveness of containerised supply chains.
Stakeholder consultation has identified 15 issues affecting containerised grain supply
chains. Please indicate your level of agreement with these issues:
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Don’t
agree

Partially
agree

Wholly
agree

Publicly-owned container port assets and supply chain
infrastructure continue to be sold-off.







Investments and technology change that lessen disruption to
container supply chains from labour disputes are inadequate.







Land-side port charges are increased with short notice and are
not regulated.







Many biosecurity protocols and processes are inefficient and are
not cost-effective.







There is insufficient number of heavy vehicle truck drivers and
train drivers.







Container and bulk supply chain services are not well monitored
so data is not available to support policy-making and
investment decisions.







There is insufficient investment in port capability to
accommodate larger container ships.
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Q2: Relative importance of containerised supply chain issues.
Please drag 5 issues from the left column into the right column, and place in order of
importance to your business. These TOP 5 issues will be used within the questions later
in the survey.
Items to Rank

Most important

Ports are now mostly privately-owned acting in
their own interest with little regulatory control
(e.g., opening days, hours and pricing).

Publicly-owned container port assets and supply
chain infrastructure continue to be sold-off.

Container and bulk supply chain services are not
well monitored so data is not available to support
policy-making and investment decisions.
Least important
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Appendix 5. Screen shots of questions used in the survey (continued)

Q3: Effect on your business.
In general, how has the following supply chain issue affected your business costs?
Land-side port charges are increased with short notice and are not regulated.
Items to Rank

Highest Impact

Increased costs mostly passed on to customers.

Less flexibility to change the volume of container
shipments at short notice.
Required switching to a different service provider
(e.g. shipping line or transport operator) to
manage costs.
No direct effect on costs.

Increased costs mostly borne by the business.

Reduced reliance on container shipments within
the business.
Lowest Impact
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Q4: Mechanisms to achieve change
In general, how effective are the following mechanisms in generating meaningful
reforms in the supply chain?
Please rate the following
Not at all

Some effect

Reasonable
effect

Most
effective

Reports — Research reports describing
issues and recommending actions









Lobbying — Representative organisations
prioritising issues and lobbying for change









Self-regulation — Industry developing
self-regulation and standards









Govt. Regulation — Government imposing
new laws and regulation









Monitoring — Regular monitoring of prices
and logistics to inform government and
industry (e.g. by the ACCC)









Ad-hoc Enquiry — Ad-hoc government
enquiry (e.g. Productivity Commission
enquiry)









Q5: Best mechanisms to resolve issues
If there are any other issues or solutions that we haven’t considered, please outline
briefly in the text box below.
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4

4 of Australia’s top
5 container ports
are in the worstperforming 15 per cent
of global ports

128

Improving Australia’s containerised grain exports

Appendix 6. Statements of issues affecting containerised
supply chains
Respondents were asked to consider 15 statements on issues affecting containerised grain supply
chains. The full statements presented to respondents are listed in Table A5.
Table A5. Issues as stated to survey participants and the abbreviated form used to present data in this report
Issue as presented in the survey

Restated issue for ease of presentation in this report

Ports are now mostly privately-owned acting in their
own interest with little regulatory control (e.g., opening
days, hours and pricing).

Privately owned ports not well regulated

Publicly-owned container port assets and supply chain
infrastructure continue to be sold-off.

Publicly owned assets continued to be sold off

Container and bulk supply chain services are not well
monitored so data is not available to support
policy-making and investment decisions.

Data on supply chains not well monitored

Many biosecurity protocols and processes are inefficient Biosecurity protocols inefficient
and are not cost-effective.
There is insufficient complementary investment to
inland rail to support cost-effective movement of
containerised grain and fodder

Insufficient complementary investment for inland rail

There are insufficient resources committed to
maintaining and enlarging international market access
for Australian grains and fodder.

Insufficient investment to maintain international
markets

Buffer zones for least-cost grain pathways are not
actively protected.

Buffer zones not protected

Heavy road transport regulations are not well aligned to
enable one national standard.

Transport regulations not aligned to one standard

Land-side port charges are increased with short notice
and are not regulated.

Land side port charges increase at short notice

Investments and technology change that lessen
disruption to container supply chains from labour
disputes are inadequate.

Inadequate change to lesson labour disputes

There is inadequate availability of 20 foot food-grade
containers.

Inadequate availability of 20 foot containers

There is an insufficient number of heavy vehicle truck
drivers and train drivers.

Insufficient numbers of truck and train drivers

There is insufficient investment in port capability to
accommodate larger container ships.

Insufficient port investment for large ships

The powers of the ACCC to enhance competition, do not
cover shipping lines.

ACCC powers do not cover shipping lines

Equality in modal access pricing (i.e., rail v road) is not
being maintained (e.g. inclusion of congestion impacts,
emissions and accident risk)

Inequality in modal access pricing
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Appendix 7. Agreement Score
An agreement score to estimate the overall level of agreement with the statements listed in Table A5 was
calculated by weighting the number of times participants either disagreed, partially agreed or wholly
agreed with a statement, then multiplying that count by either 1, 2 or 3 respectively. For example the
agreement score of 63 for the issues “Insufficient investment to maintain international markets” (first
issue listed in Table A6) was calculated as (9x1)+(15x2)+(8x3)=6
Table A6. Number of times respondents either did not agree, partially agreed or wholly agreed with the issues stated
as affecting containerised grain supply chains and the calculated agreement score
Don’t agree
count

Partially
agree count

Wholly agree
count

Agreement
score

Insufficient investment to maintain international
markets

9

15

8

63

Biosecurity protocols inefficient

7

14

11

68

Data on supply chains not well monitored

6

15

11

69

Publicly owned assets continued to be sold off

5

15

12

71

Buffer zones not protected

2

20

10

72

Insufficient complementary investment for
inland rail

3

15

14

75

Insufficient port investment for large ships

2

15

15

77

Inequality in modal access pricing

0

19

13

77

Transport regulations not aligned to one standard

3

12

17

78

Inadequate change to lesson labour disputes

2

14

16

78

Privately owned ports not well regulated

3

9

20

81

Insufficient numbers of truck and train drivers

2

9

21

83

Land side port charges increase at short notice

2

4

26

88

ACCC powers do not cover shipping lines

0

8

24

88

Inadequate availability of 20ft containers

0

7

25

89

Issue
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Appendix 8. Business Impact Index
A business impact index was calculated by weighting the number of responses received in each category
by the inverse to which it was ranked. For example the impact index of 7 for the issue “Publicly owned
assets continued to be sold off” (first issue listed in Table A7) was calculated as
(0x5)+(1x4)+(0x3)+(1x2)+(1x1)=7
Table A7. Number of times (count) issues were placed in order of importance from 1 — most important to 5 — least
important (e.g. the issue of inadequate availability of 20 foot containers was rated as most important on seven
occasions.) and its impact index (calculated as described above)
Issue

Rated as Rated as Rated as Rated as Rated as
1 count 2 count 3 count 4 count 5 count

Impact
index

Publicly owned assets continued to be sold off

0

1

0

1

1

7

Insufficient port investment for large ships

0

0

1

2

3

10

Inequality in modal access pricing

0

1

0

3

1

11

Biosecurity protocols inefficient

0

2

1

0

2

13

Data on supply chains not well monitored

0

1

1

2

3

14

Buffer zones not protected

1

1

2

0

1

16

Insufficient complementary investment for
inland rail

1

0

1

3

3

17

Inadequate change to lesson labour disputes

1

2

1

0

2

18

Transport regulations not aligned to one
standard

0

2

3

4

0

25

Insufficient investment to maintain
international markets

4

0

2

1

0

28

Insufficient numbers of truck and train drivers

1

3

5

1

3

37

ACCC powers do not cover shipping lines

3

2

4

1

1

38

Privately owned ports not well regulated

4

3

0

4

4

44

Land side port charges increase at short notice

6

6

3

1

2

67

Inadequate availability of 20ft containers

7

4

4

5

2

75
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Appendix 9. Business Effects Index
A business effects index was calculated by weighting, for each issue, the number of responses received
in each category by the inverse to which it was ranked. In order to emphasise the differences between
categories, weightings were increased or decreased for the upper and lower ratings respectively (i.e. 8 —
ranked 1st, 7 — ranked 2nd, 4 — ranked 3rd, 3 — ranked 4th, 1.5 — ranked 5th, 0.5 — ranked 6th).
Issues received different numbers of responses because respondents only rated their top five issues.
This meant that issues that received a high agreement score fell into respondents’ top five issues more
frequently than issues that received a low agreement score, and consequently received a higher number
of rating responses. In order to compare across issues with different numbers of responses, results were
expressed as a proportion of the total index score.
a) Privately owned ports not well regulated

h) Transport regul

Increased costs borne by the business

Increas

Less flexibility to change container shipments

Less flexibility

Increase

Increased cost passed on to customers

Requires switching ser

Requires switching service providers service providers
Reduced container shipments
No effect on costs
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

b) Data on supply chains not well monitored

i) Land side port ch

Increased costs borne by the business

Increas

Less flexibility to change container shipments

Less flexibility

Increased cost passed on to customers

Increase

Requires switching service providers service providers

Requires switching ser

Reduced container shipments
No effect on costs
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

c) Publicly owned assets continued to be sold off

j) Inadequate chang

Increased costs borne by the business

Increas

Less flexibility to change container shipments

Less flexibility

Increase

Increased cost passed on to customers

Requires switching ser

Requires switching service providers service providers
Reduced container shipments
No effect on costs
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

Biosecurity
protocols
inefficient
Figured)A1.
The business
effect index
for each of 15 issues rated by responses. Note respondents only rated their
top five issues so different issues received different numbers of ratings
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k) Inadequate avail

Increased costs borne by the business

Increas

Less flexibility to change container shipments

Less flexibility
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Increased cost passed on to customers

Increase

Requires switching service providers service providers

Requires switching serv

Reduced container shipments

R

No effect on costs
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

c) Publicly owned assets continued to be sold off

j) Inadequate change

Increased costs borne by the business

Increased

Less flexibility to change container shipments

Less flexibility to

Increased cost passed on to customers

Increased

Requires switching service providers service providers

Requires switching servic

Reduced container shipments

R

No effect on costs
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

d) Biosecurity protocols inefficient

k) Inadequate availab

Increased costs borne by the business

Increased

Less flexibility to change container shipments

Less flexibility to

Increased cost passed on to customers

Increased

Requires switching service providers service providers

Requires switching servic

Reduced container shipments

R

No effect on costs
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

e) Insufficient complementary investment for inland rail

l) Insufficient numbe

Increased costs borne by the business

Increased

Less flexibility to change container shipments

Less flexibility to

Increased cost passed on to customers

Increased

Requires switching service providers service providers

Requires switching servic

Reduced container shipments

R

No effect on costs
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

f) Insufficient investment to maintain international markets

m) Insufficient port i

Increased costs borne by the business

Increased

Less flexibility to change container shipments

Less flexibility to

Increased cost passed on to customers

Increased

Requires switching service providers service providers

Requires switching servic

Reduced container shipments

R

No effect on costs
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

g) Buffer zones not protected

n) ACCC powers do n

Increased costs borne by the business

Increased

Less flexibility to change container shipments

Less flexibility to

Increased cost passed on to customers

Increased

Requires switching service providers service providers

Requires switching servic

Reduced container shipments
No effect on costs
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

Figure A1 The business effect index for each of 15 issues rated by responses. Note respondents only rated their
top five issues so different issues received different numbers of ratings (cont.)

o) Inequality in moda

Increased
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Increased

Requires switching servic

Appendix 9. Business Effects Index (continued)

h) Transport regulations not aligned to one standard
Increased costs borne by the business
Less flexibility to change container shipments
Increased cost passed on to customers
Requires switching service providers service providers
Reduced container shipments
No effect on costs
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i) Land side port charges increase at short notice
Increased costs borne by the business
Less flexibility to change container shipments
Increased cost passed on to customers
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Reduced container shipments
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j) Inadequate change to lesson labour disputes
Increased costs borne by the business
Less flexibility to change container shipments
Increased cost passed on to customers
Requires switching service providers service providers
Reduced container shipments
No effect on costs
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k) Inadequate availability of 20' containers
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top five issues so different issues received different numbers of ratings (cont.)
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Increased cost passed on to customers

Requires switching service providers service providers

Reduced container shipments
No effect on costs
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k) Inadequate availability of 20' containers
Increased costs borne by the business
Less flexibility to change container shipments
Increased cost passed on to customers
Requires switching service providers service providers
Reduced container shipments
No effect on costs
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m) Insufficient port investment for large ships
Increased costs borne by the business
Less flexibility to change container shipments
Increased cost passed on to customers
Requires switching service providers service providers
Reduced container shipments
No effect on costs
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n) ACCC powers do not cover shipping lines
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Increased cost passed on to customers
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Reduced container shipments
No effect on costs
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o) Inequality in modal access pricing
Increased costs borne by the business
Less flexibility to change container shipments
Increased cost passed on to customers
Requires switching service providers service providers
Reduced container shipments
No effect on costs

Figure A1 The business effect index for each of 15 issues rated by responses. Note respondents only rated their
top five issues so different issues received different numbers of ratings (cont.)
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Appendix 10. Reform effectiveness index
A reform effectiveness index was calculated by weighting, for each issue, the number of responses
received in each category using a linear scale (i.e. 1 — no effect, 2 — some effect, 3 — reasonable effect,
4 — most effective). In addition, as with the business effects index, in order to compare across issues
with different numbers of responses, results were expressed as a proportion of the total index score
(Table A8).
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Transport regulations not
aligned to one standard
Land side port charges increase
at short notice
Inadequate change to lesson
labour disputes
Inadequate availability of 20
foot containers
Insufficient numbers of truck
and train drivers
Insufficient port investment for
large ships
ACCC powers do not cover
shipping lines
Inequality in modal access
pricing

Buffer zones not protected

Insufficient complementary
investment for inland rail
Insufficient investment to
maintain international markets

Biosecurity protocols inefficient

Mechanism for
reform

Privately owned ports not well
regulated
Publicly owned assets continued
to be sold off
Data on supply chains not well
monitored

Table A8. Number of times respondents indicated different mechanisms were effective at achieving reform of issues
affecting containerised grain supply chains

Reports

1

0

3

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

2

Lobbying

4

0

1

1

1

2

1

4

2

0

4

4

1

3

2

Self-regulation

1

0

0

0

2

2

0

2

1

2

5

4

0

0

1

Govt. regulation

13

2

3

4

6

4

2

7

15

2

10

6

5

8

2

Monitoring

4

0

3

1

1

0

1

0

5

2

6

3

0

4

0

Ad-hoc enquiry

3

0

2

1

1

0

0

1

2

2

3

1

1

3

0
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Appendix 11. Explaining the surge in container rates
The initial outbreak of COVID forced China and its
neighbours into national lockdowns at the end of
2019. The region is the world’s main source of
manufactured goods yet COVID caused a shutdown
initially in the region’s manufacturing sectors.
Cargo ships already en route out of Asia dropped
off hundreds of thousands of containers full of
goods in ports across the Americas — but because
of pandemic restrictions, they could not load
those containers back up with new products to
send back to Asia. Instead, the containers piled up
in ports and inland rail depots.
By the end of 2020, Asian manufacturing was fully
recovered. Simultaneously, under COVID, most
international households had increased their
savings (Figure A2) and increased their

expenditure on home improvements (Figure A3),
face masks and sanitisers, rather than personal
services like dining-out or attending live shows.
Despite people having a pent-up demand for
tourism (Figure A3), the reality of prolonged
restrictions on travel, lock-downs and a greater
acceptance of working from home arrangements
by employers meant most households upgraded
various features of their home or accommodation
to make living and working at home more
enjoyable and productive. The upshot of the
enhanced and sustained demand for homewares
and face masks, when combined with China being
the principal source of those products, was an
increased Chinese demand for empty containers.

China
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United Kingdom
Japan
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United States
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Excess savings as a percentage of GDP (%)

Figure A2. Excess savings as a percentage of country GDP
Source: American Express and BCG.
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Appendix 11. Explaining the surge in container rates (continued)

Survey respondents (%)
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Figure A3. Top purchases that consumers are saving for in 2021
Source: American Express and BCG.

However, previously congested ports struggled to
load and unload containers fast enough to keep
up with the flow of ships. Many ships, already
running behind schedule because of congestion at
ports, left their empty containers behind rather
than wait days to load them back onboard.
Consequently, empty containers continued to pile
up at major receiving ports, whilst their supply
lessened at major export hubs.
The early months of the global spread of COVID in
2020 caused a curtailment in global shipping, as
borders closed, factories shut down and
households faced lock-downs and reduced
incomes. Labour management issues in many
supply chains arose and logistics management
quickly became problematic. Timely access to
ports and port facilities worsened. Container port
congestion became a widespread problem. Trade
flows from China were hugely curtailed (Figure A4)
for a few months. Then as demand for homewares
emerged across the globe, but principally in the
wealthier regions of Europe and North America,
traders looked to China as the principal source of
those products.
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China initially controlled the spread of COVID and
re-opened its factories, boosting its supply of
those products. Trade flows re-emerged in
2020–21, surpassing the value of pre-COVID levels,
as shown by the example of China’s trade with the
USA (Figure A4).
The impact of the shifts in demand for goods
packed in containers; and the inability of shippers
and container suppliers to easily or quickly
increase the flow of containers to and from China
caused a prolonged price spike in container rates.
The pricing and revenue impacts are illustrated in
Figure A5 and Figure A6. The shaded rectangles in
Figure A5 and Figure A6 show the revenue being
earned by the shipping container industry; with
most of the revenue being generated by the lift in
the unit price of accessing containers.

Monthly trade (USD billion)
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Price of containers

Price of containers

Figure A4. Monthly trade flows between China and the USA: March 2016 to July 2021

Quantity of containers
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Total demand for containers
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Figure A5. Illustration of demand and supply conditions
for containers in 2018

Quantity of containers
Containerised grain demand
Container demand for other goods
Total demand for containers
Total supply of containers
Revenue

Figure A6. Illustration of demand and supply conditions
for containers in 2021
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Appendix 11. Explaining the surge in container rates (continued)
The supply of containers and ships that carried
containers during 2020 and 2021 is characterised
by what economists call a price inelasticity of
supply. Explaining more; COVID disrupted most
industry supply chains and manufacturing activity.
Quickly and cheaply building more ships to
increase the global flow of containers in 2020 and
2021 was not possible. Similarly, a rapid increase
in the construction of new containers was not
feasible. Moreover, congestion and demurrage
issues at many main ports, especially during the
early phases of COVID meant that the existing fleet
of ships and containers could not efficiently and
speedily move goods between various markets
and regions. With the size of the container
shipping fleet being largely inflexible and
constraints also applying to the construction and
flow of containers, the supply of containers was
what economists call inelastic. In effect the supply
of containers was restricted so rationing of
containers to end users then occurred through
price increases. Fuelling those price increases was
firstly the enhanced demand for homewares, and
related products, principally transported in
containers from China. Secondly, Australia
experienced a wave of industrial action at its ports
as maritime workers sought to capitalise on the
enhanced demand for containerised goods. For
example, in 2020 union action reduced Patrick
Terminals’ operations in Sydney to around
50–60 per cent of usual levels, generating a
backlog of 90,000 containers.
Simultaneously higher infrastructure charges were
introduced by stevedore companies. For example,
in July 2020, Hutchison Ports increased its charges
on containers delivered to and from its facility in
Brisbane by 9 per cent. VICT in Melbourne also
imposed a 7 per cent increase in their charges.
Despite container volumes dropping, total
operating profit margins for stevedores increased
for the first time in a decade, from 5.8 per cent in
2018–19 to 9.9 per cent in 2019–20. Yet the costs of
those stevedore charges were being paid by the
importers and exporters of containerised goods.
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To worsen the commercial reward for importing or
exporting containerised goods, shipping
companies imposed port congestion charges of up
to US$350 per TEU in September 2020. The
shipping line MSC announced a US$300 per TEU
Sydney port congestion surcharge, whilst CMA
CGM’s ANL announced an equivalent surcharge.
As a result, grain exporters, for example, needed
to absorb an extra AU$17 per tonne of direct costs.
These congestion charges continued until
March 2021.
A casualty of the increased costliness of exporting
goods in containers has been the trade of
containerised grain. In the fiercely competitive
world of grain trading often the margins on grain
trades are relatively small. Hence, unanticipated
cost increases, or failures in supply chain services
rapidly and often completely eroded profit
margins. Compared to other goods with attractive
profit margins on each container load, grain
containers attract small profit margins. Hence, the
capacity of containerised grain traders to readily
absorb the price increases in container rates,
along with disruptions to schedules and
congestion costs was limited.
Despite an increased demand for containerised
grain due to increases in regional populations and
aggregate incomes; cost-effectively satisfying that
demand became problematic and throughout 2020
and 2021 was often unprofitable or barely
profitable, forcing a diminution of the container
trade in grain.

Appendix 12. The US Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2021
Section-by-Section Summary
Section 1: Short Bill Title
Section 2: Purposes
• Updates and improves the purposes of the
Shipping Act to better reflect current
federal policy governing international
ocean shipping.
• Directs the FMC to promote fleet of
US-flagged vessels to meet commercial
needs, not just national security.
• Establishes reciprocal trade as part of
FMC’s mission in enforcing the
Shipping Act.
Section 3: Service Contracts
• Authorizes the FMC to stipulate additional
minimum requirements for service
contracts by ocean common carriers, at the
agency’s discretion.
• Expands the FMC’s unreasonable practice
jurisdiction to service contracts when an
ocean common carrier is engaging in unfair
contracting practices on a
widespread basis.
Section 4: Shipping Exchange Registry
• Establishes new authority for the FMC to
register shipping exchanges and issue
licenses for registered exchanges
to operate.
• Licensing will ensure industry-wide
compliance with federal law and FMC
regulations for ocean shipping industry and
promote widespread adoption of
best practices.
• Allows FMC to exempt licensing only for
shipping exchanges with equivalent
regulatory supervision in their
home country.

Section 5: Prohibition on Retaliation
• Applies anti-retaliation safeguards to all
regulated entities and protects those filing
complaints about potentially unlawful
conduct or anticompetitive business
practices to the FMC.
Section 6: Public Disclosure
• Requires the FMC to publish online all
findings of false certifications for
demurrage and detention charges and any
resulting penalties imposed.
• Enhances public transparency for FMC
actions and bad actors in ocean
shipping industry.
Section 7: Common Carriers
• Updates requirements on ocean common
carriers to incorporate best practices in the
shipping industry.
• Prohibits ocean common carriers from
unreasonably declining export cargo
bookings if the cargo can be loaded in a
safe and timely manner.
• Requires ocean common carriers or marine
terminal operators to certify that any
demurrage or detention charge complies
with FMC regulations, or face penalties.
• Limited exemption for marine terminal
operators for any terminal detention or
demurrage charges if such charges are
based on public port tariffs set under
State law.
• Effectively codifies the FMC’s “Interpretive
Rule on Demurrage and Detention Under
the Shipping Act” (Docket No. 19-05).
• Obligates ocean carriers to adhere to
minimum service standards that meet the
public interest, determined by the FMC in
new required rulemaking.
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•

Requires ocean carriers or marine terminal
operators to maintain all records regarding
invoiced demurrage or detention charges for
at least 5 years and provide such records to
the FMC or invoiced party on request.

• Shifts burden of proof in any proceeding
with the FMC regarding the reasonableness
of demurrage or detention charges from the
invoiced party to the ocean carrier or
marine terminal operator.
• Prohibits ocean carriers from declining
opportunities for U.S. exports unreasonably,
as determined by the FMC in new
required rulemaking.
Section 8: Assessment of Penalties
• Authorizes the FMC to order refund relief in
addition to civil penalties in enforcement
proceedings.
Section 9: Data Collection
• Requires ocean common carriers to report
to the FMC each calendar quarter on total
import/export tonnage and twenty-foot
equivalent units (loaded/empty) per vessel
that makes port in the United States.
Section 10: Complaints
• Permits third-party challenges to
anticompetitive agreements for complaints
filed with the FMC
• Establishes new, separate process for
addressing demurrage and detention
complaints, allowing the FMC to take a
more active role in investigating such
complaints. Currently, many shippers are
reluctant to file complaints due to the
complexity, expense, and time involved
with the adjudication of such complaints.
• Allows FMC to order automatic and full
refund of any detention and demurrage
charges paid if accompanied by a
certification of compliance with federal law/
regulations found to be false due
to negligence.
Section 11: Investigations
• Authorizes the FMC to self-initiate
investigations of additional carrier practices
and apply enforcement measures,
as appropriate.
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Section 12: Award of Additional Amounts
• Authorizes the FMC to order double
reparations for violations of existing
prohibition (under 46 U.S.C. § 41102(c)) on
unjust or unreasonable practices in
handling property by ocean common
carriers, marine terminal operators, or
ocean transportation intermediaries.
• Also authorizes the FMC to order double
reparations for knowingly false certification
of compliance with federal law/regulations
required to accompany any detention and
demurrage charge.
Section 13: Injunctive Relief
• Permits third-party intervenors in court
proceedings initiated by the FMC seeking
injunctive relief against agreements that
reduce competition in the ocean
shipping industry.
Section 14: Enforcement of Reparation Orders
• Authorizes parties owed refund ordered by
the FMC to seek enforcement of that
payment in federal district court.
Section 15: National Shipper Advisory Committee
• Specifies that newly established and
Congressionally authorized Advisory
Committee may include customs brokers
and freight forwarders who participate in
ocean shipping commerce.
Section 16: Annual Report to Congress
• Adds reporting on anticompetitive business
practices, nonreciprocal trade practices, or
other factors exacerbating the United
States’ trade imbalance with foreign
exporting countries in the FMC’s annual
report to Congress required under
current law.
• Directs FMC to examine foreign state control
or undue influence over ocean carriers’
business practices and ramifications for the
global shipping industry.
Section 17: Technical Amendments
• Corrects typos, errors, and outdated
citations in current law pertaining to the
Federal Maritime Commission or the
Shipping Act.
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